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INDIA'S OLDEST JOURNAL ON DEFENCE AFFAIRS

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- India's Security in the 1990's *– Prof K R Singh*
- India is Totally Safe Against
A Military Coup *– Lt Gen Dr ML Chibber (Retd)*
- The Reorganisation of Central
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- Higher Defence & National
Security Management—
A Flawed Structure *– Wg Cdr Amar Zutshi (Retd)*
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OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1989

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Planning is Profitable

The expenditure on defence in India, which was only Rs. 167.5 crores in 1948-49, when we attained independence, has grown more than 80 times to Rs. 13,000 crores in 1988-89. At this rate it is expected that by the end of the century, if not earlier, it could reach a figure of Rs. 50,000 crores. One could, without further questioning, accept this escalation in the cost of security as a necessary premium we have to pay. After all, national security is the prime responsibility of nations.

Steady increase in military spending has been a global phenomenon over the years. Due to geo-strategic compulsions and a variety of domestic and external threats and challenges to India's security, the growing trend in India's military budget cannot be demurred. However, it is a legitimate question whether we are getting the maximum security at this cost, and whether the import of costly foreign weapon systems can be avoided by adequate planning in advance for indigenous development and cost-effective production of such systems.

While doing some introspection on the issue of self-reliance, it seems that our planning process must be geared to a policy of assessing the long-term requirements for the defence of our country instead of the present ineffective approach. In order to achieve this goal, it will be appropriate if the Research and Development(R&D), the production organisations and the users (the three services) can sit down and reflect on the causes of our failure in the field of self-reliance in major defence equipment.

It is time for us to attend to the woeful inadequacy of long-term planning for our defence and security needs, despite the existence of several high-level planning bodies in the Defence Ministry and Service Headquarters during the last 40 years.

In the final analysis, it is evident that we cannot do without long-term realistic planning for defence which by its very nature, would need an institutional infra-structure at the highest level with all the information in-puts to engender pragmatic and purposeful 10-15 year defence plans.

With a new Government at the Centre and the approaching Budget session in the midst of the worst financial crunch - the foreign debt at a hefty \$54.6 billion and the actual deficit for the current year expected to be close to Rs. 10,000 crores - perhaps, it is the right time to formulate a pragmatic policy on defence planning.

On this thought, and with our good wishes for the New Year to all our readers, I would request them to share with us their views on this vital security issue, namely, long-term planning for defence.

India's Security in the 1990's *

PROF K R SINGH **

India's security in the coming decade will be influenced by anticipated changes in several variables at global, regional and sub-regional levels. One of the variables representing change at global level and likely to affect India's security is the New Detente between the two Super Powers. It has given a new thrust to nuclear disarmament as represented by the INF treaty. Also, there are pointers towards disarmament at the level of conventional weapons also. Will some of these weapons, both with conventional and nuclear warheads, be destroyed or transferred to other states, and what effect would that have on regional peace and security needs to be examined with care. It should be kept in mind that some of the Chinese IRBMs, without their nuclear warheads, have already been transferred to Saudi Arabia. Parts of India come within the range of those missiles.

Another facet of the New Detente is the understanding among great powers to resolve regional problems. Momentum for the resolution of long-drawn conflicts, as in Namibia, Cambodia, and to some extent, in the Gulf, reflects that trend. The impact of new developments in the Asia-Pacific region, especially the new turn in the Sino-Soviet relations, also needs to be analysed in the context of its possible impact upon India and the neighbourhood. Detente in Sino-Soviet relations, among other things, has relieved military pressure on the northern and western borders of China. Whether that leads to a redeployment of Chinese forces in the south or to an overall reduction in the Chinese force-level is still undecided.

These global changes, among other things, are the contribution of basic changes in the domestic and world view of leadership both in the USSR and also in China. *Glasnost* and *perestroika* represent a 'real politik' view rather than an 'ideological' view of the Soviet policy. What impact that change will have on the Soviet policy towards the developing countries will have a far reaching impact on India's security also.

* Paper presented at the seminar jointly organised by the Department of Political Science, Bangalore University and School of International Studies, JNU, New Delhi, Bangalore, 9-11, July 1989.

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Like the Soviets, Chinese society was also opening up. But struggle between two forces, the so-called hardliners and the reformists, came out openly during the May-June 1989 demonstrations and responses of sections of Chinese ruling elite. At the moment, it seems that the so-called hardliners have an upper hand but the student demonstration has unfolded a new facet of Chinese domestic policy that is bound to have its impact on China's foreign policy as well. These forces of continuity and change in Chinese society need to be carefully evaluated because of the likely impact on the future of nascent detente between India and China.

Not only changes at the global level but also at regional level need to be analysed in depth. South-East Asia has been long neglected in India with the result that events have overtaken our policy in that region. For a long time, the Cambodian question had polarised forces in South-East Asia. That polarization, with the Indo-Chinese states and USSR (along with India) on one hand, and the ASEAN states, the west, Japan and China on the other, will hopefully end soon. Vietnam has announced the decision to withdraw its troops from Cambodia by September 1989. Also, the USSR has conceded to China on the Cambodian question. The settlement of the Cambodian question on terms favourable to China and growing Chinese presence, both on the land frontiers of South-East Asia and in the South China Sea, is likely to lead to new equations in that region. A correct appreciation of these developments in India's eastern flank is essential to assess the impact of the new strategic equation, that is likely to emerge in South-East Asia, on India's security in the coming decade.

India's security was always influenced by events on its western flank. Three major factors will continue to dominate the scene there; the Arab-Israeli question, Islamic reassertion, and the future of oil. These three factors not only influence India's foreign policy but also domestic policy and hence, need careful assessment.

India has been deeply involved, both politically and emotionally, in the Arab-Israeli question since the last ~~50~~ decades if not more. Today, that question has been reduced to two major issues; the Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, including the Golan Heights, and restoring their legitimate rights to the Palestinian people. Unlike the past decades when Arabs had rejected the very concept of negotiated settlement with the Jews, today Arabs are on a diplomatic offensive and are almost challenging the ruling elite of Israel to come to a negotiated settlement. While the Arabs, including the PLO leaders, have changed their stance, Indian policy still has to reflect that changing mood *vis-a-vis* the basic Arab-Israeli question. An updated appreciation of Arab-Israeli relations becomes essential if India has to frame its West Asia policy on a sound footing and not act as the last of the 'radical Arab' states.

Religious reassertion, that periodically sweeps the Islamic world, will continue to have its impact on the West Asian scene for some time to come, both at the level of domestic as well as foreign policies. Whether the Iranian system of the dominance of religious elite is strengthened or not will have great relevance in the context of religious revivalism in other Islamic states where politicised religion poses a great challenge to the existing secular state structure. Islamic reassertion has its foreign policy implications also and influences the 'Pan-Islamic' trends. Both these dimensions of religious reassertion in the Islamic world influence not only the domestic but also the external security environment of India.

The Third factor that is and will continue to influence West Asia in general and the Gulf in particular is the question of oil. The relative importance of the Gulf in global oil equation has been undergoing major changes as seen from table 1. In 1988, out of the total oil production of 3,025 million tons (metric), West Asia and North Africa produced about 825 mn tons. Of that, the Gulf accounted for 687.5 mn tons. Thus, the Gulf oil accounted for about 23% of the world's total. Though it is almost half of the 1973 percentage, it is very important in terms of the sustained economic development of the free market economy countries of the North.

TABLE 1

Oil Production (in mn tons metric)

	1973		1980		1988	
	Production	% of world	Production	% of world	Production	% of world
World	2,277		2,979		3,025	
WANA	1,204	52	1,084	36	827	28
Gulf	1,016	44	912	30	687	23
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait only	541	23	580	20	324	11

Since the last few years, Gulf oil has lost its previous edge as a 'weapon'. However, despite what is generally called as the 'reverse oil shock', the Gulf oil is, and will remain an item of crucial strategic importance to the industrialised North. Firstly, the North still depends heavily upon the Gulf oil. But, the real value of the Gulf is in term of the proven and commercially exploitable oil reserves that are available there. (For details see table 2) Undoubtedly, more and more oil reserves are being found but even a glance at table 2 reveals

some important trends. It reveals that the USA has very limited reserves. Though more oil has been discovered in Mexico and Venezuela in Latin America the total oil reserves of these three major oil producing states do not amount to even one third that of the Gulf. In fact Kuwait and Saudi Arabia alone have reserves of about 225 bn. bls which is double that of these three important oil producing states and almost one third of the world's total proven oil reserves. The second major trend is that the North Sea oil which has proved to be a crucial alternate source of oil for the members of the EEC is also fast getting exhausted and is not likely to last for more than a decade at the current rate of exploitation. Thus, the Gulf which accounts for almost 50% of World's proven oil reserves, will be of strategic importance to the North in the years to come. No wonder, the Rapid Deployment Force and the CENTCOM strategy has the Gulf oil as its main focus.

TABLE 2

Oil Reserves
(estimated in billion barrels)

	1976	1987
World total	658.6	703.1
USA	33.0	32.5
Mexico	9.5	54.7
Venezuela	17.7	25.0
Nigeria	20.2	16.0
North Sea (UK and Norway only)	23.0	15.8
USSR and East Europe	83.4	60.9
China	20.0	18.4
Arab Africa	38.5	35.5
Arab Asia	304.3	303.9
Iran	64.5	48.2
Gulf total	368.8	364.5

According to estimates, RDF/CENTCOM strategy will involve following force: three aircraft carrier battle groups, one amphibious ready group, ten tactical fighter wings, each consisting of about 72 aircraft, two Marine amphibious forces, each consisting of a ground combat division, a tactical fighter wing

and sustaining support, and five Army combat divisions. In all, 440,000 personnel along with their weapons and other equipment are earmarked. Several roll-on roll-off ships loaded with equipment for a Marine Amphibious Brigade (approximately 16,000 men) and supplies for Air Force and Army units are located aboard several chartered ships of the Near Term Prepositioning Force located at Diego Garcia. Several similar ships are also located at other ports near the Gulf.

The RDF/CENTCOM strategy depends upon active cooperation of atleast some of the regional powers including those in and around the Gulf. That explains the systematic links between USA on one hand and the Gulf Cooperation Council states and Pakistan on the other. If Pakistan has to play a meaningful role in the US strategy in the Gulf then, in all probability Pakistan's air-sea capability will be further strengthened by the USA and the Gulf states. In the past, 40 F-16 planes were reportedly funded by Saudi Arabia. Even now, Pakistan has been assured the funding for additional 60 F-16 planes from similar source. Also, USA had transferred to Pakistan six destroyers in the past decade. Six to eight frigates, with modern anti-submarine equipment have been promised to be supplied to Pakistan on lease. It is also likely that Pakistan might receive Orion anti-submarine and maritime reconnaissance aircraft from the USA to buttress that capability. These are the indicators of the continuing linkages between Pakistan, USA and major Arab oil producing states in the Gulf. As noted earlier, that equation will have long-term security implications for India.

In South Asian sub-system, the perennial question of equilibrium between centripetal and centrifugal forces will continue to dominate the question of regional security. These forces will continue to influence India's relations with its immediate neighbours. Over the years, number of irritants have increased even with those states with which India had cordial relations in the past; like with Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. How valid is the charge of Indian 'hegemony' or is it only a diversion from the growing domestic discontent in these countries, needs to be examined. On the positive side, centripetal force has been strengthened by the formation of the SAARC. Can that force be strengthened? It is time that India and other members of the SAARC evolve, among themselves, common denominators that would help to strengthen stability in each of the states in South Asia, so as to strengthen these centripetal forces at the level of the SAARC.

Changing strategic environment at global and regional levels will have its military implications for India. This aspect of India's security needs to be analysed under three main heads; forces of destabilization operating through domestic elements, external forces influencing region's military balance, and

the new trends in weapon systems that are likely to affect India's security in the coming decade.

Though India had always faced the question of insurgency, mostly in the North-East, terrorism is a recent phenomenon. Like insurgency, terrorism too depends upon foreign bases and support. However, unlike insurgency, whose targets are generally those that represent state apparatus, terrorism does not discriminate between targets. Soon terrorism, especially in the Punjab, got hooked on to the increasing drug trafficking.

Drugs produced in certain areas of Afghanistan, especially those that are not under direct control of the central authority in Kabul, and also in parts of North West Frontier Province of Pakistan, began to be routed *via* India. According to the *News Week* of 6 October 1986, Afghanistan grew enough opium to produce about 60 tons of heroin. Since the ratio of opium to heroin is about 10:1, production of raw opium would have amounted to about 600 tons per year. It is reported that opium production has increased considerably in that area. Drug produced there is sold in the West. Reportedly one-third of the total drug supplied in the USA originates from this so-called Golden Crescent. Much of that passes through India. Drug trafficking supplies money as well as arms to the terrorists and, according to some, political protection in South Asia and economic, political and legal support in countries where that drug is finally sold.

This parallel regional and international nexus of drug trafficking not only poses a serious threat to domestic peace, security and stability but also leads to heavy expenditure in peace-keeping and anti-terrorist operations. According to the *Military Balance* of 1986-87, India's para-military forces include about 90,000 in the Border Security Force, 37,000 in Assam Rifles, 14,000 in Indo-Tibetan Border Police and about 112,000 in other national security forces like the CRPF etc. Thus, India has about 250,000 strong para-military force besides the police and armed forces. This number has been increasing over years. When one discusses defence expenditure, one tends to ignore the cost of these forces which are under the Home Ministry. These forces, basically entrusted with anti-insurgency and anti-terrorist operations in sensitive areas on the eastern as well as the western sectors, impose heavy financial burden on the nation.

Not only India but its neighbours in South Asia have been hurt by the nexus of drug and internal instability due to terrorism. SAARC has come to some understanding on the question of terrorism but no practical policy has been evolved at the SAARC level so far on that question. The question of controlling drug trafficking is also under serious considerations, especially at

the bilateral level between India and Pakistan. Both, terrorism and drug, can become useful common denominators for a SAARC approach to regional security.

Military threat to India's security can be analysed under three heads; those arising from China, Pakistan and from forces operating in the Indian Ocean. While India faces individual challenges from each of these forces, they also tend to reinforce each other's capability through political and strategic linkages, military and economic aid and arms transfer. Often, this cumulative threat to India's security is not adequately assessed by several Indian and foreign commentators on the subject.

China and India are two major developing powers in Asia. While India had envisaged an environment of Asian solidarity as the basis of Sino-Indian relations, regional and international events contributed to the emergence of a competitive relationship, often verging on active hostilities. Though there has been no direct serious armed conflict between the two since 1962, possibility of military confrontation remains the dominant factor in their relationship even today, despite the recent attempt at detente.

Chinese adopted a two-pronged strategy towards India; the one of direct confrontation across the Himalayas, and the indirect confrontation through arms transfer to states in South Asia. Both these facets of Chinese policy need to be analysed together for a correct appreciation of Chinese military strategy *vis-a-vis* India.

Direct military confrontation across the Himalayas in Ladakh and Tibet forced India to strengthen its defences on the northern borders by building bases, constructing roads and other means of communication in very difficult and inhospitable terrain, as well as to raise about eleven specialised mountain divisions. Air defence for those sectors had also to be strengthened not only by stationing more aircraft in support of those sectors but also by creating an integrated air defence environment system consisting of radar and communication network as well as computerized data analysis system.

Chinese can, however, pose only a limited conventional military threat from the north because of logistic difficulties and also because of inhospitable terrain which is not suitable for effective operation of heavy weapons like the main battle tank. Hence, Chinese adopted an indirect method of confronting India by transferring large quantities of sophisticated arms to India's neighbours in South Asia.

Pakistan is the largest recipient of Chinese military aid to South Asian states. Reportedly, of the total tank strength of 1600, 1200 are of Chinese

origin. Its airforce has more than 250 Chinese jets out of a total of about 400 frontline aircraft. Its navy operates eight missile boats and 20 petrol boats of Chinese origin. Bangladesh has 90 tanks in operation. Of them 60 are of Chinese origin. All its frontline aircraft are Chinese. Its navy operates four missile boats and eighteen patrol boats of Chinese origin. Sri Lanka also operates similar patrol boats. Nepal is the latest recipient of Chinese arms. Reportedly, these arms are sufficient to equip two infantry divisions. How Nepal hopes to get extra funds to almost double its armed forces is not clear. May be, Chinese might offer military-related economic aid to Nepal which will further complicate the situation. Till date, China has transferred to South Asian states about 1,250 main battle tanks, besides light tanks, armoured troop carriers, medium artillery, more than 325 frontline jet fighters, 12 missile boats, 44 patrol boats beside large quantities of small arms.

These weapons pose as much a threat to India as if they were deployed by Chinese themselves. But, Chinese, by their strategy of indirect approach, not only do not have to spend any money on their use but in fact earn some profit through these deals. Even if these arms are sold at a very low price they do bring financial benefits to China. Moreover, the cost of integrating them into fighting units is borne by the country concerned and not by China. Also, the arms race generated by the induction of Chinese arms in South Asia tends to make these states further dependent upon China. Thus, the direct and indirect approach of Chinese military strategy towards South Asia, without even taking into account Chinese nuclear weapon capability, poses a serious security challenge to India. Despite the new trend towards detente between India and China and the visit of Rajiv Gandhi to China, there does not seem to be a change in that policy.

India's military environment is closely influenced by its relations with Pakistan. Unfortunately, Indo-Pak relations, at least at official levels, have been marked by varying degree of hostility, and even armed conflict. Today, there is a move towards detente and some tentative steps are being taken like official-level meetings and joint commissions at various levels, to remove misunderstanding and even to workout a framework of cooperation as in the case of action being contemplated in the suppression of terrorism and drug trafficking. But, these measures have not yet built mutual confidence and hence, long-term framework of competition if not confrontation is likely to influence mutual military equation in the coming decade. Thus, India will look at Pakistan's military capability with apprehension. Pakistan too will reciprocate.

Pakistan's military capability is not based on its intrinsic national capacity but reflects its strategic links with the USA, China and states of the Gulf.

Between the middle fifties and early sixties, US-Pak equation in the context of the Baghdad Pact and the CENTO got Pakistan not only advanced US weapons like the Sabre jets, Patton tanks, and submarine but also economic and military aid. US interest in Pakistan declined rapidly following the shift in the US strategy of land-based confrontation in the northern tier to the naval strategy in the Indian Ocean with its focus on the Gulf. Iran became the focal point of US strategy in the region. Pakistan had, therefore, to switch over to China for augmenting its military capability. The Sino-Indian conflict and China's policy of indirect confrontation with India in South Asia helped to forge that strategic link between China and Pakistan. The link is sustained by both of them even today. In the seventies, Pakistan took the help of Gulf states in its military modernization programme. Reportedly, some of the Mirage III and 5 planes, acquired by Pakistan during that period, were funded by Arab states of the Gulf. During these years, Pakistan had limited military help from the USA.

In the eighties, Pakistan once again acquired a strategic role in the context of US strategy in South-West Asia. Despite the earlier rejection of US aid offer of \$ 400 mn as pea-nuts by President Zia during the Carter regime, Pakistan was able to get \$ 3.2 bn aid package for five years. Half of that was military aid. Pakistan continues to be of strategic importance to the USA as is seen from the new six-year \$ 4 bn aid package of which nearly half is military aid. (For details of US aid see Table 3)

TABLE 3

US Military Aid to Pakistan

Period	Total Aid	Average per year
1953-1961	\$ 508.2 mn	\$ 62.5 mn
1962-1981	\$ 208.0 mn	\$ 10.4 mn
1982-1987	\$ 1600.0 mn	\$ 320.0 mn
1988-1994	\$ 2000.0 mn	\$ 333.0 mn
(proposed)		

The pattern of military aid also got reflected in arms transfer from USA to Pakistan (See table 4)

TABLE 4

US Arms Transfer to Pakistan

Period	Armour	Aircraft	Ships
1953-65	600 MBT, (200) light tanks, 50 APCs	32 B-57 light bombers, 120 Sabrejets, 14 Starfighters	1 Submarine, 6 destroyers (MAP British make), 6 minesweepers
1966-77	300 APC, 100 MBT (Patton) through third party transfer from West Germany via Iran	90 Sabrejets through third party transfer from West Germany via Iran	Nil
1978-1987	135 MBT, 110 APC, 40 203 mm self- propelled howitzer (SPH), (100) 155 mm SPH	40 F-16 (Reportedly Saudi Arabian funding), 24 Huey Cobra Helicopter gun- ships.	6 destroyers
1988 onwards transferred or proposed	M-60 MBT	60 F-16, 3 Orion maritime reconnaissance aircraft, 3 E-2/3 AWACS, Modern attack helicopters	6-8 frigates

Pakistan's military programme will aim both at modernization and expansion of its armed forces and equipment. However, both will be limited due to economic constraints. These constraints would be of two types. Firstly, the cost of new weapons is many times that of the old. That high cost is due to inflation and also increased sophistication of the systems. Therefore, Pakistan cannot afford to replace all its old weapons with new and more sophisticated weapons. Hence, it will have to aim at a mix of quality and quantity. For quality, it will look towards the USA and for quantity it will continue to depend upon China.

The second constraint arises from the fact that Pakistan has already reached more than the optimum in its defence expenditure. Its defence expenditure amounts to about 6% of its GNP. Like many developing states,

Pakistan is also facing the debt problem. While in 1984-85 its GDP was \$ 31.3 bn, it had a debt burden of \$ 14 bn. It must have increased by now. Thus, Pakistan can, at best, increase its defence expenditure by only a narrow margin which would probably take care of the inflation and the increased pay and allowance of its armed forces. Even though Pakistan is trying to collaborate with some Islamic states to manufacture and sell modern weapons, it is too early for it either to earn sufficient profit or to attain self-sufficiency. Thus, in all likelihood Pakistan's force-level is not expected to increase greatly. Also its modernization programme will be limited unless large funds are made available by some oil rich states in the Gulf. In the context of such a stalemate in the field of conventional warfare, developments in the field of missiles and nuclear technology will deserve special attention in the years to come.

Maritime threat to India's security is often overlooked because of the absence of direct and visually identified threats. But it needs to be correctly assessed so that appropriate counter-measures can be planned. The fact that there has been a sustained militarization of the Indian Ocean *per se*, in naval terms, since the last two decades, is often ignored. Not only regional powers but also great powers have enhanced their naval capability in the area. Moreover, threat to use force, overtly or covertly, in pursuance of their national interest has also multiplied since the dispatch of the taskforce headed by the *Enterprise* in 1971. Beside the Super Power naval rivalry at global level, the Indian Ocean is also the target of regional strategy of these powers. USA has reinforced the concept of rapid deployment force (RDF) in the Gulf region. The CENTCOM is geared to the RDF strategy. The Gulf has also witnessed, during the second half of the Iraq-Iran War, an active naval involvement by the NATO powers, especially in the context of escorting merchant vessels and minehunting operations. US ships and the AWACS were even actively participating in the war operations. Enhanced naval presence and willingness not only to deploy but also to employ that force poses long-term challenges to India's maritime security.

The strategic equation of USA, some Gulf states especially those of the GCC, Pakistan and China, which poses a security challenge to India on its land frontier, is equally valid for India's naval security. Not only does USA operate its taskforce, equipped with nuclear weapon capability, in the Indian Ocean but Chinese are also planning to enhance their naval power and to demonstrate a willingness to play a great power role in South and South-East Asia which is India's immediate neighbourhood. Chinese have transferred large quantities of naval equipment to India's neighbours as seen earlier. India, on the other hand, has been working for the creation of a peace zone in the Indian Ocean since 1964, but it has met with no success. Rather, Indian Ocean has been further militarized since 1971 when the UN gave a call for the creation of a Peace Zone in the Indian Ocean.

India today faces the challenge of meeting enhanced maritime threat almost alone. Moreover, under the new law of the sea, it has acquired economic stakes in the living and non-living resources in its exclusive economic zone and continental-shelf. They will need added protection both in times of peace and also in times of war. These factors give a new perspective to India's maritime strategy. Today, India possesses a naval force (see table 5), which is modest in relation to those of comparable powers like China or medium powers of Europe like Britain, France or Italy. It should also be noted that not only do these European Powers have a substantial naval capability, both conventional and nuclear but most of them have grouped together under the NATO for greater protection. India, on the contrary, is a non-aligned state and has, therefore, to depend upon its own capability for its defence.

TABLE 5

India's Naval Capability: Major Fighting Ships

Type of ships	1988	Projection 1990's
Submarine (Nuclear Powered)	1	3
Submarine (Conventional)	13	10 ¹
Aircraft carriers	2	2 ²
Destroyers	5	6
Frigates	24	24
Corvettes	5	8-10
Missile boats	13	8-10
Minesweepers	17	20
Amphibious ships	18	20

1. Four Foxtrot submarines in use today might be deleted or kept in reserves or used for training.
2. The new one being planned might replace the Vikrant.

The study of table 5 shows that there will be only a marginal enhancement in the force-level and also in the sophistication of naval weapons. Yet, India's naval capability has been criticised by others. Two weapon systems have come under specific criticisms. They are the recently acquired nuclear-powered submarine and the aircraft carrier. It should not be forgotten that in the sixties India's quest for even conventional submarine was opposed by the

West when not only China but even Pakistan and Indonesia on India's two flanks had acquired them. Today, when nuclear-powered submarines are operating in and around the Indian Ocean, India's attempt to acquire them is being vehemently opposed.

None can deny that nuclear powered submarines pose a qualitatively different type of threat than the conventional submarines because of their capability to remain submerged for a longer time and also because of their ability to maintain a high speed even when submerged for a long time. India cannot even learn anti-submarine operations, relating to the nuclear-powered submarines, unless it has its own nuclear-powered submarine. Today, China possesses about seven nuclear-powered submarines besides more than hundred conventional submarines. Moreover, nuclear-powered submarines of great powers are reportedly operating in the Indian Ocean. It is interesting that those who criticize India for acquiring even a limited capability in that field, have very little to say about Chinese nuclear submarines with SLBM capability or those of the great powers operating in the Indian Ocean.

The other weapon system that has come under constant criticism is the aircraft carrier. Some even give it the capability of an 'attack' carrier. That is a highly exaggerated view of the modest capability of the carriers being operated by India. At best, they are light fleet carriers. They have a reasonably good anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability because of the Sea King helicopters on board. They have a very limited attack or interception capability because of the limitations of *Sea Harrier* jump jets, both in terms of weapons load and speed which is less than super-sonic. These aircraft carriers, however, are capable of providing the Navy with crucial air and ASW support when and where it is actually needed on the high seas even away from the shore bases. India not only has a vast coastline and dispersed island groups to defend but also has to keep open vital sea lanes. It cannot provide airbases and assign aircraft all along the coast and in these islands. Light fleet aircraft carriers, therefore, fulfil a crucial role in that context. India, in fact, is seeking to enter the difficult and challenging field of carrier construction. No developing country has attempted that so far.

It can be reasonably assumed that the coming decade will witness the induction of new weapon systems even in the developing world. There are several reasons for that assumption. Firstly, conventional weapons in use like tanks, aircraft, self-propelled artillery etc are increasingly becoming more and more expensive, and are pricing themselves beyond the reach of small and even medium powers in the South. Earlier, jet fighters like the *Gnat* cost less than Rupees one crore. Its replacement, MIG-21, cost about Rs. 2.7 crores. Now, Mirage 2000 costs about Rs. 25 crores each. Almost the same

ratio applies to other weapon systems also. Secondly, these weapons are becoming vulnerable to counter-measures like guided missiles and electronic counter-measures (ECM). Thirdly, these advanced weapons are increasingly becoming difficult to acquire because of political, economic and strategic considerations involved in arms transfer.

Conventional warfare, as was known till recently, is, therefore going to lose its "deterrence" value. That is true not only of the wars fought between the developing countries like Iran and Iraq which reached a military stalemate even after years of fighting but also of wars in which Great powers had confronted a determined opponent in the South, as in the Vietnam and the Afghanistan conflicts. However, since deterrence *per se* would remain a crucial variable in international relations, some alternative to these conventional weapons will be found.

Missile technology is likely to provide such an alternative. Though missiles *per se* are sophisticated systems, like all other weapon systems, there are degrees of sophistication even in missile technology. These are determined by different variables. Weight of the warhead is one such crucial factor. Also the warhead can be commonly used high explosive, or exotic fuel-air explosive, precision-guided sub-munitions etc, as well as nuclear, chemical or bacteriological. The other important variable is the type of fuel used (solid or liquid fuel), guidance system etc. Range and precision will also play a crucial role in determining the operational role of that missile.

It is of interest to note that, of late, several developing states have begun to acquire missile technology. They have started at the lowest rung of sophistication and have progressively increased the range, payload and accuracy. Undoubtedly, the degree of sophistication will depend not only upon the level of technology of that state but also upon the availability of that technology on transfer. Increasing hurdles are being placed in technology transfer in the field of missiles. But these hurdles are being overcome. In that connection, the massive use of short-range surface-to-surface missile (SSM) during the Iraq-Iran War and the ability of both these powers to locally improve upon their performance is of great significance. Other developing states that have acquired an independent missile technology are Argentina, Egypt, India, Israel etc. Pakistan has also made considerable progress in its missile technology and has successfully launched two SSMs. The first, called *Haft I* has a short range of 50 km. The other *Haft II*, has a range of 300 km. Undoubtedly, Pakistan will, over the years, increase the range, payload and accuracy of its missiles.

Debate has started among the strategic thinkers in the South on the

feasibility of tactical use of SSMs with conventional warheads. Some argue that in the face of growing anti-aircraft defence and the rising cost of modern aircraft, SSMs would provide a cheaper mode for the delivery even of high explosives. Others argue that ballistic missiles cannot provide the degree of precision for effective use of conventional high explosive warheads. Few developing countries have succeeded in producing their own precision-guided sub-munitions that can be fitted as warheads to these SSMs. Even India has not reached that stage as yet.

These SSMs, with high explosive warheads will have limited effectivity vis-a-vis military targets. Long-range cruise missiles will have greater precision. But they are very modern systems that need satellite mapping, sophisticated mini computers and such other systems that few medium powers are capable of acquiring in the near future. Because of these constraints, SSMs used in the Iraq-Iran War had big civilian centres as their target. Such anti-people weapons not only have limited military value but prove counter-productive by increasing mutual bitterness.

In the absence of desired precision guidance, the SSMs in the South are likely to be armed with 'unconventional' warheads. Chemical weapons have been widely used during the Iraq-Iran War. Also, nuclear Warheads become obvious choice for these first generation short and medium range SSMs.

Though Pakistan has officially denied the existence of nuclear bombs, even responsible US officials, including the CIA Chief, have testified about Pakistan's nuclear weapon capability. Hence, logically, one can argue that missile technology and nuclear weapon technology will have a greater chance of teaming up as complementary systems. Thus, in the light of new thrust in missile technology, possibility of nuclear weapons becoming a viable instrument of 'deterrence' even in the South cannot be ruled out.

India has, over the years, evolved a strategy of confronting its actual or potential adversaries in terms of conventional warfare. However, it has, as yet, not evolved a viable strategy of neutralizing a nuclear threat. One fears that India's nuclear diplomacy in that field might also end up the way its Indian Ocean Peace Zone diplomacy has. Not only has the maritime threat to Indian security increased over the years but India is also getting increasingly isolated politically when confronted with diplomatic moves like the creation of a nuclear-weapon free zone or the balanced force reduction in South Asia. It is time that India evolves either a warfighting doctrine in the context of nuclear weapons or an effective diplomacy tailored to the requirement of nuclear weapons in the immediate neighbourhood, lest India is unilaterally forced to enter into a costly nuclear missile programme.

India is Totally Safe Against A Military Coup

LT GEN DR M L CHIBBER (RETD)*

“General, what will happen if the whole thing collapses?” was an observation by a respected citizen. He was alluding to the possibility of the political system in the country breaking down with disastrous consequences. “In extreme circumstances, it would not be a bad thing if the military takes over” remarked a respected journalist. These pithy observations were made at the end of my talk at the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library on “Civil - Military Relations in India”. My theme was that a military coup cannot take place in India.

These serious observations reinforced my conviction that there must be an open debate on Civil-Military relations for a proper appreciation as also to consolidate democracy in India. We have an ideal model of civil-military relations which is envied even by developed countries. It is flattering that even a hostile friend of India - ex-President Richard Nixon - observes that “Governing India with democracy is one of the most remarkable political achievements in the 20th century.”

In the absence of an open debate, national security policies and organisation of the military are often influenced by suspicions and fears of military coups. If steps are taken in the belief that these will promote civil control over the military, and if these steps result in deterioration of the quality of the officer corps, then the very steps become counter-productive ! There is the danger that the country might lose a war as happened in India in 1962; alternatively, there is a possible danger that a demotivated, disgruntled and unprofessional officer corps becomes the nursery for political activities and breeding ground for conspiratorial cabals, promoting ultimately that very danger which is sought to be prevented.

In this article I shall describe the results of my research culminating in a much-appreciated Paper titled “Civil-Military Relations in India: Its Relevance to Developing Countries” presented in the XIVth World Congress of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) on 28th August, 1988 at Washington, DC.

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I would discuss :

- The meaning of civil-military relations and its importance for successful democratic polity.
- What type of States are prone to military coups?
- What type of officers are inclined to intervene in a country's political system?
- Why is India totally safe from military coups? and
- A look into the future.

The term civilian control originated in the 17th and 18th century in England and her American colony. At that time, the military forces were generally under the control of the Crown and the slogan "civilian control" was adopted by Parliamentary groups as a means of increasing their power vis-a-vis the Crown. Parliamentary control was sought not as a means of reducing the power of the military but as one of the ways of curtailing the power of the Crown.

In a stable and mature democracy, effective civilian control over the military is essential. This means control by the elected representatives of the people and certainly not the bureaucratic structure of the Government, as sometimes "utterly wrongly" interpreted, in India. The reasons for civilian control are twofold. Firstly, that the country must get optimum value for the money spent on defence, and to ensure that the military is competent, effective and professional. Secondly, to ensure that the military does not intervene in the country's politics. The conclusion of scholars is that "higher the degree of professionalism of the Officer Corps and larger their corporate autonomy, the less are the chances of their intervening in a country's politics."

An analysis of 55 countries in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, Asia and Europe, where military coups have taken place since the end of World War II shows certain symptoms which make a State prone to military intervention. The primary conditions for military intervention have been identified as the collapse of the executive power, inability of the political system to function within the constitutional requirements, weakness of the political system or the rapid decline in authority. In such environments, the military is either asked to intervene, or it does so on its own! Ineffective, bickering and quarrelling political parties are particularly an important sign of a State prone to military intervention.

Military intervention in civilian affairs is not usually done by military groups. In most cases, civilians turn to the military for political support

when civilian political structure and institutions fail, when factionalism develops and the constitutional means for the conduct of political action are lacking. The civilians, therefore, begin to indoctrinate the military with their political ideologies. The size of a country has a bearing on its proneness to a coup. Barring Indonesia and Brazil, the remaining 53 countries where coups have taken place, are very small. Most of their population is less than Delhi's and in some cases, equal to many mofussil towns. The area of most of these States is equal to or lesser than Haryana State. There is one centre of political and military power which, when captured by a small group, can change the regime.

The involvement of some of these countries in military blocks also make them prone to military take over. For example, at the height of the Dullesian foreign policy, Pakistan was a Member of CENTO. It was an essential requirement of military planning of CENTO that the military takes over administrative control of the country in the event of an attack by the Russians! Proper contingency planning for the running of the country was an integral part of the CENTO doctrine.

Culture also plays a part in military intervention. 19 countries out of 55 victims of military coups are Latin American nations. The Spanish colonial legacy of patron-client relation - a traditional patrimonial system - influenced the outlook of military leaders in these countries: the next group of 16 countries is Islamic.

There are many reasons which motivate military officers of a country to intervene in politics. Obviously, it is always a small group of officers, a few activists, who succeed in propelling the military into politics. What generates political ambition among military officers?

A condition which gave rise to political ambition among military officers in a large number of countries who have been victims of coup, has been their participation in their independence struggle against colonial rule, a revolution or a struggle against an occupying power during World War II. Participation in such a struggle develops a degree of political idealism, which ultimately turns into ambition to wield political power for effecting socio-economic changes and to modernise their countries. There are also examples of what happened in Burma where the majority of the 23 Colonels who had played a key role in administering the military Government were, at one time, either politicians or close associates of politicians. Most of them were involved in the independence movement of Burma and were assigned in a random fashion to careers in the Army and overnight donned military uniforms with "assumed ranks"!

There are cases where officers from deprived sections of society have intervened in politics out of socio-economic grievances, when vast disparities exist in income distribution. Colonel Gadaffi, a bedouin from the desert, imbued with socialistic ideas, decided to capture power when, he, as an ADC to the King, was outraged to witness the unabashed and luxurious life style of the Royal family on a holiday in Europe!

An important factor which politicises an officer corps is the system by which 'civilian control' is exercised. Subjective control is the system when the officers are managed, based on the political reliability. That means promotions and placements are based on the basis of political affiliations of the officer, rather than on his professional competence. To advance in the military hierarchy, the officers willy-nilly are obliged to establish political alliances with their civilian superiors and that thoroughly politicises them.

On the other hand, "objective control" is the system which recognised the autonomous military professionalism, and promotions and placements are left to the military itself. These must naturally be based on professional competence.

One of the primary causes of India's defeat in 1962 was that, due to imaginary fears of a military coup, the country was moving towards a subjective system of control. Mercifully, Mao-Ze-Dong rescued us from a bigger disaster of politicising the military which may well have taken place if we were not defeated in 1962!

We have discussed the symptoms which prevail in a country prone to military intervention; also, the reasons which propel and egg on military officers to intervene in a country's politics. It should by now be obvious that India is a classic case which, due to its continental size, diversity of population and languages, historical heritage, cultural ethos and conscious steps taken by statesmen and military leaders themselves, is virtually immune to praetorianism.

In the 'fifties, there were a number of hush-hush but unfounded fears about this Defence Chief or that Chief planning to usurp political power. These were completely figments of imagination. Most of the coups in 55 countries, happened in this decade and when Pakistani military took over power in 1958, these fears came to a boiling point! So much so that when General P N Thapar, as was expected from a professional and honourable soldier, resigned after the 1962 debacle, a successor was to be found. General J N Chaudhuri was the obvious choice. It was "whispered" to Lal Bahadur Shastri, the Home Minister that General Chaudhuri had political ambitions.

However, a sagacious and experienced Shri L P Singh who was the then Home Secretary showed to Shastriji, Abraham Lincoln's letter to General Hooker while appointing him as Commander-in-Chief during the American Civil War:

"I have placed you at the head of the Army of the Potomac. Of course, I have done this upon what appears to me sufficient reason, and yet I think it best for you to know that ... I have heard in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the Army and the Government needed a dictator. Of course, it was not for this, *but in spite of it*, that I have given you the Command. Only those Generals who gain success can be set up as dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship!"

Sure enough, General Chaudhuri was promptly appointed as the Chief: Shri L P Singh while recalling this incident observed that "Military dictatorship in a large country like India was out of question."

India is a federation and has multiple centres of power both in political and military spheres. There are 13 Commanders-in-Chief - 5 of the Army, 5 of the Air Force and 3 of the Navy. If anyone thinks that all 13 of them or even all 5 of the Army, which is largest component, could ever plan and agree to a nefarious and non-professional move to usurp political power, he would be totally unrealistic and unfamiliar with the professional ethos in the Indian defence forces. The multi-regional, multi-linguistic, multi-ethnic and multi-religious composition of the military is an additional deterrent against usurping political power.

The Indian officer corps took no part in the Independence struggle; hence developed no political idealism. During the Independence struggle, the leaders of the Indian National Congress never tried to involve the officer corps. Unfortunately, the Muslim League leaders assiduously cultivated Muslim military officers. On the creation of Pakistan, they paid a price for it. Officers who fought in the Indian National Army, were honoured for participation in the struggle for Independence, but Pandit Nehru, Sardar Patel and other political leaders were sagacious enough to ensure that none stayed on in the Armed Forces!

In our long history only Pushyamitra, the Military Commander is alleged to have usurped power, that too due to mitigating circumstances. Pushyamitra took over power to avoid chaos when the king became mentally deranged and there was no heir. Barring this isolated case, the military

leadership in India has followed the tradition of Bhisham Pitamah, whose unflinching loyalty was to Hastinapur, and was willing to serve the wily Kauravas who illegally usurped Pandava's rights.

Our statesmen and soldiers maintained apolitical traditions and complete non-interference in the political affairs of the country - the hallmark of the old British Indian Military tradition. On Independence, the Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy which, till then, for historic reasons, were technically semi-autonomous components of the Indian Army, were separated and three independent Services were created. There were two reasons - one was to break the image of the most powerful British Commander-in-Chief (next only to the Viceroy) who lived in "Teen Murti House", and functioned as the Defence Minister, and was the symbol of British might in India. Instead, the three new chiefs with their responsibilities attenuated were allotted bungalows in New Delhi, and "Teen Murti House" was occupied by the Prime Minister. This was a sound demonstrative move, extremely well received within the Armed Forces. The other purpose was to allow the small elements of the Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force to grow to their full size and stature. This was particularly required for them to carry out their roles appropriately and was in accord with practice then obtaining in developed nations.

There was no conscious thought of using the three independent Services to play one against the other to exercise control. Indeed, this re-organisation was implemented on the advice of Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten who had hoped that after a while, when the two smaller Services came into their own, the time would be ripe to implement the lesson of World War II - that is, to integrate the three services into a well-coordinated, attuned and cohesive defence force. This reform was implemented in the USA in 1953 and in the UK in 1958. In my correspondence with him, when I enquired of Lord Mountbatten as to why he did not advise a similar framework in India, he wrote back to say - "The main reason for not urging an immediate appointment of a Chief of the Defence Staff was precisely that it would be a number of years before a Naval or an Air Force officer would be senior enough to be considered for the appointment. The tragic death of the most senior Air Force officer, Air Marshal Subroto Mukherji in Japan, put back the date by at least a couple of years . . . I could perhaps add that the last time Nehru had stayed with me here at "Broadlands" before the Chinese invasion, I urged him to appoint General K S Thimayya to be the Chief of the Defence Staff straightaway . . . Nehru said Krishna was so bitterly opposed to Thimayya and, indeed, all the really intelligent independent senior officers such as Muchu Chaudhuri, that he was sure he could never get Krishna to agree."

Another step taken was to downgrade the status of military officers. This was right vis-a-vis the elected representatives of the people. However, in the bureaucratic machination there were some down gradation of military officers compared to the Bureaucrats, which has created considerable amount of unhealthy competition: competition for status between the bureaucracy and professionals is a well recognised malaise in all democratic countries, and India is no exception. However, Civilian Authority, as symbolised in the elected representatives of the people, must be paramount in a democracy.

The major lesson we learnt was from our defeat in 1962. Since then, the military enjoys internal autonomy in the crucial matter of selection, promotions and placements, even though these are and naturally must be approved by the Raksha Mantri. The collective judgement of the senior military officers who participate in these matters are respected unless there are weighty reasons indicating an injustice. The yardstick is the professional competence and service, and not political affiliation or political views.

Similarly, a convention has developed that the senior-most C-in-C of the Army/Air Force/Navy is selected as the Chief unless there are very weighty and strong reasons against it. This is the correct policy and helps in keeping the military apolitical.

The senior military officers have been wise enough to assiduously resist employment of the military on law and order duties. Unfortunately, we still have the old Imperial system under which the Deputy Commissioner of a district can requisition the help of the military, and the military is obliged to assist when such demand cannot be made even by the Chief Minister of a State! This provision gives a lazy man's option to our administrators when they face difficulties and adopt the line of least resistance. There is a very sound reason for senior officers to be reluctant to get into law and order duties. Nothing politicises a soldier more than to get mixed up in maintaining law and order in a democracy, not to speak of the adverse effect on training of troops if constantly used in aid of civil power. Pakistanis paid a heavy price for misusing the military. One hopes that, when powers are decentralised to District Panchayats, suitable provisions would be made to make requisitioning the military for maintaining law and order more difficult than it is today.

An ingenious measure was adopted during the 'fifties of starting public schools, named Sainik Schools. These were set up to educate young bright boys from all strata of society with special incentives for children of low income group amongst our citizens. These institutions were designed as nurseries to groom young boys as future military officers. This broad-basing

of the officer corps has not only provided upward social mobility to brighter youth, but has also brought the military leadership closer to our polity. This is a positive step to keep the military in tune with our society.

What should be done to consolidate this fine tradition of keeping away from the country's politics which has prevailed among the officers of the Indian Military? It has been aptly said that there are no good or bad armies. There are only good or bad officers. An important step which will contribute most to the country's integrity and security as well as consolidation of democracy, is to take steps which will contribute to the excellence in the quality of the officer corps. It is suggested that a National Commission may be appointed with the statutory provision that its recommendations will be implemented to look into the following areas and make appropriate recommendations for adoption: Firstly, take a total look at the terms and conditions of the officer corps so as to make sure that the cream of youth in the country comes forward to defend the motherland for a full career or short periods of time. Secondly, to achieve this we must follow the practice prevalent in most countries of the world that only one third of the officer corps needed in our Armed Forces, serve for full life; the remaining two-third come in for periods ranging from 3 to 10 years, and are then statutorily sidestepped into other appointments controlled by the Government. Lastly, promotions and appointments in the military are totally insulated from non-professional and other extraneous influences.

If these suggestions are implemented, the great traditions in the Indian military before and after Independence, will be consolidated and reinforced to make our country great and be an effective instrument for peace, stability and progress.

The Reorganisation of Central Police Forces

Some proposals

ARUN SINGH*

INTRODUCTION

There has been a massive increase in the force levels and numbers of Central Police Organisations (or Armed Forces of the Union) over the last few years. There has also been an increasing tendency to use many of them as 'jack-of-all-trades' organisations to perform a multiplicity of roles in relation to a variety of problems (eg terrorism and communal outbreaks). As a result, there has been a distinct tendency to ignore the capabilities of individual forces relative to the roles for which they were created and, so, to treat all uniformed men with guns as a deployable asset for all contingencies. Since this deployment usually, if not always, occurs as an adjunct to State Police hierarchies, the Central force personnel are normally split up into penny--packets and used without most of their own command structures. This in turn escalates the numbers required and so the circle continues.

The Central Police Organisations (CPOs) are:

-- The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF). Primarily used for law and order duties but increasingly involved in anti-insurgency and anti-terrorist roles.

-- The Assam Rifles (AR). The oldest force, largely officered by deputationists from the Army and so closely patterned on army-type discipline. Expanding rapidly with the bulk deployed under the Army/MHA (Ministry of Home Affairs) for counter--insurgency duties in the North East but some deployed on the Sino-Indian border in Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh as forward screening.

-- The Border Security Force (BSF). Intended to police the Indo-Pak border and the Indo-Bangladesh border. Increasingly used in other roles in Punjab, North East and in aid of civil power in 'hot spots'.

-- The Indo Tibetan Border Police (ITBP). Intended to police the Indo-Tibet border in J&K, HP and UP. Expanding and also given new role of Bank security in Punjab.

* Former Minister of State for Defence.

-- The National Security Guard (NSG). Raised as a specific anti-terrorist force to deal with specific 'terrorism' scenarios. A mixed force with army deputationists and police personnel.

For purposes of this paper I am ignoring the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), the Railway Protection Force (RPF), and the Special Protection Group (SPG).

RESTRUCTURING PROPOSALS

There are a few clearly definable roles for CPO's and individual forces should be allotted specific functions so that equipment, training and organisation structures are tailored to handle such functions. 'Have gun, can travel' is no way to use expensive manpower.

I. Land Borders

India has common land borders with six countries. In four cases the problems are similar albeit varying in degree, while the other two situations are quite different. From the National Security point of view, taking both external and internal threats into account, Government should define each border in terms of one of three scenarios - cold, warm and hot.

a) *Indo-Pak*

(i) International Border: The problems on this border are numerous, varied, complex and increasingly dangerous to National Security. These involve illegal border crossings, smuggling including arms, and even more dangerous-narcotics, exfiltration and infiltration of terrorists and transborder espionage. In the normal course this is treated as a 'cold' border but 'warm' parameters need to be defined since I believe, in a 'warm' scenario, the border should be brought under the control of Army Headquarters. The force that is best equipped to handle this border is the BSF.

(ii) Line of Control: By definition this is not a border and should therefore be placed in a 'warm' scenario. The BSF units on the line should be brought under Army HQ but rear area units should continue to function under their own command structures.

b) *Indo-Bangladesh border*: The entire border, including the hill tracts should be allotted to the BSF. The National Security scenario is 'cold' and command structures are well established.

c) *Indo-Burma border*: Similar in complexity to the Indo-Pak border and should be handed over to the BSF with the same provisos regarding NatSec scenarios.

d) *Indo-Nepal border*: Similar to Indo-Bangladesh border and should be a BSF responsibility.

e) *Indo-Bhutan border*: Does not require significant border policing but, to the extent necessary, should be a BSF responsibility.

f) *Indo-Tibet border*: A completely different situation to any of the others as a result of both geography and the nature of the State on the other side. Part of this border is policed by the ITBP with the rest assigned to the Assam Rifles. The ITBP suffer from one severe handicap -- the lack of rotation--with the result that men are being asked to spend most of their active life at relatively high altitudes in inhospitable areas with resultant impact on morale and efficiency as the force ages.

In my view the most logical solution would be to disband the ITBP since this border is unlikely, in the foreseeable future, to require any of the normal policing activities. Volunteers from both ITBP and AR should be absorbed into the regular army, as Scouts Units on the pattern of the Ladakh or Himachal Scouts and these new units would be deployed on the border for forward screening. The remaining ITBP personnel would transfer to other CPO's.

An alternative solution would be to inter-transfer battalions from ITBP to BSF and Vice versa to ensure adequate rotation. However, all transferred personnel would be required to spend a given period of time in training centres to equip themselves to handle their new roles.

The Indo-Tibet border should be classified as 'warm' and all units brought under Army HQ.

The BSF and perhaps the ITBP will therefore have a specific, clear and precise operating role. These forces should not be used in law and order scenarios except on the border and as border guards would be straightforward para-military organisations.

II. Counter Insurgency Operations

In my view, it is time the army is withdrawn from COIN ops in the North-East and the force best placed, equipped and trained to replace them is the Assam Rifles. The AR are in a very anomalous position today being

officered largely by Army deputationists but controlled by the MHA with terms and conditions of service similar to other CPO's. This hotch potch needs sorting out.

The border guard component of the AR should be absorbed into the regular army as Scouts on the Indo-Tibet border in Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh. The remainder should be retained as the AR, officered by Police/AR personnel, brought squarely under the MHA and deployed to handle COIN ops in the North-East.

III. Anti-Terrorist Operations

The problem is assuming gigantic proportions and is probably a command and control nightmare with numerous agencies playing a role. A straightline solution would be to task the CRPF as the primary force in aid of the State police with the NSG as a specific 'strike' force for special circumstances. Industrial security, including banks, should be the charge of the CISF. BSF and ITBP units should be withdrawn in consonance with the role set out for them earlier in this paper.

IV. Law and Order

Our handling of law and order problems, with particular reference to communal riots, has been appalling. No Government, particularly no secular, democratic government can justify the shame of the riots in November 1984 (particularly Delhi), Ahmedabad, Bhiwani, Meerut Malliana, and now Bhagalpur to cite just a few instances. For no apparent reason every system, every structure, every command and control mechanism, except the Army, seems to fall apart at the seams in the face of major communal outbreaks. Obviously there is something very wrong with at least two basic inputs to handling these situations -- intelligence, (which I will not spend time on in this paper but which is fundamental to the anticipation of problems) and the show/use of force optimally and rapidly to prevent or control outbreaks.

The problems has its genesis in the constitutional division of State and Central powers whereby law and order is defined as a State subject. In a sense this has resulted in the problem falling between the proverbial two stools. Without getting involved in any controversies regarding constitutional law, what has to be understood is that communal violence is as much a threat to National Security as any external threat. Both State and Central Governments, particularly the latter, are charged with the fundamental responsibility of ensuring the integrity and security of the Nation.

State Governments have two sets of forces which are expected to deal with any situation—the State police and the State Armed Police. In the event that additional forces are required State Governments are expected to request Central assistance. With some honourable exceptions like Haryana, Kerala and West Bengal, all evidence suggests that the State structures are either inadequately trained/motivated or too closely involved in local situations, to be able to deal firmly yet impartially with major communal outbreaks. As a result there has been an increasing tendency to call for Central assistance and the Centre tends to deploy any men with weapons principally the CRPF and BSF to assist the State. Usually and most unfortunately, at least in respect of major outbreaks, the Central deployment has been too slow, too little and too late. A direct result of this woefully inadequate system has been the increasing deployment of the Army in Internal Security duties. I am firmly of the view that the Army must not be deployed on IS roles for two basic reasons.

-- The Army is not trained to handle law and order problems. The fact that they have been effective speaks volumes for their discipline and command structures but it is time to sound a loud note of caution. As far back as 1947, even the British were astonished at how quickly the Punjab Boundary Force tended to split along communal lines under severe provocation. I do not mean to suggest that the situation can or will repeat itself but to mark out the man in olive green as the 'enemy' is to take a grave risk with the very foundations of the army.

-- The Army is not trained to operate optimally without bringing to bear all the weapons at its disposal. I submit that our experience in the North-East, in Operation Wood Rose and in the IPKF deployment has been that the army should not be expected to operate with one hand tied behind its back. I further submit that this fact is corroborated by experience in Northern Ireland, Argentina etc. This, perhaps, is one of the fundamental differences in the training of soldiers and armed policemen.

Given this background, with better management, the CRPF is ideally suited to the role of 'first intervention force' in support of the State police. The CRPF is one of the few truly 'integrated' forces in this country with an all-class, all-region composition at section level. There are two reasons why, in my view, the CRPF has not been used optimally.

-- There is a distinct lack of long range planning for force levels and deployment. Numerous instances exist of jawans being airlifted from, say, Assam to, say, Kashmir without messing facilities, tentage etc. and being redeployed on active duty on arrival.

-- There is a distinct tendency for State police authorities to deploy the CRPF in penny packets ignoring the units own command structures. Thus there are instances of a battalion commander in Delhi, a company commander in Ahmedabad and one of his sections in Mehsana. No unit can function in such circumstances.

It should be relatively simple, albeit expensive, to set up five regional centres allotting battalions to each centre on the basis of projected deployment requirements. Rotation among centres and to and from training establishments should also be possible. Provided planning inputs are well organised supplementing force levels at 'hot spots' from another centre through airlifts etc. could become the exception rather than the rule.

A "SECOND INTERVENTION FORCE"

In my view the Central Government should take a decision not to deploy the army on IS duties. A new force should be raised for this purpose and for another role which I shall come to later. This force may be designated the Federal Guard to be deployed as the 'second intervention force' where the CRPF deployment has not solved the problem. The F G should be patterned on and officered by the army and equipped as light infantry divisions with no armour 'artillery and scaled down engineer, EME and Signals. The F G should be clothed in dark grey or dark blue uniforms to distinguish them from the army. To begin with five such divisions could be raised, under the Ministry of Defence and located on the basis of one in each region. The FG would be an Army HQ sub-unit and MHA would deploy them on exactly the same basis as is currently applicable to army deployment in aid of civil power.

V. Rear Area Security

A major problem that we will encounter in the event of military operations of any significant size will be security to VA's, VP's and the LOC. Spelling out details is unnecessary. Given this fact the Federal Guard, assisted by the Territorials', will have a very vital role to perform, a role which cannot be handled adequately by any of the CPO's. This is one more reason why the FG should be located under Army HQ.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

It is apparent that we have reached a point where a coherent and well planned approach to policing in terms of the Centre's involvement is now vital. We have 'developed' to the point where our problems span the

whole range from traditional crime through narcotics, insurgency, terrorism to communal conflagrations. It is submitted that the time has come where the police must be given a much greater stake in administering themselves and the now out-of-date structures in the MHA should be refashioned. My recommendations are as follows:

a) One of the senior most police officers in India should be selected for a post to be designated, say, Controffer General of Police (CGP). This individual should be located in the MHA with the rank of Secretary to Government. The CGP will replace the DIB(who is an intelligence officer not a policeman) as Chairman of the DG's Conference and will thus be the first ranked policeman by convention.

b) The CGP will have under him the DGs of the CPO's. He should operate his own budget with a full time Financial Adviser attached to him. This budget should be distinguished from, although forming a part of, the MHA budget. The CGP should be assisted by an officer of the rank of Director General heading a full time Police Planning Staff similar to the Defence Planning Staff. The Staff will be made up of officers drawn from the CPO's, State Police, MHA, Defence etc. The PPS should be tasked to analyse, evaluate and recommend solutions to specific problems related to policing. The CGP should be assisted by another officer of DG rank designated DG-Training and Research. This individual will have under him the Training Academies and the Bureau of Police Research & Development (BPR&D). Among the many tasks the BPR&D can take on are the development of specialised ammunition, riot control chemicals and weapons (water cannon, shot guns) protective clothing, riot shields etc.

With these assets at his disposal the CGP should take on the job of preparing a long range perspective plan for each COP including force levels and financial outlays.

c) The Home Minister should chair a body designated the National Internal Security Committee on the same lines as the National Defence Committee proposed in an earlier paper*. The NISC would have as its members the Ministers of State in MHA, the Home Secretary the CGP and DIB. The DG-PPS would be member-secretary of the committee and PPS would provide the staff support. Representatives from other Central Ministries and State Governments would be invited to attend meetings as required. The NISC would be the body to brief CCPA on matters concerning internal security.

* Published in the USI Journal July-September 1989.

Higher Defence & National Security Management - A Flawed Structure

Cosmetic Changes Wont Work

WG CDR AMAR ZUTSHI (RETD)

When Arun Singh the former Minister of Defence went Public through this Journal recently from his Himalayan hideout, it meant different things to different people. To politicians who expected him to open up on the controversial 155 mm howitzer gun deal, it was disappointing to read his sermon on defence management instead, a theme alien to them. But for students of defence studies his contribution is welcome howsoever peripheral his approach has been. Before examining the suggestions made by him, let us first examine what ails the present system.

PRESENT SYSTEM

It was at the dawn of independence that the existent heirarchy of higher defence management was forged. Lacking proper experience or expertise in the area at that time all that we could do was to evolve a system patterned on the previous colonial order. While in their own country the Service Head Quarters formed a part of the British Ministry of Defence (MOD), in the British Colony that was India, the three Services were only to carryout commands as those ruled were not supposed to participate in the decision making process. Hence the three Services Head Quarters (HQ) never formed a part of the Ministry. Regrettably though the democrat in Nehru chose to continue with the colonial practice even after independence and the three Service HQ were not incorporated in the MOD. Hence there has been no direct and regular interface of military professionals with the political executives in policy planning, decision making and overall management of the defence forces. In the Cabinet Committee meetings at the highest level, the Services are represented by the Defence Secretary, a Civil Servant.

COMPULSIONS OF DECISION MAKING

In this way whatever professional advice is tendered in the notings on files in the style pioneered in Clives' days gets distorted by the time it reaches the political executive (if it does) through the back breaking bureaucratic channel. Since there is no integrated approach between the Service HQ, the bureaucrats of Finance and MOD, there is triplication of

work. The same subject is first examined by the originating Services HQ, then in the MOD and yet again by the Financial Adviser. So there is red tapism, the line of accountability gets blurred and in the end the decisions taken often compromise the very object of the proposal mooted. To quote an example, the need for an advanced jet trainer was put up by Air HQ at least 15 years back. All successive Air Chiefs have cautioned the Govt. that the Air Force could be grounded by 1982 for lack of operationally qualified pilots. Yet even to-day there is no light at the end of the tunnel. Now that the original estimates have gone up by several times, there are no funds for this vital requirement.

Civil servants of Defence or Finance Ministry, bureaucrats all, they naturally lack the military perspective or proper appreciation of martial matters. While they sit in judgement over technical and professional proposals, they bear no responsibility for implementation of their uncanny and some times vexatious decisions in the field area. Whatever harm accrues out of executing such decisions is the headache of the Services for which they could even be blamed. Even in the Committee for Defence Planning the Service element is under-represented and it is dominated by Civil Servants. On the ground of primacy of civil authority over the military, the system has degenerated into a stifling bureaucratic control over the armed forces.

Speaking on the inadequacy if not absurdity of the system Mr. H.M. Patel a former Defence Secretary who should know better, admitted in 1954 that: "The ignorance of the Civil Servants in India about military matters is so complete that we may accept it as a self evident and an incontrovertible fact". The Administrative Reforms Commission set up in 1967 under Mr. Morarji Desai as Chairman went further to nail the lie of bureaucratic control by declaring that "The subordination of the military to Civil Power should be interpreted in the political and not in the bureaucratic sense. We recommend that the principle of Civilian control over the defence machinery to mean not bureaucratic or Civil Service Control but essentially ultimate political control by the President and the Cabinet".

All that it implies is that the role of the Civil Servant in the MOD has only to be participatory with the uniformed specialists. They will have an important role in providing advice on financial and political matters, budgetary control, management of the Civilian staff, liaison with other Government Departments, procurement, Parliamentary questions etc. as in the British MOD. What is more relevant to Indian scene is that the civil servants of MOD should not be shifted out of the Ministry so that the continuity of specialist experience is not lost. In UK a Civil Servant allocated

to the MOD at the outset of his career generally continues to serve there for the rest of his career.

In his treatise on British Central Organisation of Defence, Michael Howard writes "A Civil Servant should take as much interest and pride in serving with his Ministry as a soldier in his regiment and preserve as zealously its historic quirks and oddities -- They seldom have executive authority, their tasks is to advise, to inform, to co-ordinate and perhaps occasionally to warn -- The services, it is agreed need to be able to regard the Civil Servants with whom they work as their men". While the Ministry of Defence in democracies consists of a judicious mixture of both Civil and Military Staff, in USSR the Defence Minister himself is generally a Military Officer and there are no civilians in the Ministry of Defence. The Gosplan is worked out by military officers who are trained at the School of military Finance.

The need for direct interface of political executives with the military specialists has also been underlined in the White Paper on COD presented to the British Parliament. It says "On all technical questions of strategy and plans, it is essential that Cabinet and Defence Committees should be able to have presented to them directly and personally, the advice of the Chiefs of Staff as the professional advisers of the Govt". Evidently the bogey, of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) system as a "Threat to democracy" is the creation of the lobby that fears to loose their strangle-hold over the military. After all a five star General with inter-service authority and access to the RM and PM would cut the clout of a Defence Secretary to its proper size.

COMPULSIONS OF JOINT WARFARE

The other structural deficiency in defence management stems from the changed concept of warfare. The explosion in warfare technology over the last forty years has inevitably evolved the concept of three dimensional warfare or combined operations wherein the three wings of the Armed Forces have to operate as a single cohesive force against the enemy. One valuable lesson learnt in the Falklands war has been the integrated approach to warfare. Indeed, Sri Lankan or Maldives commitments were combined operations conducted under a single theatre commander. The planning, training, equipping as well as inter-se priorities of such a combat force have to be so scheduled that each of the three services becomes complementary to the other for optimum effectiveness at an optimum cost and effort. But our system does not provide for a centralised authority like CDS to forge and direct a unified combat force for joint operations. Our three Service HQ function independent of each other. The institution of unified defence

staff or CDS is in vogue in western democracies as in Russia, China and even in Pakistan. No where has the CDS toppled a democratic Government. The system was introduced in the UK way back in 1963.

In conceptual terms defence management involves operations like inputs for problem identification, evaluation of options available, selection of best course, command control and communication (C³I), execution/implementation and finally the review process. These steps often dovetail into one another but each area is immensely specialist/technical requiring a high calibre of intellect, knowledge, experience and understanding. Stakes in defence management are high. Any mismanagement could court national disaster. Superior weapons and motivated men behind the machine alone cannot guarantee success in war. An effective central machinery is needed to arrive at defence-wide solutions and the right management organisation is required to carry them through.

From the aforesaid it is obvious that the need for revamping our defence management is long over due. Mr. Singh's contribution to the debate is therefore timely and welcome. The changes suggested by him are principally of three types. Firstly to achieve better interservice co-ordination he suggests that the heads of Intelligence, Communications, Logistics, Operations and Combat support Directorates in the three Services "Will report to the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC)". But if past experience is any guide the role and relevance of COSC to achieve desired objective is not very inspiring.

COSC INADEQUATE SUBSTITUTE FOR CDS

The former Air Chief P C Lal commenting on the role of the COSC writes "When it came to "fighting the Chinese in 1962, it was as if the combat and strike elements of the Air Force did not exist. On that occasion, the Air Force knew next to nothing about what the Army intended to do to meet the threat that stood out so starkly along the northern and north-eastern borders. The Chiefs of Staff Committee, as became apparent later, had ceased to function. Mr. V K Krishna Menon, then Defence Minister, had taken over, in all but name, the command of the Army and direction of the war against the Chinese.¹ Subsequently, however, the Chairman COSC himself eroded the relevance of this committee. Says Lal "I mention the Chhad Bett incident at some length because it was later said by Gen Chaudhuri that it had given him a clear indication of Pakistan's intentions in regard to Kashmir. If so, he did little to alert the other two Service Chiefs about the danger ahead. In the USI National Security Lecture that he delivered in January 1971, he stated, "It was on the 5th May, 1965 that

the larger pattern of Pakistan's intentions to seize Kashmir ... became apparent"². He goes on to say that he discussed the pros and cons of this possibility with the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister and "the necessary sanction was obtained", though precisely for what is not clear. Some time later, the Air Chief was also informed of what was going on. This was done through informal meetings from which the Naval Chief was excluded "for the Navy's role did not look like being a very big one"³. To ensure security, the General applied the need to know' yardstick so thoroughly that the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Joint Intelligence and Planning Staff were completely bypassed. No contingency plans were drafted, nor were the three Services asked to define the parts that they would have to play in the event of a war"⁴. The result was that when the 1965 war actually came the Army Air-Force link-up was found lacking dismally and there was a total absence of any Joint Naval Air Plan.

About the 1971 war Lal thus writes about the then Chairman COSC Gen. Manekshaw. "Thus our questions about the progress, or lack of it, on the western front, in the Punjab sector, brought forth little useful information, nor could we elicit any alternative plans that the Army might have had to break the deadlock. At times it seemed that the Army could do as it wished and the Navy and Air Force would just have to help as best as they could"⁵. Whatever interservice co-operation was achieved during war resulted from contingency pressures or amicable personal ties and not out of institutional arrangements of COSC.

During peace time each Chief is under pressure from his own service for advancing its weapon, personnel and allied interests which often conflict with that of other services. The acrimony due to transfer of aviation Maritime Reconnaissance role from Air Force to Navy unlike the practice even in the UK, a maritime nation is an instance in view. Lovett who was the US Defence Secretary after the last war wrote to President Truman; "By their very makeup it is extremely difficult for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to maintain a broad inter-service point of view. Since they wear two hats, it is difficult for them to detach themselves from the hopes and ambitions of their own Service without having their own staff feel that they are being let down by their Chief." Co-ordination is thus limited to areas of agreement between the three services and does not represent optimum solutions to wide range of problems. After all the Chairman COSC is only the first amongst equals and the committee has only recommendatory and no preemptory authority.

The concept of superimposing the role of CDS on the Chairman COSC as an alternative to the CDS was in fact examined and rejected in the UK. The MINIS white paper placed before the British Parliament by the Defence Secretary in March 1984 reads, "I can see that there is in theory a third

option of "Single-Service" groupings of Staff responsible for all the "operational" and "Policy functions of that service but working under a single frame work and under higher level direction (i.e. the Chairman COSC). I should make clear my own views that such an alternative would be likely to mean the continuation of separate Central Naval, General and Air Staffs in a new guise". In the light of the foregoing no ploy of refurbishing the image of COSC to avoid the CDS system would help the situation. Tinkering with the system by innovating joint-service level changes cannot solve problems the way an Executive Council cannot perform the role of a Ministry.

THEATRE COMMANDERS

While the first suggestion related to joint-service level changes the second suggestion of the former Minister relates to the Service HQ level changes. His idea of redesignating the three Service Chiefs as Commanders in Chief cannot be contemplated since the President is the Supreme Commander or C in C of the Armed Forces under Article 52 (2) of the Constitution. In any case mere change of name is not going to solve the real problems. He further observes that "COAS has far too wide a span of control in terms of officers reporting directly to him". He therefore seems to suggest placing the entire Northern frontier from Indira Col to Kutch in the west and Karakoram Pass to Calcutta in the east under two Theatre Commanders, both four star Generals. This requires elucidation. If his proposal envisages grouping of Commands in the west (viz. Northern and Western) and East (viz. Eastern and Central) as Western and Eastern Armies under separate Theatre Commanders respectively reporting to COAS through VCOAS, it makes sense. Any other suggestion is outright untenable since the existing Commands have evolved out of not only geographical/topographical compulsions but of the dictates of exercising effective Command and Control over the Indian land mass.

REDEFINING COMMANDS

The vast western Sector is of prime strategic value in any war. Therefore creation of a S.W. Air Command in 1981 to take care of the operations in Rajasthan and Gujarat makes a lot of military sense. The Army ought to follow suit by detaching Gujarat and Rajasthan from Southern Command and forming a S.W. Army Command. It may be recalled that in Nov., 1971 Lt. Gen. G.C. Bewoor, GOC in C Southern Command in Pune had to move to Jodhpur to launch an offensive in the South Western Sector. Placing this Sector under a Command down South in Pune is not rational and the change would be a logical sequel to creation of Northern Army Command and S.W. Air Command itself.

ROLE OF SOUTHERN COMMAND

The functional role of Southern Command needs to be redefined specifically for Training, Orientation, Reserves and an Amphibian Force. While doing so the Army planners should bear in mind future developments in the littoral states of Indian ocean region. Mr. Singh's suggestion for abolition of Central Command is unsound. This Command is the only cog in the long chain of defence from North to far off Eastern borders. Moreover the mercurial stance of the rulers in an otherwise friendly Nepal has made alive our Himalayan borders in the middle sector. Incidentally Nepal is just now in the process of raising another Army Division reportedly with Chinese assistance. If anything the Army could at best examine the relocation of Central Command in Gwalior-Jhansi belt.

AERO-SPACE AND MISSILE COMMAND

Arun Singh rightly suggests the creation of an aerospace Command for the Air Force. The successful test firing of Prithvi and Agni missiles has revived the issue of Strategic Air Command once again. The idea is to raise a few squadrons equipped with deep penetration strike aircraft with a complement of missile squadrons. While Agni is a ballistic missile traversing to the target through the space, Prithvi and long range bombers like Mirage 2000 and Jaguars are both "air breathing" strike strategic weapons traversing through the atmosphere and the doctrine of strategic warfare is basic to fighter bombers as well as missiles.

Therefore it baffles all logic and rationale if the Govt. has decided to assign Agni only to the Air Force leaving the Prithvi and obviously all other "air breathing missiles" for the Army. The prime role of an Army is to advance into and physically capture the enemy territory while defending one's own. To this end battlefield environment control weapons like NATO's Lance and other missiles say within 50 Km range should fall in its arsenal. On the other hand the prime role of an Air Force is to take war into the heart of enemy territory to cripple its will, capacity and potential for fighting through the strikes of deep penetration long range "air breathing" weapons like bombers and missiles. Strategic warfare is thus the preserve of Air Force which has the cumulative expertise of decades and the built in infrastructure for such a role. The nation will be paying through its nose if bifurcation of strategic warfare is allowed by narrow minded authorities between the Army and Air Force. It has to be remembered that defence of India against strategic offensive of the enemy is the responsibility of the Air Force and cannot be bifurcated. How then can you bifurcate the offensive operations?

Moreover strategic reconnaissance by aircraft or round the clock

satellite surveillance is the basic requirement for target identification be it for missile or bomber strike. Apart from the duplication of cost and effort once you place long range missiles under control of two different agencies, dichotomy over C³I of satellite surveillance system would spell chaos and end up in utter disaster. All such missiles in US and UK are held by their respective Air Forces. If the Government decision in this regards is the outcome of pressure tactics by the Army, it will only lend credence to apprehensions of the smaller two Services of the bulldozing proclivities of the bigger senior service.

RIVAL CENTRES OF COMMAND

Why does a former Minister suggest upgradation of the Army Group Commanders and VCOAS and their equivalents in other services to four star status without at the same time making the COAS a five star general? He should know it would dilute the unique status and authority of COAS, howsoever tempting it may be for a politician to create rival Centres of Power. It should be remembered that the nation must at all times refrain from doing anything that would in any way create dissensions in our armed forces, the bastion of our national security in an extremely hostile environment, internal and external.

NDC - CONFUSED COCKTAIL OF NSC & NATIONAL DEFENCE COUNCIL

The third suggestion of Arun Singh speaks of substituting the present "Monday Meetings" with the Service Chiefs with a National Defence Committee chaired by the Raksha Mantri. The secretarial support for the Committee is to be provided by the Defence Planning Staff (DPS) revitalised by addition of "Personnel with wide variety of backgrounds" to arrive at what he calls as "distilled perceptions -- political, military, civilian and scientific".

Any body even slightly acquainted with the Defence and Security management system in the UK and USA respectively would notice that the above suggestion reveals a cross current of ideas flowing from National Defence Council (Apex Defence body) in UK and National Security Council (Apex Security body) in USA. The first is chaired by the Prime Minister and the other by the President. While making a hotch potch hybrid of the two, the suggestion lacks objectivity and structural mandate of both. What is more, the NDC in UK and NSC in USA have both been established through legislative mandates. We do need an apex body for Defence, but it has to be structured and institutionalised the way the British Defence Council has been. If we ever had a duly constituted Defence Council, Krishna

Menon could never dare to consign General Thorats' NEFA operational contingency plan to the fire place as all such discussions would have been recorded. And what is more we would perhaps not have lost thousands of kilometers of our strategic Aksai Chin area to the Chinese. Surely then Chinese and Pakistani frontiers could never have converged through the silk route and they could never have colluded against us jointly in that sector. The strategic equation on our northern borders would have been altogether different. Nothing more can illustrate the bankruptcy of our system any better than this lone example. One of the tragedies of the Indian systems is that foreign policy is made primarily out of political dictates and not strategic compulsions. Military counsel rarely if ever guides our foreign policy.

However, Indian problems of defence and national security cannot be easily identified much less tackled by those whose only qualification is to be close to the seat of power or even having mustered sufficient votes to get elected. The political executives will have to be guided by the considered opinion of men of learning and proven expertise in various disciplines. We have to realise that defence and national security are subjects crucial to the survival of India and have to be treated exclusively.

CASE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

To illustrate the point let us take the case of a scientifically managed system as in the USA. Broadly speaking national problem identification and solution evaluation is carried out by the National Security Council (NSC) which is composed of various military/civil officials besides specialists/experts and academicians coopted from time to time. It has a number of committees like Action and Study, Review and Verification groups, Coordinating Boards etc. Problems are thrown up and researched into by various academic institutions/Centre's, all specialists in their own specific area. Various intelligence agencies also contribute to the inputs of the NSC where solutions are evolved after in- depth study of issues, an elaborate process of elimination and filtration. But NSC is only an advisory body with no executive powers.

Against this, all that the Indian system provides is the Political Affairs Committee of the Cabinet which is an amorphous group of political executives bereft of any competent specialists or academicians what to talk of Defence experts. The inputs for this supreme body come from the R&AW and some omnibus intelligence agencies. Now, how can such an amorphous committee ill-equipped for the stupendous task serve the objects set before it effectively.

A nation-state of 800 million people has to have a positive national

strategy with a clear and widely shared understanding of where we aim to go in the world and how we propose to get there and establish an order of priorities. It has to be a coherent long term national policy based on rational design and consistency of purpose so that each successive government operates within a shared decision making process in the light of complexities of a changing global scenario all geared to protect our national interests. Only a multi-discipline body of top government functionaries and various experts, call it the NSC or any other name can measure up to this task.

DIFFERING PERSPECTIVES

Air Chief marshal P.C. Lal's none too happy observations on the way the Army Chiefs went about their job as Chairmen COSC during 1965 and 1971 wars reveals deep apprehensions of the two smaller services Navy and Air Force under CDS -- perhaps also a minority syndrome. It is also a sad commentary that in India the Service Chiefs are disinclined to subordinate their individual service interests to larger demands of inter-service cooperation. However it would perhaps help to do a bit of heart searching. Certain psychological and historical factors contribute to such difficulties. Army the Senior Service and numerically the largest always bears the major brunt during a war in terms of commitments and casualties. Threats to our security are largely from land frontiers and this perhaps instils a wrong notion in the Army that Air Force and Navy be subservient to it and not as equals. In seeking government approval to its proposals it can put down its heavy foot when it so desires.

On the other hand Air Force the youngest of 3 Services nurses a hurt feeling for the raw deal in snatching the M/R role from it for the allocation to the Navy contrary to the practice even in a maritime country like UK. There is also the case of Army's insistence on a separate share of communication choppers from out of the Air Force inventory. All this it is argued could eventually lead to disintegration of the Air Force. But then the Air Force has only to thank the acquiescence of its top brass when confronted with such contentious situations in sharp contrast to the firmness of other Chiefs. The Navy like most Navys the world over believes in self contained isolation or go it alone doctrine and does not want to depend on other services no matter at whose cost. The way it capitalised on a besieged Govt. welting under a controversial HDW deal to get through the acquisition of an aged and discarded Hermes Carrier long awaiting scrapping at Portsmouth illustrates the point. This second Carrier whose initial overhaul followed by operational and maintenance cost sticks out like a millstone around defence allocations, is suspect for its contributions to maritime defence of the country even by some Naval brass itself. If anything the Navy surpasses

other services in an excellent PR work unlike the self centered Air Force which lives in a false world of its own thinking.

This necessary diversion apart the fact that sinking such differences, our armed forces acted as one cohesive force during the Bangla Desh War goes to prove that such underlying inhibitions are only notional and superficial. Whatever it be there has to be mutual accommodation since such apprehensions prevailed in other countries also during transition to unified defence staff system. After all the CDS appointment at the highest level is only rotational between the 3 services. At lower level some sort of a joint command could be worked out as between the Army and Air Force in Jodhpur in 1971 war. Air Chief Lal writes appreciatively about it; "To begin with the Brigadier General Staff (BGS) expected OC TAC (only a Gp Capt) to work under him. But Lt. Gen. Bewoor and his COS sorted that out. They recognised that the Army and Air Force would be operating jointly rather than the Air Force under the Army."⁶ This type of joint command is precisely the practice in UK's CDS system and perhaps in USA and other countries.

GOVERNMENT PERVICACY

The proposal for CDS was infact mooted by Mrs. Gandhi after the 1971 war. But it could not make much headway since the then Air Chief PC Lal had reservations over it. Subsequently in June, 1982 Gen. KV Krishna Rao, the then COAS advocated the creation of a CDS. Since the opposition supported the suggestion in March, 1983 Parliamentary discussions, the then RM, R Venkataraman rejected the plea probably under the same bogey of concentration of authority in one General as a threat to democracy. The argument is not even plausible since the CDS heads only the operational component of armed forces. The respective service Chiefs continue to control the rest of the Directors at the Service and HQ level.

The failure of the Govt. in incorporating the Service HQs and Financial Advisor in the MOD is highly debilitating to national security interests. There is no unified and Centralised determination of problems, perspectives and plans/strategies or priorities to meet them. Each service has its own set of aims and objectives which if not contradictory to others could be overlapping. Each Service wants to be self sufficient and go it alone. The Army wants to have an Air Force of its own, the Navy has already taken over maritime aviation reconnaissance as well as strike role (carriers). Each Service tends to back up its own weapon requirement out of proportion to a balanced integrated force requirement. There is an overlapping of effort and avoidable waste of scarce resources, men and material. The benefits

of scale are missed and standardisation suffers.

STRUCTURE & FUNCTIONS - UNIFIED DEFENCE STAFF (CDS)

The bulk of the Unified Defence Staff would be drawn from the three Service Head Quarters itself by including in it a large part of the Army, Air and Navel Staff now reporting to the Service Vice Chiefs. The CDS will be the principal Military Adviser to the Govt. charged with the corporate duty of finding best defence solutions whether of an operational nature, strategic planning, defence policy or equipment priorities for the three services after taking into account the views of three Chiefs of Staff. He could be assisted by various sub committees. The agreed collective advice of the COSC presided by him would be tendered to the RM. When agreed collective advice is not possible, he could report the views of other members of the Committee and render his own in the light of those views. While enforcing economy in defence expenditure, the ultimate object is one of progressive decentralisation in management of Services under a regime of responsible and performance oriented budgeting.

The CDS system envisages that the Chiefs of Staff shall normally report and tender advice through CDS to the RM while retaining the right of direct access to him and PM. Service Chiefs would continue as the professional heads of their Services and as members of COSC. They would be fully responsible for the fighting effectiveness, management and overall efficiency and morale of their Services. The need for maintaining separate identity of the Services is best illustrated by the 1984 report on re-organisation of the British MOD which says, "The fighting spirit of the individual man in battle derives largely from his loyalty to his ship, his Unit or his Squadron."

CORE PROBLEM IN DEFENCE MANAGEMENT BEING SIDE-TRACKED

While he has had only a short stint with the Govt. for better understanding of defence management, Mr. Singh's paper in this Journal reveals atleast the basic need i.e. direct interface of uniformed men with the political executives for effective management of our defences. But strangely enough the suggestions made by him for change ominously skirt the very core of the problem i.e. incorporating the Service headquarters in the MOD. Then comes the CDS which is basically an institutional arrangement for effective joint combat operations. We are not addressing the basic problem by assigning the role of CDS to COSC or of defence Council and National Security Council to a Defence Committee as suggested by Arun Singh. Railway Board, SAIL, Coal India, Atomic Energy

Commission, BHEL, ETTDC, ONGC etc. specialists all, manage their own affairs in the Govt. You even have cops working as various Secretaries in Home Ministry! Why this discrimination against those who stake their lives to defend the nation? Don't hurt their sense of patriotism. They are not mercenaries.

STAKES

The formation of a National Security Council is happily now under active consideration. CDS will automatically be the next logical outcome of it. Wars in the sub-continent have been short and swift. Any future war is going to be intense and fought to militarily finish the adversary. Gains made by an adversary initially, cannot be easily offset in a short war. Therefore, effective combat coordination and timely decision would determine the course of events. Let it not be said tomorrow that we botched up the battle because of an antiquated, flawed and fractured defence management system, and some vested interests opposed to change, unmindful of larger national interests. The writing is on the wall.

NOTES

1. P C Lal, *My years with the I.A.F.*
(New Delhi : Lancer International, 1986) p. 158
2. Ibid, p. 162
3. J N Chaudhuri, *India's Problems of National Security in the Seventies*,
(New Delhi, United Service Institution of India, 1973) p. 44.
4. Ibid N I, p. 162
5. Ibid N I, p. 326
6. Ibid N I, p. 285

Employment of Indian Armed Forces*

BRIG P K PAHWA

"Success in war is determined by the political advantages gained, not victorious battles".

Niccolo Machiavelli

INTRODUCTION

India lies in the heart of a region plagued by border disputes, ethnic tensions, separatism and religious fundamentalism. These deeply affect its security and constitute a threat to its existence as an independent political entity. It is the primary duty of a government to preserve law and order within its boundaries and protect its citizens from external aggression. As Negendra Singh puts it "Defence has been a time-honoured function of government and an essential attribute of sovereignty ever since the birth of the political state. The standards relating to functions may have varied from age to age and from country to country, but it is indeed of the very essence that every state, since the earliest days of recorded history, has had an armed force to defend itself."¹

There was a time when Indian military strategy was based on the assumption that its prestige as a non-aligned nation dedicated to peace would be adequate safeguard against external aggression. India got the lion's share of the erstwhile British Indian Army at the time of partition but, through a mixture of naivete and idealism, allowed it to atrophy within a decade. It took the severe humiliation inflicted by the Chinese in 1962 to bring home to the Indian rulers that a foreign policy which is not backed by military might is impotent. Fortunately, India once again has fairly large and modern armed forces. It is also on the threshold of emerging as a regional power. There is a requirement to see that the armed forces are used to the best advantage of the country.

The roots of violence in and around India lie in its geostrategic location and the socio-political and economic realities of the region. A further analysis shows that in the coming years the incidence of interstate and intrastate violence will continue to remain high.

The government of India's right to employ its armed forces is uninhibited

* This article won the first prize in group 'A' of the USI Gold Medal Essay Competition 1988-89.

and has been resorted to frequently since independence. At times their employment has appeared to be hasty and ill-conceived. It needs to be noted that though the armed forces should only be used in pursuance of the country's political objectives not all political problems can be solved by the use of force. The wrongful use of the armed forces could cause immense harm to the national interests. There is, therefore, a requirement to draw up a charter of duties for their guidance and enumerate the important factors which must be considered in each type of situation before they are employed.

GEOSTRATEGIC AND SOCIO-POLITICAL REALITIES

India is the largest country in the Indian subcontinent and among the Indian Ocean littorals. It has a unique geographical location. Mainland India forms the core of the subcontinent with its smaller neighbours struck around its periphery. Both in terms of size and population it is larger than all the other countries in the Indian subcontinent put together. It has a large coastline both on the East and West and island territories well away from the main land which it must defend. Peninsular India juts into the Indian Ocean and dominates the East-West trade route which is also the major oil route from West Asia to the Far East.

The majority of the states in the South Asian and Indian Ocean region have a colonial background and each one of them is economically backward. In most cases, their boundaries are not the natural boundaries representing any geographic or ethnic divisions but are the legacies of their former colonial days. According to A Perlmutter, "The frontiers of the colonial states were defined by conquest and guaranteed by imperial powers, in accordance with the classical nineteenth century, balance-of-power concept. Once the imperial powers withdrew, the colonial boundaries did not prove to be viable. The struggle over the frontier was mainly internal - a struggle over central authority, ethnicity, cultural pluralism, and the control of the military establishment."² These unnatural boundaries have led to violence both at the external and internal levels. Externally, they have led to inter-state disputes about the actual alignment of the borders, territorial claims, distribution of river waters, sea boundaries, claims on off-shore islands, treatment of ethnic and religious minorities, influx of refugees and so on.

Internally, the arbitrary alignment of the boundaries has divided ethnic groups of population into citizens of two different countries, leaving alienated minorities on either side of the border. These minorities have become part of a political entity with which they have no ethnic, cultural or religious affinity. Many of them, as brought out by Perlmutter, have begun struggles against the central authority which, where not handled well at the political

level, have developed into terrorism and insurrection. Such movements may begin as purely internal affairs but they seldom remain that way; in most cases the neighbouring countries intervene, overtly or covertly. Inevitably the country's armed forces get committed, for no multi religious and multi ethnic state can allow any part of it to secede without facing the danger of breaking up completely. Foreign intervention does not stop with the neighbours either; ultimately the super powers also get involved. Morris Janowitz states: "Developing nations are subject in different degrees to external penetration; and even more to the point, each has a series of international linkages and is therefore responding to powerful processes of regional diffusion, especially in its management of the agencies of national defence and internal coercion. A nation's military leaders are self conscious men who come to recognise that the fate of their nation is related to regional and international developments."³ The point that Janowitz is making is that in today's world a country's internal problems cannot be isolated from international power politics - that internal violence is seldom free from outside influences.

India too has several external and internal problems because of the borders that it inherited from the British. It has had territorial disputes with Pakistan and the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir still persists. Currently a warlike situation exists in the area of the Siachen Glacier. With Bangladesh there is the dispute over Farakka barrage. There is also the problem of both countries claiming New Moore islands. The border dispute with China is well known and erupted into a war in 1962.

The border alignment has also caused internal problems for India. The people of Jammu and Kashmir are not yet reconciled to being a part of India. In the North East, there are secessionist movements off and on because the people there feel no particular affinity with the rest of the country. In all such cases there is an involvement of an external power.

Apart from these situations, brought about by imposed frontiers, India has many other areas of violence also. The disease of communalism had already eaten into the fabric of society by the time India became free and it has since spread rapidly. City after city has been rocked by communal violence and large scale killings forcing the government to call out the armed forces. Punjab is still in the grip of terrorism. Hardly has the Gorkhaland agitation died down in West Bengal than one for Bodoland has started in Assam. Naxalite violence is continuing in Andhra Pradesh and the movement for a Jharkhand state in the Central regions of India has a potential for great violence. Every now and then scores of people are massacred in caste wars in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. The list is endless. Several religious and sectarian movements are now raising armed militias under various guises. There is a

feeling in India, and quite justified too, that the government only pays heed to violence. The potential for internal violence is therefore unlimited.

Economic frustration is another reason for internal violence. Here a quote from Gavin Kennedy is apt. "The aspiration levels of the various social groups, peasantry, proletariat, middle class, ruling elite and the dispossessed have risen faster than their competing claims can be satisfied. The minimum tolerable levels of per capita consumption press on the actually achieved levels, and the result is a continual frustration, a feeling of alienation from yesterday's liberators and widespread cynicism at the open corruption of the political elite. There is a continual struggle between competing ideologies to guide the country out of its predicament."⁴ There could hardly be a better summing up of the social and economic causes of tension in India except that Kennedy could also have mentioned the uneven distribution of the fruits of growth.

Lack of democratic rights for some or all sections of the people is another cause of internal violence in some of the countries in which India could be drawn in indirectly. There are very few countries in the Indian subcontinent and Indian Ocean region which are genuine democracies and where the power actually rests with the people. A few are monarchies while others are dictatorships. Even in some of the so-called democracies various constitutional ruses have been used to deprive the people, or at least the minorities, of their rights. Popular movements which are launched for the rights of the people are crushed by force resulting in a flow of refugees across the border. Events along these lines have taken place in our neighbouring countries like Bangladesh and Sri Lanka in the past. The inflow of refugees from the erstwhile East Pakistan resulted in the Indo-Pak war of 1971. Thousands of Chakma refugees from Bangladesh are presently in India causing tension between the two countries. The Sri Lankan problem has of course developed into something far more serious. Several banned Nepali Congress leaders from Nepal have taken shelter in India leading to some misunderstandings between it and Nepal. Such struggles could take place in our neighbouring countries in the future also leading to a large scale influx of refugees into India and possible violence between the countries.

The Sri Lankan problem is a very good example of how India could be drawn into the internal problems of other countries against its will. Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka who had crossed into India after the ethnic riots there were becoming an economic and social burden to the country just like the Bengali refugees from East Pakistan in 1971. The treatment of Tamils in Sri Lanka was also causing anxiety to the Indian Tamils, many of whom had family ties with them. The situation was ripe for a foreign power, which could

have been one hostile to India, to offer assistance to the Sri Lankan government and thus acquire a foothold on India's doorstep. To preempt a situation which could at a later stage threaten its security, as well as to satisfy Indian Tamils, India had to step in and the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord was the result.

Lastly, in the Indian Ocean India's dominant position also imposes upon it certain responsibilities which it cannot shirk without detriment to its security and national interests. The fact that foreign presence is increasing in the Indian Ocean and that super powers are looking for bases in the area makes it all the more incumbent on India to take steps to see that the littoral states are not subjected to undue foreign pressure and that local and regional disputes are contained before outside powers can take advantage of them. This may involve the use of force. Admittedly this sounds like India taking on the mantle of the regional policeman, but India cannot barter away its national interests to stifle such criticism. It is its destined role. Although peace loving idealists may not like to admit this, but India's geo-strategic location and developing economic strength will compel it to assume a role of growing importance in the Indian Ocean and South East Asia. Historically, these roles are analogous to those of Britain east of Suez in the nineteenth century . . . "5

CHARTER OF DUTIES FOR THE ARMED FORCES

GENERAL

It is universally accepted that the military power of a country is an important adjunct of its foreign policy. Armed forces should therefore be used only for political purposes to promote the country's national interests at home and abroad.

The role of the armed forces, as laid down at the time of independence, is to defend our borders against external aggression and to assist the civil authorities in the maintenance of internal law and order when called upon to do so. This role is too generalised and encompasses almost every conceivable situation within the country, on our borders, and even overseas. No country's armed forces can be equipped, organised, and trained to meet all the varied situations with equal efficiency. There is therefore a requirement to further analyses, at least in broad terms, the types of situations that the armed forces might be engaged in and work out a design and charter of duties for their guidance.

There is little doubt that given India's geostrategic location, its socio-political compulsions and economic problems, the armed forces will frequently

be called upon to execute the tasks inherent in the roles laid down for them. "The State depends for its very existence as an independent entity upon its ability both to preserve order within its territory and protect its citizens against external attacks".⁶ The military must assist the government in protecting the political order from external and internal threats. The Indian government which is responsible to preserve order within the country has therefore kept open to itself the option of calling out the armed forces in aid of the civil authorities also. There is nothing unusual in this and even the constitution of the United States empowers its President to use the armed forces against domestic violence.⁷ It is altogether a different matter that their use in this role in the developed countries has been extremely rare. The Indian armed forces could thus be used against foreign forces on the country's borders, in a neighbouring country or further beyond its borders, or within the country itself on internal security duties. The situations could be anything from a full scale war to a border incident and from organised insurrection to rioting in the streets. It is necessary to further examine the likely circumstances of their employment in order to arrive at a charter of duties and decide upon the factors that should affect their employment.

DEFENCE AGAINST EXTERNAL AGGRESSION

The term 'defence' when used in the context of the role of the Indian armed forces has a very wide connotation. It is not merely meeting a physical attack by an aggressor but in a larger perspective is, in the words of a former Defence Minister, "to shield India's economic and technological developments from the pressures arising out of the play of international forces."⁸ Seen in this light defence against external aggression could involve the employment of the armed forces anywhere in the world, be it the country's immediate borders, in a neighbouring or regional country, or well away across the seas. The guiding principles in every case is national security.

Let us first take the case of a full scale conventional war on our borders involving all the three services. This is the most important contingency and all the three services plan, organise, equip and train with this in view. Paradoxically, it is also the least likely in the present circumstances. It presumes a proper conventional attack on us by a neighbour or vice versa. A full scale conventional war is only possible between India and either Pakistan or China because the other neighbouring countries are too small to fight India in this manner. Even with outside help they cannot take on India because of their geographical location. With Pakistan and China also, this type of a conflict is unlikely. The terrain on the India-China border and the physical distance between the two countries by sea will not allow any conflict between them to go beyond the stage of a limited war. Besides, China is already a nuclear

power. These constraints do not apply where Pakistan is concerned but Pakistan is unlikely to initiate full scale hostilities with India because not only is it a much smaller country than India but India also has a clear edge over it in the size and composition of its armed forces, specially the Navy and the Air Force. India, on the other hand, does have the military capability to initiate a full scale war against Pakistan provided it has the political will to do so. It will, however, lose this option as and when Pakistan acquires nuclear weapons. A full scale war beyond India's immediate frontiers is not likely because there does not appear to be any area in the region where such a contingency could arise. Nor do the Indian armed forces have the capability for it.

The next likely employment is a limited war on the country's borders. The word 'limited' has different connotations in different contexts. In the global context it means a war other than a world war. In the regional context, however, it is a war with a limited objective, or a war limited to a particular area of the border, or one that is limited in the use of forces by the adversaries, say the use of ground forces only. Once again such a conflict is unlikely with our smaller neighbours though Bangladesh could sustain a limited war for a very short period to make a point in international fora. It is, however, a live possibility both in the case of China and Pakistan. A limited war beyond India's immediate borders does not appear to be a possibility. India's capability in this regard is also doubtful.

Another area of employment, away from mainland India but technically on our borders, is in defence of our island territories. Considering the location of these islands and the capabilities of possible adversaries, the employment is likely to be against a small opposition. Nevertheless, it will have to be a properly organised operation involving all the three services. The Navy and the Air Force could also be involved in minor actions to protect our off-shore assets or clear encroachment on our exclusive economic zone.

Other possible employments on our immediate borders could be minor border incidents, hot pursuit of terrorists and guerrillas across the border, covert assistance to guerrillas and alienated groups in neighbouring countries, and training of refugees in handling of weapons and subversion. It could also be a show of force in the form of a build up of ground forces, an air attack, or a naval presence.

The independent employment of our armed forces beyond our immediate borders can only be against limited or no opposition from the ground, air or sea in view of their present strength and composition. Thus, the armed forces could be landed by air or sea in friendly territory to assist a friendly government

or friendly forces, occupy a lightly held area as a base or as a preemptive measure, or as a show of force. The quantum of troops, specially ground troops, that could be sustained would however be limited.

EMPLOYMENT WITHIN THE COUNTRY

In their secondary role, the Indian armed forces can be employed within the country on internal security duties. Their use in this role has been a recurring feature since independence and it has been estimated that in the four years between 1983 and 1987, the armed forces were called out for internal security duties many more times than in over two centuries of British rule.⁹ Much as the armed forces may resent this, it is a legitimate task and is inevitable in a developing society. "In a developed society the pluralistic conflicts are constrained and within limits reinforce the stability of the society; in the developing world, the pluralistic conflicts are factionalising and keep the state off-balance."¹⁰ A clue to the extent to which the incidence of internal violence has increased in India is given by the fact that the Public Accounts Committee of Parliament reported that government expenditure on para military forces had increased 52 times between 1950 and 1974.¹¹ We are all aware that it has increased many times more since then.

The situations in which the armed forces may be called upon to assist the civil authorities in the maintenance of law and order fall broadly into three broad categories. First, there is the rioting, disorder and arson brought about by a popular disaffection of the masses and indulged in by unarmed leaderless mobs. Violence is not preplanned but spontaneous and the targets of violence are all symbols of the government like government offices, vehicles and policemen. The armed forces, however, are regarded as friends by the public and they achieve their aim merely by their presence. The use of force on such occasions has been very rare.

The second category is communal riots. On earlier occasions these too were spontaneous but some of the recent ones appear to have been well organised. Stores of arms, ammunition and explosives have been discovered, indicating preplanning and organisation. The target in this case is the rival community and its houses, shops and property. Killings of rivals and settling of old scores also takes place. Once again the mere arrival of the armed forces tends to bring the situation under control because they enjoy the reputation of being non-partisan. There is no direct intervention of foreign forces though it may be in the form of agents provocateurs, subversive literature, and a deliberate effort to aggravate conditions by spreading rumours and disinformation in the world media.

The third category is the one that is the most important for the armed

forces. This is the situation where an alienated minority is agitating for a cause and political and administrative mishandling has turned it into an insurrection. The movement is characterised by fanatical motivation and unconventional style of violence like terrorism and guerrilla warfare. Here the armed forces are the 'enemy' and the active targets of the guerrillas. More often than not, the insurgents in such cases have the support of some foreign power. This is the type of task for which the armed forces are not trained but which they must carry out and the commitment could last for years. The solution to the problem has to be political but the armed forces are required to create the conditions for a political dialogue.

CHARTER OF DUTIES

Having seen the circumstances of employment of the armed forces in various contingencies, a possible charter of duties can be evolved. Primarily, the armed forces must be prepared for a full scale conventional war in the plains on the Western border and a limited conventional war in the mountains. They should be organised, equipped and trained accordingly. In addition they must also be prepared for minor actions like border skirmishes and show of force on our immediate borders. They should also be capable of providing covert assistance to friendly troops beyond our borders involving training and supply of arms and ammunition.

The Indian armed forces should also be prepared to be employed beyond our immediate frontiers and within the Indian Ocean region with limited forces in support of a friendly foreign government or friendly forces. They should also be capable of showing the country's naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

Within the country, the armed forces should be prepared to assist the civil authorities in the maintenance of law and order when called upon to do so. They must also be prepared to combat insurgency and terrorism which may or may not have foreign support.

In short, the armed forces must be prepared to be employed across the whole range of conflict spectrum from a full scale conventional war to border incidents to local or foreign inspired insurgencies. In fact, the likelihood of employment in unconventional conflicts like counter insurgency and counter terrorist operations in the future is likely to be far more frequent than in conventional wars. "It may well be that unconventional conflicts - small wars (in which special operations forces are important) and counter terrorist operations will assume far more important roles in any strategic equation."¹² Yet the suggested charter of duties requires the armed forces to be prepared

primarily for a conventional conflict and tailor its doctrines, organisation, equipment and training for it. This is so because it is not possible to have a different set of armed forces for use in each type of situation. Forces which are prepared for conventional conflicts can more easily adapt themselves for unconventional conflicts than vice versa. They can shed their sophisticated equipment and heavy weaponry and with a little training be ready for unconventional operations. The reverse is much more difficult. That is the reason why, even though the likelihood of unconventional conflicts is much more, all countries basically organise, train and equip their forces for conventional wars.

FACTORS AFFECTING EMPLOYMENT OF ARMED FORCES

Immediately after independence, India was an innocent in the realm of power politics. While it freely used its own military power to safeguard its national interests as in Junagadh, Hyderabad, Kashmir, and Goa, it believed that where power against it was concerned diplomacy alone could be an adequate safeguard. It took the trauma of the events in 1962 to bring home to the Indians what is common knowledge to the practitioners of power politics - *that a country's foreign policy is as weak or strong as the armed forces backing it*. Today, India has the fourth largest army in the world and is the strongest military power in the region. It has, therefore, sufficient military backing for pursuing its national interests provided that the armed forces are employed after careful consideration. It is therefore essential that all the relevant factors affecting each situation are carefully considered before they are employed.

The charter of duties for the armed forces covers a very wide spectrum. The armed forces cannot be equally ready to face all the likely contingencies at all times. They must be employed after careful consideration and under the most favourable conditions if they are to achieve the aims laid down for them. It is therefore unfortunate that inspite of our large and modern armed forces and their extensive employment in support of our political objectives over the years, we have yet to evolve a decision making body at the highest level which has the inbuilt capacity to consider all possible facets of a situation, analyse the various options and their implications, and ensure that they are employed in the best interests of the nations. Much has been written about the requirement for such a body and hardly any writer has ever dissented. It is enough to emphasise here that the need is urgent and without it the employment of our armed forces will always have an element of adhocism about it. It is this body which must consider all the relevant factors and render its advice to the government before the armed forces are committed anywhere. Some of the factors to be considered are of a general nature

applicable to most situations while others are specific depending on the nature of the task and the type of situations. In discussing these the routine military factors have not been touched upon. It has also been assumed that the various non-military options available to the country have already been discarded.

FACTORS COMMON TO ALL SITUATIONS

The most important factor to be considered in all cases is whether the employment of troops is in consonance with the nation's defence policy and will further the national interests. This presupposes that the country's national interests have already been identified, that the total threat perception has been taken into account, and that an overall defence policy for the country exists. Only then will it be possible to define the national objectives in that particular situation which must form the basis of all strategic and operational planning by the armed forces.

The next factor to be considered is the national and military objectives. A word of caution is necessary in defining the national and military objectives. The record of conventional wars in obtaining clearcut and lasting decisions, especially since the Second World War, has not been heartening. It is as yet premature to question the very utility of war as an instrument of policy but it has to be accepted that in modern warfare a definitive victory (Bangladesh was an exception) is very rare. It may therefore be wiser at the political level to limit the military objectives to only creating a situation in which a political solution can be feasible.

If the country is subjected to an open attack, or is under threat of attack, there can be no question but that the armed forces must be mobilised to meet that threat. The only point that really requires consideration is at what stage mobilisation should be ordered. A premature mobilisation might unnecessarily escalate into a war while a delayed one could expose the country to an unnecessary risk.

The factual position, however, is that war these days is not a clear cut matter. There is no declaration of war by any state and there is no clear dividing line between a state of peace and a state of war. A careful decision has therefore to be taken as to at what stage to commit regular troops in such a scenario. Where the initiative lies with us, the armed forces must not be hustled into acting prematurely. The Indo-Pak war of 1971 is a very good example where open hostilities were deferred till such times as the armed forces were fully prepared. Timing is therefore a crucial factor to be considered before employing troops.

In case the employment of armed forces is in the form of a show of

force or covert support to friendly forces across the border, the possibility of further escalation and its consequences has to be kept in mind. The duration of the involvement and its long term effect on our international relations must also be taken into account.

The government sometimes tends to take on too many commitments for the armed forces specially if their employment has led to positive results in the past. A large number of Indian troops are already deployed along the borders and too many additional assignment may not only affect their training but also their morale. This is another important aspect to be considered.

EMPLOYMENT BEYOND THE IMMEDIATE FRONTIERS

In this case also, the question of timing is very important. This is especially so when the nature of the conflict is unconventional and our own forces are not ready for it. A soldier is not a machine. Apart from physical preparations, he has to be psychologically prepared for a new type of war.

The likely duration of the conflict is very important. Not only is a long drawn conflict bad for the morale of the troops and detrimental to the nation's economy, but history shows that such a conflict on a foreign soil soon loses public support at home. Without popular support and the national will to win, the operation is unlikely to succeed. The Russians in Afghanistan and the Americans in Vietnam readily come to mind but few remember that even before the Americans, the French troops in Vietnam had also lost public support at home. It had become a forgotten war till the humiliation at Dien Bien Phu.

It might appear highly negative, but is essential to consider, even before the troops are committed abroad, as to in what way and at what stage it would be possible to disengage. The Americans in Vietnam and the Russians in Afghanistan faced this problem and we in Sri Lanka are facing it now. This factor itself may decide the manner in which the armed forces should be employed. It is for instance, far easier to disengage if the intervention is by the Navy or the Air Force than by the ground forces.

For an involvement beyond our borders in support of a friendly government or forces, the long term effect on the country's economy has also to be taken into account. "Military strategy is the servant of policy but policy must not lead a country to a situation which is beyond its strength and strategy to support."¹³ Such an involvement is bound to be unpopular at home in the long run.

And lastly, the employment of the Indian Peace Keeping Force has

thrown up the question of command and control of the armed forces away from India. Currently an adhoc system is being followed. A proper system of joint command needs to be evolved if best results are to be achieved. Also there has been some controversy and differing interpretations about the command relationship between the Indian armed forces, the Sri Lankan armed forces, and the government of Sri Lanka. Such matters must be considered and decided before the employment of troops.

INTERNAL SECURITY

The most important factor to be considered when employing troops for internal security is whether at all it is absolutely essential to employ them. Too often in the past have troops been deployed as a result of panicky reaction by the civil administration. Apart from the fact that the presence of troops tends to lose its pacifying effect if called out too often, the legitimacy of the government itself is undermined if it appears to be propped up by armed might. This is especially so if the disturbances are caused by a popular movement against the party in power. The use of the Chinese army in Tiananmen Square recently is an example.

An added reason for avoiding calling up troops is that historically the soldier lacks interest in domestic affairs and despises internal security duties. Besides he cannot distinguish between a political problem and a police problem and by his very training regards any problem as amenable to a direct solution. It may thus be that the employment of troops in a delicate political situation could make the situation worse than it was.

Internal security duties may have a deleterious effect on the armed forces themselves. The armed forces personnel too belong to some community or the other and discipline can keep them non partisan only upto a point. Beyond that, as a result of long term involvement in law and order tasks, the armed forces themselves may get factionalised. And worse, notwithstanding their apolitical nature, in the process of propping up an ineffective or unpopular government, they might end up in the role of being the arbiters in politics.

Where insurgency and terrorism are concerned, a few more factors have to be considered. First, the armed forces should be used only after it is abundantly clear that paramilitary forces cannot do the job. The question of command and control involving the armed forces, the para military forces, the police and the civil administration also must be decided in advance and unity of command must be aimed at. The physical and mental preparation of troops is very important. They should be properly trained for the job, and even more important, be psychologically prepared.

Counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism are thankless jobs which place

the armed forces in a non-win situation and expose them to allegations of atrocities. Such operations are conducted against misguided citizens of our own country who have to be brought on the correct path but in the process the people in general must not be alienated. The success of an insurgency or terrorist movement depends on the local popular support it enjoys. If, therefore, in the process of crushing the movement, the sympathy and support for it is enhanced, the action is self-defeating. All these aspects have to be borne in mind. Also, the long term effects on the psyche of the soldiers, specially those belonging to the same ethnic or communal group as the insurgents must be considered. It is almost axiomatic that an insurgency or a terrorist movement today will have foreign involvement. There may even be foreign troops masquerading as local insurgents. In any case terrorists and insurgents would be finding safety across the border. The borderline between external aggression and internal insurgency is therefore quite blurred. To what extent our troops should be allowed freedom to pursue the terrorists or insurgents across the border or take preventive action along the border will have to be decided at the highest level taking into account the international implications.

CONCLUSION

It is sometimes said that a nation's geography often decides its destiny. India's size and geostrategic location has imposed upon it the role of maintaining stability in the Indian subcontinent and the Indian Ocean region. Its actions are bound to evoke accusations of expansionist and hegemonistic tendencies from its smaller neighbours. We must try and allay their suspicions without being dissuaded from our goals. We must also learn to accept such criticism for as Jaime Benitez has said, "The best that a great power can hope for is to be loved by its own, understood by its friends, and respected by those with whom it deals."¹⁴ India is not a great power and some even question its regional power status; few however doubt its potential.

The security situation in India, both internal and external, has never been so bad. As far as possible we must use diplomacy and avoid violence in resolving interstate disputes. But the armed forces are the country's iron fist inside the velvet glove of diplomacy. They represent power, the capability to defend, to coerce and enforce by military means the nation's will. Armed might continues to remain the currency of power in the Third World in spite of all the gloss and veneer put on it by modern day civilisation. It must, however, be used in a subtle manner after careful thought and consideration.

The threat of internal violence in the Indian context is far more than external violence. It is very much the right of a government to use the armed forces for quelling domestic violence. But here, armed might can have the

opposite effect, and after the initial shock effect, end up in further reinforcing the determination of the people to fight the government. Careful consideration is, therefore, necessary before calling upon the armed forces because the issues are generally politically sensitive and the exercise can be counter-productive.

The ultimate aim is to employ our armed forces to promote our national interests. All the relevant factors pertaining to a situation must be carefully considered to make sure that their employment will result in promoting the country's political objectives. Employed thoughtlessly, and in a casual manner, they could turn into an expensive burden for the nation.

NOTES

1. The Defence Mechanism of the Modern State by Nagendra Singh, pp 9.
2. "The Military and Politics in Modern Times" by A Perlmutter, pp 28.
3. Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations by Morris Janowitz, pp 21.
4. The Military in the Third World by Gavin Kennedy, pp 31.
5. USI Oct-Dec 1988, "Committing the Armed Forces Abroad" Lt Gen EA Vas, PVSM (Retd).
6. The Defence Mechanism of the Modern State by Nagendra Singh, pp 9.
7. *Ibid*, pp 10.
8. Mr C Subramaniam, quoted in an article "Defence of the Realm" by Lt Gen SK Sinha (Statesman, 2 Mar 88).
9. The Indian Defence Review - Jan 87, "Civil Power and the Army" by Lt Gen S K Sinha, PVSM.
10. The Military in the Third World by Gavin Kennedy, pp 55.
11. Quoted in Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations by Morris Janowitz pp 62.
12. Strategic Influences in Manpower Planning by Sam C Sarkesian published in Strategic Dimensions of Manpower Planning, pp 81.
13. Defence Mechanism of the Modern State by Nagendra Singh, pp (xi)
14. Quoted in "Military Concepts and Philosophy" by Henry E Eccles, pp 29.

India's Role in the Context of Indian Ocean Security *

LT SANJAY J SINGH IN

INTRODUCTION

The Indian Ocean has witnessed from the sixteenth century onwards, an influx of extra-regional forces vying for supremacy over one another and over the littoral states. These powers sought, in accordance with their perceived strategic and economic interests, total domination of the region. In this they abided by a concept, voiced subsequently by Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan that, "Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia." It was thus that the Portugese, who maintained an ocean-going navy, were able to secure command of the sea in 1503 AD after the Battle of Calicut, despite being chased out of coastal waters repeatedly by the Indians. Consequently Portugese were able to secure a foot-hold in India.

Today the Indian Ocean is witnessing a similar situation where extra-regional forces are seeking to secure domination of the Ocean and its littoral in pursuit of their respective strategies. The region has witnessed a heavy influx of weapons and weapon systems, and employment of the same in consonance with the interventionist and imperialist policies of powers having no more justification for their actions than their very might.

In the last fifteen years, the security environment of the Indian Ocean and its littoral states has undergone a steady deterioration. Extra regional powers have not only contributed to this deterioration, but also stand poised to take advantage of the situation like their predecessors a few centuries ago.

With the exception of Australia, all the states on the Indian Ocean littoral belong to the underdeveloped/developing Third World. Having once gained independence from their colonial masters, these nations are again being subjugated to the will of the super powers whose military forces saturate the region. While India and some other nations have argued for making the ocean a "Zone of Peace" and worked for the same by advocating the ideologies of non-alignment and regional co-operation, these powers have been inexorably driving it instead into a "Zone of Conflict".

* This article won the first prize in group 'B' of the USI Gold Medal Essay Competition 1988-89.

The region remains poised today on the brink of conflict, which may directly scar the littoral nations and their people. In this scenario, let us examine India's role in the context of Indian Ocean security.

THE REGION

The Indian Ocean spans from the East coast of Africa to the West coast of the Philippines, from 20° E to 120° E longitudes and from 25°N to 45° S latitudes. It covers 28.3 million square miles, encompassing 20.7% of the world's sea area and 14% of the earth's surface, and houses almost one-third of the world's population.

The region comprises 36 littoral and 11 hinterland states, all of which (except Australia) belong to the underdeveloped/developing categories. They were without exception a part of the colonial empires of west European nations for the best parts of the 19th and 20th centuries. These states are nascent nation-states with their vulnerabilities and instabilities heightened by their underdeveloped status.

Access to the ocean is through the broad "gateways" at the southern extremities of Africa and Australia, and through the narrow "choke points" of the Suez canal/Horn of Africa and the Malacca Straits. Every year around 30,000 ships travel the sea routes through the Indian Ocean, including some 1500 tankers.

Towards the north of the ocean beyond the littoral states lie the Soviet Union and China, two communist powers hostile to each other and at ideological conflict with the western world. The Indian Ocean also constitutes, in strategic terms, the soft underbelly of the Soviet Union.

ECONOMIC VALUE

Traditionally, the oceans have been used as a medium of trade and commerce, as a dumping ground for wastes from human habitations, as a source of food through fishing, and as a platform for power projection. With advance in technology, the oceans now provide an extensive source of energy, food and minerals.

The world offshore oil production has been rising steadily over the years. It was about 15% of the world's total production in 1969 and rose in a little more than a decade to nearly 23% in 1980. It is further estimated that 50% of the world's oil will come from the seas by the turn of the century. Further discoveries of hydrocarbons are expected to be in the seas, or else in the unexplored regions of the Third World. India's crucial dependence on the Indian Ocean for its economic development may be seen by the fact that nearly 40 per cent of its oil energy needs come from the

offshore installations both on the western as well as eastern seaboard. Nearly 97 per cent of India's foreign trade (which in 1987-88 represented a monetary value equivalent to 15 per cent of the GNP) is carried across the Indian Ocean.

The world demand for food and its production lie in a delicate balance presently. The world's seas offer a vast treasure house of food by the cultivation of marine plants and the husbandry of marine animals. The seas also provide a vast bed for minerals, such as manganese, copper, tin, zinc, lead, gold, silver, molybdenum, platinum, cadmium, etc.

In comparison to the Pacific and Atlantic oceans, the beds of the Indian Ocean are less exploited and provide untapped economic resources.

STRATEGIC VALUE

The strategic value of the Indian ocean can be seen at two levels. At the first level, the region provides a platform to the superpowers to pursue their biplanar strategies. Since the advent of the USA and USSR as super powers in the post World War II era, there has been an ideological conflict between the two which has been translated into political, economic and military spheres. This struggle manifested itself in military force structures and postures, nuclear and conventional arms race, militarisation of space, political alignments, economic competition, etc. The Indian Ocean region - its area, people and resources - is just another ground for super power conflict, albeit a safer one for the western world which itself would be safer from the consequences of a destructive conflict in the Indian Ocean region. This shift in the epicentre of conflict from Europe to the Third World region is eminently suitable to the developed world in pursuing their interests.

The Indian Ocean region is strategically, the soft underbelly of the Soviet Union, and as such provides the US with certain advantages in the likelihood of a full-scale war between the two. It also provides the US with an advantageous position from which to carry on its antisatellite operations in the "Star Wars" programme. The Indian Ocean is thus an important feature of the super power biplanar strategy at the direct conflict plane.

On the second level, the Indian Ocean is the target for the centuries old imperialist policies of the western world. Third World nations are increasingly asserting themselves in international affairs, and the non-aligned movement has been taking them further out of the western sphere of influence. This would necessarily cause a loss in perceived power and prestige of the developed nations. In order to maintain their influence, the developed nations feel the need to dictate the world's politico-economic order, and

to control and influence the Third World in such a way as to subvert their interests to those of the developed world.

In pursuit of this strategy, there has been a constant western and particularly US intervention in the issues and affairs of the Third World. This intervention has been in the form of direct military action, where troops alien to the country in which the war was fought took active part, and indirect military action in the form of arms supplies, political moves and gunboat diplomacy.

US PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

US military presence in the Indian Ocean commenced in 1948 with a base in Manamah (Bahrain). From the sixties, major US naval units have been frequently entering the Indian Ocean. Some major events in US military build-up in the Indian Ocean are outlined below:

- 1962 - During the Sino-Indian war, a task force of the Seventh fleet was ordered into the Bay of Bengal.
- 1963 - US carrier, submarines and surface ships participated in CENTO exercise "Midlink" in the Arabian Sea, though the US was not a member of CENTO.
- 1964 - The CONCORD sqn sailed into the Indian Ocean. A joint US-Iranian exercise was also held this year in which 6800 US officers and men including 2300 paratroopers participated.
- 1968 - Establishment of US military base at Diego Garcia.
- 1971 - US carrier task force from the Seventh fleet entered the Bay of Bengal during the Indo-Pak war to coerce New Delhi.
- 1972 - Indian Ocean declared as the "Zone of responsibility" of the US Pacific Fleet.
- 1974 - 50 US ships participated in CENTO "Midlink" manoeuvres.
- 1975 - Task group of the Seventh fleet carried out exercises in the Persian Gulf.
- 1977 - "Midlink - 77", joint exercises of US, UK, Iran and Pakistan, held in North Arabian sea. Creation of the RDF initiated by Presidential Directive-18, on Aug 24.
- 1971-79 In this period 20 carrier groups of the US visited the Indian Ocean.
- 1979 - One aircraft carrier group deployed on a permanent basis from April onwards.
- 1980 - 80 US and allied warships present in the region. US launched the abortive Force Delta into Iran.

- 1983 - US CENTCOM created (with, ultimately, 440,000 troops assigned to it, including three aircraft carrier battle groups).
- 1987 - 100 US and allied warships present in the region, with direct intervention in the Persian Gulf War.

Until 1977, the US military posture seemed to imply that its interests were served by naval deployments. However, after the Ogaden war the US was probably convinced of the need for force dedicated for intervention in Third World situations. This took shape in the form of the RDF (Rapid Deployment Force). The fall of the Shah of Iran and the Soviet entry in Afghanistan quickened the pace of the RDF build-up, and caused the US to shift its focus on south-west Asia.

In January 1983, the US went one step further and created US CENTCOM (Central Command) which has 'jurisdiction' over 22 countries of SW Asia and NE Africa. This was also the first regional command in 30 years. It is intended for sustaining US interests in the Indian Ocean region, especially in south west Asia.

The US has bases and facilities at Diego Garcia, Philippines (Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay), Kenya (Mombasa port and airfield, and Nanyuki air base), Somalia (Berbera and Mogadishu), Oman (Muscat and Masirah), Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Sinai, Singapore, and Australia (NW Cape and Cockburn Sound).

The US has consistently maintained a large military presence in the Indian Ocean, using the excuse of protecting its interests in the Gulf War and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as a cover for its own imperialist and interventionist policies. Consequent to the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the settlement of the Gulf conflict, the US will have to search for new justifications and may be expected to take up "other interests" in the region after some initial period of part disengagement in actual deployments.

SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE

Soviet military presence in the Indian Ocean has steadily increased since its first entry into the region in 1968. The Soviet Union has been handicapped, however, by the lack of permanent bases and has had its supply lines stretched over long, interdictable routes.

In tactical as well as strategic terms, a large Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean would be disadvantageous in the context of any conflict

with the US, which would be in a strong position to overcome any Soviet naval force in the region. However, Soviet naval presence in the region has enjoyed a limited success so far. It provides a countervailing presence, as in the case of 1971 and 1973 crises. It has also been used in the context of regional conflicts. In 1973, a Soviet naval contingent was despatched to Iraq during its border clash with Kuwait. In 1977-78, the Soviet fleet supported air operations in the Ogaden war. In 1981, the Soviet Union reinforced its naval presence in Mozambique following a South African incursion.

The Soviet Union possesses bases/facilities in Ethiopia (Assab, Massawa and Dahlak Island), Mozambique (Maputo, Nacala and Beira), and Vietnam (Da Nang, Cam Ranh Bay). In the recent years Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean basically transient in nature, has shown significant decline.

FRENCH MILITARY PRESENCE

France is the only western nation other than the two super powers to operate an Indian Ocean fleet. The French Indian Ocean fleet comprises a large number of auxiliaries, enabling the fleet to patrol the Indian ocean for long periods of time without the benefit of major bases. At times, the French presence in the ocean rivals that of the Soviet Union. French naval activity in the Indian Ocean in fact represents about 30 percent of the total French naval activity. If necessary, France could deploy a well balanced fleet including nuclear armed and powered submarines in the region.

France has two main bases in the Indian Ocean - Djibouti and Reunion. Djibouti is strategically located between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. It has a substantial French military presence, including a major air force base at Ambauli. Reunion Island provides C³ facilities and a support base for the French Indian Ocean fleet. If required, this could be developed into a major military facility. France also possesses a number of other islands in the Indian Ocean which could be used as bases. France has created its own RDF recently.

BRITISH INTERESTS

In the late sixties, Britain withdraw its forces from the Indian Ocean but proclaimed British Indian Ocean Territories (BIOT) to assist its allies. In this context, it leased Diego Garcia to the US which has since developed it into a major base. Britain has maintained several pacts for defence co-operation in the region and has participated in CENTO "Midlink" manoeuvres alongwith the US. After the outbreak of the Gulf War, Britain

has kept several naval units in the region. It has also pursued the policy of creating its own RDF.

CHINESE CAPABILITIES

China has displayed interest in the naval capabilities of the littoral states by active defence co-operation. It has supplied missile boats to Egypt, Tanzania, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, and submarines to Egypt. There is a possibility of further development of Chinese interests in the region, followed by deployment of SLBM's and acquiring of bases and facilities.

REGIONAL NAVAL POWERS

The growth of naval power of the littoral states of the Indian Ocean has been slow. This is due to the high capital involved and the lack of indigenous shipbuilding industries. These states have thus been forced to look towards the developed nations for their naval systems, and the latter naturally imposed their own limitations and conditions for providing the constituents of naval power. Consequently, some states, like Pakistan, were able to develop their naval power far in excess of their legitimate security commitments in return for toeing the western line. This factor is amply brought out by comparing the major surface combatants belonging to the regional navies, as given in the following extract from the IISS Military Balance 1988-89:

	Australia	India	Indonesia	Pakistan	Iran	Egypt
Aircraft carriers	-	2	-	-	-	-
Submarines	6	14	2	6(+5)@	-	12
Destroyers	3	5	-	8	3	1
Frigates	9	24	15	10*	5	5
Patrol/FAC	22	32	29	29	34	41
	40	77	46	53(+5)	42	59

@ Migdet submarine

* Procured recently from the US and UK.

Pakistan has only a 700 km coastline with no island territories to safeguard. In spite of this, it possesses a navy almost comparable in size and strength stronger than that of any littoral state (including Indonesia) except India; whereas the Indian Navy is actually far short of the force required to meet India's maritime security commitments. India possesses a 7,000 km coastline (ten times that of Pakistan), and over 350 island territories most of which are at a distance of over 1000 km from the mainland. India's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) itself covers over 2 million sq. km.

Such disproportionate growth of regional naval power, and the sanction to extra-regional powers to develop their military and naval presence in the Indian Ocean, has contributed to worsening an already deteriorating security environment.

INDIAN OCEAN SECURITY : INDIA'S ROLE

India's consistent policy in support of peaceful co-existence and regional stability is well known. Despite having been the victim of aggression four times in the first three decades of independence, India has always maintained the tenets of PANCHSHEEL and strived for regional co-operation. India has watched with concern and anxiety the growth of extra-regional military units in the Indian Ocean, and the consequent disruptive influence on peace and security in the region. Firmly committed to non-alignment, India has observed other littoral states seeking to place themselves in the noose of military alliances, thereby providing a foothold in the region to imperialist and neo-colonialist extra-regional powers.

The Indian peninsula has always been and remains the vital ground of this ocean area. India therefore has to take steps to improve the security environment and be the harbinger of regional peace and stability. With a view towards this, India should pursue a two-pronged strategy:

- promotion of regional stability
- safeguard her own security.

REGIONAL STABILITY

Within the purview of regional stability, India must strive to attain the following objectives :

- the removal of extra-regional military forces and establishment of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace (IOZP),
- promotion of the policy of non-alignment and elimination of foreign powers (and facilities) in the region,
- promote regional cooperation.

The IOZP concept was first voiced 25 years ago by the Sri Lankan Prime Minister at the Cairo Non-alignment Summit in October 1964. The issue again came up at the Lusaka Non-alignment Summit in September 1970. In the earlier formulation the nuclear free character of the proposed zone was stressed, while the later formulations broadened the concept to exclude great power rivalries from the zone and the elimination of bases in the region.

India supported the Sri Lankan call for a IOZP in the subsequent Commonwealth Summit (Jan 71), the Ministerial Meeting of Non-alignment countries (Sep 71), the Kuala Lumpur Declaration (Nov 71) and the Peace Zone move in the UN General Assembly (Dec 71). These calls were made to prevent the intrusion of the arms race and great power rivalry in the Indian Ocean, following the principles of the Antarctic Treaty, Outer Space Treaty and the Seabed Treaty, and were motivated by the establishment of BIOT and the building up of regional bases/facilities by, and growth of military presence of the super powers in the ocean area.

Unfortunately, this call for a IOZP was misunderstood, perhaps deliberately, and criticised by both Western and Eastern bloc nations. It was only in the second half of the seventies that the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries started to support the proposal. However, with the failure of SALT processes the growth of extra-regional military presence only increased.

The US, adhering to Mahan's theory, has developed a military advantage in the area over the Soviet Union. The region also figures prominently in US global strategy. It is very improbable, therefore, that the US would agree to dismantle the CENTCOM or its military bases and move out of the region. It would prefer rather to provide one or the other justification for its continued presence in the ocean area. In the recent years, this was provided by the Iran-Iraq conflict and the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. But with the end of both these factors, it is likely that the US will evolve some other justifications.

India's efforts must therefore be directed at revealing the blatant falsehood of super power claims that their military presence provides stability. Judging by the near total lack of protest to the growth of extra-regional forces, these claims are apparently believed by most of the littoral and hinterland states.

While the developed world has enjoyed peace and prosperity in their homes, their forces have unleashed war and destruction in the Third World. In over 120 wars fought since the second world war, over 75% were fought in Third World countries. And in around 80% of these, the developed nations

contributed by way of direct military action with the intervening powers belonging predominantly to the Western World. The indirect intervention by these powers, by way of arms supplies, political moves and gunboat diplomacy, cannot be quantified. But the quantum of arms pumped by them into Third World nations has at least ensured the latter's ability for mutual destruction and continued conflicts.

The perceived threat to the littoral states security is not from direct invasion by a superpower, but from fears about their own neighbours or from domestic upheavals. In this context, superpower military presence and actions are both vestigial and destructive. The US could not intervene in case of domestic upheaval of a large, populous nation like Iran without having to face an unacceptable level of casualties. The case was similar even for a much smaller Lebanon. In case of small countries where such intervention is feasible, it would merely contribute to a further rise in tension by providing corresponding opportunities to the rival superpower in neighbouring states. For example, activities in Oman result in rival activities in South Yemen, and activities in Somalia and Kenya result in activities in Ethiopia.

Similarly, superpower influence in disputes and conflicts amongst neighbouring states only contributes to further tension and insecurity. By providing resupply operations to warring states in the developing world, the superpowers only ensure the continuance of the war which otherwise would be beyond the former's capacity. Such operations are also vestigial as this reliance on external sources precludes decisions on the battlefield, the war then taking the course of episodic engagements and resulting in a near stationary front, as in the case of the Iran-Iraq war. The 'stability' which the superpowers seek to provide can also be judged by the actions of the US mighty armadas in the Gulf, which have achieved little beyond the destruction of a civil jet liner and killing of its innocent passengers (USS Vincennes, July 88), or the near sinking of one of its own ships by an ally (USS Stark, May 87).

India should also direct efforts at strengthening regional ties and building of a sense of co-operation amongst littoral and hinterland states of the Indian Ocean. This would have the strongest impact on reducing the perceived insecurities of these nations. Most of these countries have faced various kinds of problems : with neighbours (Afghanistan, Botswana, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lesotho, Malaysia, Mozambique, Pakistan, Somalia, Thailand); insurgencies and secessionist movements (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Malaysia, Oman, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Uganda, Zimbabwe); attempted coups (Comoros, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Maldives,

Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan); religious and ethnic strife (India, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, South Africa), etc.

But this is not an unnatural situation. The developed nations also faced such problems for several centuries in their evolution to nation-states, including two world wars. Today they experience a semblance of stability, but only under the threat of annihilation. Despite this they still have their problems, such as in Northern Ireland, Basque secessionism and the Greek-Turkish dispute. If the western nations accept their own concept of stability, then they should invite the Soviet Navy to patrol the Irish and Adriatic seas !

The developing nations will naturally face a period of turbulence in their evolution to nation-states. Any external naval and military presence will not help stabilise the situation. If this be the aim, then such presence would prove counter-productive for it would actually add to the insecurity and tension in the region. The solution to ushering in stability is the strengthening of relations between the nations of the Indian Ocean. The tenets of PANCHSHEEL are more conducive to peace and stability than the guns of the VINCENNES.

The US used the excuse of the creation of a 'power vacuum' in the region to justify its incursion, following the British withdrawal from East of Suez. Many nations succumb to this theory and welcome US presence on the horizon. However, historically the hub of power in the Indian Ocean has been with the Indian peninsula. Following India's independence, and further, the withdrawal of British forces from the region, the logical and rightful inheritor of this mantle is India, not the US. Indian power and prestige should be further enhanced in order to resume this mantle, and to aid removal of extra-regional forces, in the interest of regional stability.

India's efforts should also be aimed at increasing her economic ties with regional states. This can be achieved by providing economic/technical assistance to these states, promotion of joint commercial ventures, military sales, promotion of military training relationships, etc. This would have the multiple benefit of stronger relations with these states, earning of useful foreign exchange and reducing the dependence of these states on extra-regional powers. This would also help strengthen India's own security and thereby contribute to greater stability in the Indian Ocean region.

INDIAN SECURITY

In less than three initial decades since independence, India has been the victim of aggression four times. India has supported proposals for a IOZP, but it is evident today that the prospects for realisation of this concept

are low. Instead the trend may well be towards a greater probability of conflicts in the region. In this deteriorating security environment, India must take steps to safeguard her own security. Indian security commitments with regard to the Indian Ocean are :

- Maintain India's territorial integrity through defence of the mainland and island territories against an attack from sea;
- Ensure India's independence, including taking measures to increase the stakes of intervention by great powers against India's vital interests;
- Safeguard India's economic resources, and offshore assets, including protection of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ);
- Provide support to friendly countries in maintaining stability in the region.

India's coastline extends over 7,000 km. India's island territories in the Arabian Sea (Lakshadweep Islands) and the Bay of Bengal (Andaman and Nicobar islands) number 345. If a number of named and unnamed rocks and islets are included, the figure rises above 600. While the Lakshadweep group lies about 220 km to 440 km from the mainland, the closest island in the Andaman and Nicobar group is about 1000 km from the mainland. The Andaman and Nicobar group itself extends over 850 km between parallels, lying 190 km from Burma in the north and 146.5 km from Indonesia in the south.

The task of protecting the homeland (mainland and island territories) from seaborne attack and intervention is assigned to the Indian Maritime Forces. To this may be added the task of safeguarding India's two million plus sq. km. EEZ with its increasing importance in terms of economic resources, (especially the offshore assets), and also the protection of India's vital sea lanes of communication carrying about 97 per cent of India's external trade. Evidently, the task is formidable.

In order to meet its security commitments the Indian Maritime Forces, comprising primarily the Indian Navy, air force units employed in maritime interdiction roles and the Coast Guard, need a force projection capability in three zones which encompasses the Indian mainland, island territories and the EEZ. In order to protect this area, the Indian Maritime Forces must have *total control* over a zone extending upto 500 km beyond the limits of the EEZ. By securing command of the sea in this zone, the Indian Maritime Forces would be able to engage targets before the latter could bring their weapons to bear upon Indian territory or the EEZ. The zone of total control would therefore necessarily cover the entire Bay of Bengal

in the East, and portions of the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean extending upto 1000 km from the coastline in the West and South.

The second zone is the zone of *medium control*. This zone would extend another 500 km-1000 km beyond the zone of total control. Indian maritime reconnaissance systems should be able to cover the zone of medium control in order to provide early warning of potentially hostile units, which would be engaged within the zone of total control.

The third zone is the zone of *soft control*. This zone would cover the rest of the Indian Ocean. In order to safeguard India's sea lanes of communication, and India's other maritime interests in the Indian Ocean, it is imperative that the Indian Maritime Forces possess a force projection capability at sea (as distinct from force projection on to a littoral state) in any part of the Indian Ocean.

While Indian Maritime Forces have undergone modernisation and expansion in the past decade, this was only in keeping with India's security commitments and was long overdue. Even now, the Indian Maritime Forces have to be developed further in order to meet Indian security commitments along the lines suggested above. In building up her naval power, however, India must exercise care to develop a balanced sea power so as to maintain its efficacy in any environment or meet any contingency.

There are many facets to a balanced sea power, and only a few are stressed upon in the succeeding paragraphs. It is evident that India requires a 'blue water' navy which would be capable of operating on the high seas and discharging its role in the various zones described above. Within this, particular emphasis needs to be laid upon the development of the submarine arm and area air defence capability on the high seas.

The submarine is the most flexible unit at sea, deployable in offensive and defensive roles over a large zone, in total stealth, and for long periods of time. It is most efficient in maintaining command of the sea. It is imperative for India to strengthen her submarine force, as it would provide the single strongest deterrent to any adventurous intrusions in our waters. The acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines would significantly increase the potency of the Indian Navy, especially in its ability to conduct ASW (anti-submarine warfare) and raise the stakes of intervention by external powers.

In order to achieve command of the sea, it is imperative to also attain command of the air above it. This would not only permit freedom of

movement of own forces, but also provide a strike capability against hostile surface, sub-surface and air elements. In waters contiguous to the coast and upto a limited range at sea, this task could be performed by land-based aircraft. The Ocean area covered could also be increased by procuring maritime strike aircraft with longer ranges and positioning them in the Andaman-Nicobar Islands. However, the needs of a naval force on the high seas could only be met by an integral air defence capability which can be provided by aircraft carriers and carrier-borne air-defence interceptors. The anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability of the entire force would also be greatly enhanced by the large number of ASW helicopters which could be carried by these aircraft-carriers. The carrier task forces would be deployed to attain command of the sea, in order to maintain the country's vital sea lanes of communication and other maritime interests, in the Indian Ocean beyond the range of land-based aircraft.

In-depth defense of coastal areas may be provided by land-based aircraft, shore-based batteries and patrol/fast attack craft. But in order to develop a balanced sea power, India must also enhance its capabilities for maritime reconnaissance, amphibious warfare, mine warfare (laying and sweeping) and for replenishment of ships/submarines at sea.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the Indian Ocean which has all former colonies on its littoral has witnessed turbulence in the search of these littoral nations for nation-statehood, and a concomitant deterioration of the security environment in the region especially over the last decade. The superpowers have contributed to this deterioration by pouring in arms and equipment into the region, and maintaining a military presence in the Indian Ocean to influence the thinking and policies of the regional states so as to suit their own perceived interests and bipolar strategies.

The area has witnessed a rising amount of tension and conflicts, and efforts to de-escalate the same or create an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace have not met with much success. India as the main and significant power in the Indian Ocean must lead the way to regional peace and stability. This can be achieved by promoting regional ties and exerting diplomatic influence on the superpowers to reduce their military presence in the Indian Ocean. India will need to continue to discharge its responsibilities in terms of the UN charter and international norms in sustaining regional stability and contain regional disputes and conflicts. India must simultaneously strengthen its maritime forces and develop a strong, balanced sea power in order to meet its security commitments, especially in the wake of the rising tension and increased probability of conflicts in the region.

India has Only One Enemy - Poverty

BRIG RAJ BIR CHOPRA (RETD)

DEFINING THE PROBLEM

I am a simple soldier. I like to think that I served my country to the best of my ability for upwards of forty years, in the Armed Forces and in Industry, before going into what is commonly termed a well-earned retirement. I am and always have been proud of my country; I have rejoiced with it and wept with it, as it has progressed and suffered set-backs, over the sixty and odd years of my thinking life.

I appreciate that the life of my country has been and will be thousands of times longer than mine. Much as I may wish it, therefore, I know that all the improvement that I want India to achieve cannot be achieved within the short span of my life. My training and discipline have taught me to be patient and, believe it or not, to abhor dictatorship. (when I look around at the "shambles" that surround us, on this sub-continent and beyond, I thank the Lord that we continue to remain a democracy). Nevertheless, I cannot get rid of the feeling, which persistently gnaws at my innards, because I love my country, that it is not going forward as fast as it intrinsically deserves to do.

I am neither an economist nor an intellectual, but in my years of work I have faced problems in which I had the responsibility of determining the best possible solution *and* of implementing that solution. Although my years at the University had developed and broadened my mental equipment, it was the Army that taught me how to grapple methodically with a problem and to arrive at a well-rounded, practical and timely answer, which took into account every known relevant factor that had a bearing on the problem.

APPRECIATING THE SITUATION

— The process was known, in military parlance, as "appreciating the situation" and went like this. You began by defining the "Aim" that you wished to achieve. You then considered every "Factor" which may affect the achievement of your Aim, with a view to seeing how to make the best use of the Factors which were in your favour and how to reduce to the minimum the effect of those which militated against the accomplishment of your Aim.

Having thus examined every relevant Factor, you normally found that there were a number of "Courses Open" to the enemy and to you. You first considered those open to the enemy, in order that you may not be caught unprepared by his adopting a course which you had not thought about and catered for. You then examined thread-bare the advantages and disadvantages of each Course open to you, until you were clear which one, on balance, was the most likely to lead to success. Now you were ready to formulate your "Plan of Action"

The Plan of Action began by the statement of your "Intention" and you checked back to ensure that this Intention of yours was in line with the Aim which you had defined at the very start of the entire process of thought. You then went on to state the "Method" by which you would accomplish your Intention; the task of each sub-unit of your Force; the most effective means of coordinating their efforts; the administrative details of how they would be kept supplied with ammunition, food and other requirements; how casualties would be evacuated so that the progress of your Force was not affected and, simultaneously, the wounded received medical aid properly and in time; how inter-communication would be maintained between your Headquarters and the various sub-units as well as between the sub-units themselves.

This logical thought-process has served military organisations well, both in peace time and in the heat of battle, irrespective of whether one is a junior leader commanding thirty men or a General commanding an Army of a quarter of a million. It ensures that nothing of importance is overlooked; that you are not deflected from your Aim by irrelevancies; that each limb knows its precise function and the entire body operates in an organised and coordinated manner - and that the goal is accomplished in time.

THE WEAPONS - EMPLOYMENT AND EDUCATION

Loving my country as I do, I have tried in my humble way to apply this thought-process to the vast canvas which is India. Considering the many and baffling factors over and over again, whilst remembering all the time that the arch enemy is Poverty, I seem invariably to come to this simple and basic Plan of Action; Employment and Education are our two prime needs, in that order of priority.

Productive employment on a regular basis for every able-bodied person throughout the country, according to each one's current ability, is the first need. The resultant earnings, and the continuous creation of real wealth through productive work, would have the necessary snow-ball effect of getting

the country moving forward, with an in-built momentum which would give ever-increasing speed to that forward movement.

A full stomach through one's own hard work leads to the creation of self-respect. The taste, however faint, of a better standard of life gives one the desire for further betterment, for one's self and for one's children. And the fewer the children the better the betterment. This, more than anything else, could be the most potent factor in leading our people towards smaller families, with fewer but healthier and better cared-for children.

Education improves a person's mental equipment and thereby enriches the nation. Potentially, it lays the basis for people to become more employable in a larger number of fields of activity. Combined with productive employment, it further stimulates the desire for individual betterment and for smaller but healthier families. The two together, open the way for continuing progress.

BUT HOW?

How is this basic Plan of Action to be implemented in our vast country? It can only be done in small, well thought-out packets of local effort; productive work must be provided where the people are.

Government should not, and should not be expected to, be solely or even primarily responsible for organising and running those local schemes of gainful work-except as secretary, treasurer, statistician and coordinator if required. In fact it is essential that our people break away from the slavish habit, formed during the two hundred and odd years that we were ruled by foreigners, of running to the "Sarkar" whenever there is a problem.

THE AGENTS

In our democratic system every inch of the country is represented by an elected individual, both in the State Vidhan Sabhas and in the Lok Sabha. These individuals know the territory from which they have been elected, its strengths and weaknesses and its needs. They are responsible to the local people, who had them elected by voting for them. These individuals should be deeply involved in and, indeed, responsible for both formulating and implementing the plans for bettering the lot of the people whom they represent.

There are many organisations which have no political, religious or personal axe to grind and, additionally, have the training, the devotion and

the will to be of use in this great task. There are ex-servicemen throughout the length and breadth of our Country; they have learnt much of value whilst in the Armed Forces, which could be utilised at the local level. There are Soldiers', Sailors' and Airmen's Boards at District level and the Indian Ex-Servicemen's Association as well as Resettlement Directorates at the all-India level, through which the efforts of ex-Servicemen could be organised and coordinated.

Then there are some fine voluntary organisations which, I feel sure, would be delighted at the prospect of serving the people in an integrated and purposeful manner. The elected representatives - the M.Ps and M.L.As - should know these set-ups in their areas and rope them in, regardless of caste or creed. The Ramakrishna Mission comes immediately to mind, but there are several others. In this context, one organisation which has a virtual all-India coverage, deserves special mention; the Sri Sathya Sai Seva Organisation. With an emblem which embodies the signs of all major Indian religions, this outfit contains devoted leaders at State, district, taluka and village/mohalla levels. Its motto - Sathya, Dharma, Santhi, Prema (truth, righteousness, peace, love) - is of a universal character. Not only does it run welfare projects at district and lower levels, but it also has effective ladies' and children's set-ups at all levels. And, most importantly, it seeks to restore the moral fibre of our people. Who will not say that morality - at the personal, social, political and national levels - has been the most serious casualty in the country during the last few decades.

THE TALUKA IS THE HUB

Although broad planning and coordination are undoubtedly necessary at the district and higher levels, it is essential that there should be a coherent, practical plan at the taluka/tehsil level. Not only is the taluka the lowest administrative level but, even more important, each taluka normally contains a large village or small town which is the local market town and, therefore, the hub of local economic activity. Productive employment means making goods which are to be sold, and for such goods manufactured at village/hamlet level the natural and most accessible outlet would normally be the taluka town.

The taluka/tehsil economic plan should be formulated at the grass roots, practical level, taking into consideration locally available raw material resources, with each village panchayat directly involved at the planning stage and responsible for implementation at its own little level.

The AIM of each Taluka plan must be "to provide productive employment for every able-bodied adult in the Taluka now"

What goes for Talukas goes equally for towns and cities. The organisational set-up is already there - metropolitan councils, municipalities, wards and the like.

THE ELECTED LEADER

The elected leader - the panch, the municipal councillor, the M.L.A., the M.P. - has been placed on a pedestal, so to speak, by the will of the people of his locality. He should, therefore, be given the responsibility for ensuring that "his" people have productive employment.

Detailed, practical planning at the village/mohalla and taluka/town level with the AIM of providing productive employment to every able-bodied person *now* is the first, the most important and the most urgent need. Empty bellies cannot be asked to live on promises of a square meal tomorrow, next week or, worse still, at the end of a five-year plan.

Of course higher planning is necessary, at district, State and Central level, but at none of these levels can the primary AIM be forgotten; the provision of productive employment *now*. Having ensured that that has been effectively planned, we may consider ourselves sufficiently free to get on with planning for the future.

LET'S INTROSPECT

I do not know if we, as a nation, have applied ourselves seriously to the task of such low-level planning, but it would not seem so. Otherwise there should have been more visible and rapid progress in defeating the enemy, Poverty. Instead, one reads that the numbers of unemployed and under-employed continue to increase and so do those below the "poverty line".

In the national thought-process, did we define correctly our Aim to begin with - to defeat our arch enemy, Poverty? If so, did we check back, when charting out our Plan, that it would achieve that Aim in the shortest possible time? If so, have we set up the machinery with which to accomplish our Plan? If so, has that set-up proved to be the correct one to achieve our Aim?

We have undoubtedly gone wrong somewhere, else we should have been getting palpably closer to our Aim of licking Poverty, with a larger percentage of our people climbing above the "Poverty line".

Detailed, low-level planning is a bore and a chore, but you have to do your homework if you wish to succeed; there is no short-cut. If you did do it in the first place and now find that the answer you arrived at is not the right one, you have to get down pretty smartly to determining where you have gone wrong, so that you can without delay set yourself on the right course.

AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY

At this stage, let me state another axiom which has stood the Armed Forces in good stead over the years; authority and responsibility must never be divorced from each other.

The M.P./M.L.A. has the authority to represent the people of his area. He must, therefore, bear the responsibility for delivering the goods, by ensuring that the people he represents do not continue to be ground under the heel of the enemy, Poverty. He, and not the Government servant or the voluntary philanthropic agency, is responsible to the people. Place the responsibility squarely on his shoulders, therefore, and let him be answerable to "his" people for failure and, equally, let them make him their hero when he succeeds.

The Government servant who, in the classic sense, does not derive his authority from the local people, should not be burdened with this responsibility. He can provide the "secretarial" services - the keeping of records, accounts, statistics and the like. In all conscience, he already has enough on his plate - running his District efficiently, so that the people are given the "climate" in which they can go about their lives without fear, let or hindrance.

In all this, there is no room for "party-baazi". No matter which political party you belong to, the enemy is the same, Poverty. You can have your little intrigues and your skirmishes, within your party and against other parties, but you may not take shelter behind them; they are irrelevant to the central problem. The poor want reasonably full bellies, and now.

CONCLUSION

I hope this article does not smack of anger or hatred. That was not the intention; impatience perhaps, but not anger or hatred, which solve nothing. The task is urgent and needs to be tackled accordingly, on a war footing. And soldiers do not go to war in a spirit of anger or hatred, but with the clear and firm resolve of defeating the enemy - so that there may be peace again.

Let us, then, look at our Plan of Action critically and objectively, but urgently. And let us ensure that we get down to solid, hard work, particularly at the local, village and taluka levels and the M.P./M.L.A. level, in order to eliminate the scourge of Poverty *now* - not tomorrow or next year. And let us make the "man of the people", the M.P. and the M.L.A, responsible for achieving the Aim, which is the same for all regardless of political creed - to defeat the arch enemy, Poverty.

**"WHAT WE DO" is not what matters;
The glory of endeavour lies in
"HOW WE DO IT"**

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The Grand Grenadiers

A Grenadier force in Europe arose
In the midst of 17th Century,
Which hurled grenades at those who opposed
Amidst grit and Grenadier gallantry.

In India did merge Bombay Infantry
With Marine Battalions of yore,
In 1779, amidst much pageantry
Arose First Grenadier 'de jure'.

As Bombay Grenadiers the Regiment was known,
It fought at KOREGAON soon after,
At MANGALORE and at TALEGAON
It brought its opponents disaster.

Third Afghan war brought it fame
As did EGYPT and Imperial CHINA,
World War I brought it the names
of PALESTINE and KUT-AL-AMRA.

With Prince of Wales they originated,
While Edward and Black reformed,
With Claude Auchinleck they united,
The Grand Grenadiers thus formed.

Under Wellesley's Review in 1922
It came 4th in Regimental seniority,
In World War II it fought at PEGU,
At Mid East, KOHIMA and IRRAWADY.

Three Victoria Crosses in two World Wars
The Grenadiers won with distinction,
Oft 'married' to tanks, this 'Grinder' Force
Drew world acclaim and attention.

With partition grew its strength and fame,
 'Grinders' become quite legendary,
MEWAR and BIKANER, the fabled names,
 Joined them with all their pageantry.

Tall and tough, agile and witty,
 They are as rare a breed,
With men from different communities
 They respect all cast and creed.

From Bombay to Nasirabad its Centre moved,
 with all its relics quite vast
At Jabalpur now rests their glory
 where honours new they amass.

Param VC Hamid and Hoshiar Singh
 Excelled against the Pakistanis,
Their names will leave a haloed ring
 In many a hearts till eternity.

They Pipe to march a 'Back of Bonnachie'
 They Brass the 'British Grenadiers'
They attack SARVADA SHAKTISHALI,
 They'll remain real rugged peers.

An exploded grenade depicts their badge
 with 17 flames of fire,
A Hannoverian Horse its centre has
 and a hackle white they attire.

Verma and Rajendra gave their best
 While Garewal positively did bind,
General Menezes did the rest
 Now Tomar steers to refine.

In excelling wide the Grinders pride
 From Jessami to Jaiselmer across,
From Ladakh's ice to Lanka's tide
 They abound in experience gross.

Highly trained in war and games
 The Grinders are now at prime,
As years go by they'll leave their names
 As footprints in the sands of time.

Maj Anil Shorey
(The Punjab Regt)

Diversity in Unity *

LT COL L JOAWN (RETD)

INTRODUCTION

In his 15 August, 1985 Independence Day speech, Rajiv Gandhi had assured the nation that, in the days to come, the country would become stronger and united. In support of this he had mentioned the accords with the Akalis and the Assam agitationists and the Bills dealing with anti-defection, company donations to political parties and the proposed induction of the 'Lok Pal'. The two accords he had referred to just mark the beginning of a phase. Responsible opinion has it that the implementation of these accords would demand the exercise of the greatest measure of goodwill and give-and-take on the part of all concerned.

But these are not the only problems that beset our country. At a meeting that he addressed at Visakhapatnam on the eve of the eighth general election, Rajiv Gandhi himself had said that 'the Opposition parties with all their ideological differences have been encouraging disruptive forces working in the name of religion, language and regionalism'. And while inaugurating the new building complex of the Andhra Pradesh Assembly at Hyderabad on 3rd August last, he had stressed that 'all-out efforts should be made at all levels to root out corruption'.

The state of the nation is not such a closed-door affair that we need to probe into public speeches of politicians, whichever party they might belong to, to get to know what is going on around us. However, it might serve as a beneficial cross-check to recall the opinions voiced by some of the public-spirited men in different segments of the society. R.M. Lala says that in May 1968, Kamaraj told him : "Nationalism is going down; regionalism is coming up". And a couple of months later, Dr Zakir Hussain had expressed his fears to Lala thus; "We are witnessing the atomisation of our country".

B.G. Verghese, Editor, 'Indian Express' had said in a signed article: "Until and up to Independence the only kind of riot with which the country was sadly familiar was communal. Politicians mobilised people on religious lines and there were periodic clashes. Communal rioting after Partition primarily related to residual issues of security and integration. Gradually

* Edited text of an article sent for the USI GOLD MEDAL ESSAY COMPETITION 1984-85.

socio-economic issues have come to the fore. Political mobilisation has diversified into numerous categories from religion to caste, language and region. The dormant scheduled castes and tribes and other backward classes have begun to assert themselves.

Colonel CL Proudfoot (Retd) is of the view : "And the decline in law and order is one of our gravest problems today, one that is deteriorating rather than improving".

The above quick survey of the state of the nation should make us realise how grave is the prevailing situation. It is said that abnormal situations warrant abnormal remedial measures. But having opted for a democratic form of government we shall have to ensure that whatever steps we might devise are in tune with democratic principles.

Problems faced by our country today are many and varied. One senior columnist has bluntly said that the State has already 'withered'. Though we may not take such a pessimistic view, we shall still have to do an urgent reappraisal of the past and present and evolve at least skeletal projections for the future. To start with, it might be rewarding to do a self-introspection to understand our own 'id' and to satisfy the query whether our mental and ethical make-up is good enough for an intellectually advanced nation that we claim to be.

WHAT AILS INDIA?--WRONG NOTIONS

We seem to be harbouring many wrong notions about ourselves. Some of these notions are deliberately cultivated in order to satisfy our vanity and ego while others are being continuously picked up quite unwittingly. We are concerned in this essay with a few of these notions which keep retarding the nation's progress by leading us astray. We shall take them up for scrutiny where relevant. Here we may mention two of them by way of introducing the subject.

The first is the oft-repeated cliché that the Indian Nation is a fine example of unity in diversity. While probing the roots of instability in India, T.C. Joseph explodes this myth thus: "The characteristics of an unstable society are a weak governing elite and a volatile population divided into groups and sub-groups based on affiliation that do not promote humanistic values ... The Indian character had greater mental equilibrium during British rule, with opposition to colonialism acting as a unifying factor Once freedom had been won and the British had left, there was no common

enemy; (therefore) enemy camps were formed within the country, and hatred grew under the influence of irrelevant factors such as religion, class and caste differences The egocentric Indian ethos is responsible for the country's ills"

The second is the senseless belittling of the benefits that have accrued to us as a result of British rule over India. People forget that even the Indian National Congress, the residual party of which Rajiv Gandhi is the present head, was the brain-child of an Englishman, Alan Octavian Hume. Colonial rule is the scapegoat for all our ills, and there is endless adverse criticism of it, day-in and day-out, much of which is imaginary. Media, both governmental and private, leaders in all walks of life and even scientists, do not seem to be immune to this form of hysteria. A recent example (September 1985) was the announcement calling for questions to be addressed to the Union Minister for Industries for the 'Janvani' programme on Doordarshan. The announcers, both at Delhi and at the regional centres, had been given scripts which read: "Prior to Independence not even safety pins were being produced in India".

Attempts to pervert history might boomerang on us some day! Besides, as a nation we should learn to differentiate between reality and illusion, truth and untruth, right and wrong, and good and evil.

THE INDIAN ETHOS

As a race, we are lethargic and ease-loving. We have made it a habit to blame the climate and the weather for these failings of ours. In most parts of India, rural in particular, the womenfolk work both at home and in the fields or factories or offices, whereas men spent part of the day sleeping, gossiping, smoking 'hukah', or even drinking local brews. As a result, duties and responsibilities of different members of the household are often forgotten or neglected. Children grow up unaided with respect of canalisation of thought processes. Therefore, many of them gradually become unmanageable at home, unmanageable at the educational institutions they attend, and unmanageable later on, in adult life. Probably India is the only country in the world where educational institutions remain closed for the slightest political excuse.

This state of affairs can be changed by prescribing 'Civics' as a compulsory subject upto and including University level, and 'Logic', in addition, for college students. Fresh text-books may have to be compiled taking advantage of the experience gained during the last 38 years. (Student misbehaviour may be a growing world phenomenon today. But we are presently concerned with reshaping our country).

It is often said that ours is a tolerant and peace-loving society. This cliché might have gained currency because some religions, other than 'Hinduism', have managed to get a slight foot-hold in the country. But it is not true. This should be apparent from the treatment meted out to Buddhism in this country, -- the land of its birth. Our literature is full of accounts of religious wars among our own countrymen. (Those wars still keep breaking out, only they are nowadays referred to euphemistically as 'communal clashes').

Next in the order of importance is our perception of loyalties. This failing is considered an appreciatory quality and is indulgently referred to as 'strong family ties'. That even our elders of today subscribe to this contrariness in our attitude towards fellow humans -- that of 'concentricity' with respect to one's kith and kin and of 'centrifugence' with respect to others(outsiders).

It would appear that the forces of 'progress' were defeated then. Over the years the 'status quo' forces have gained considerably in strength and support and, as a result, it might prove very difficult to uproot them from their entrenched positions. But a sincere, all-out effort will have to be made to rid India of such corrupting and corroding influences by including these aspects also in the moral instruction to be imparted to our countrymen as suggested earlier, and by leaders in all work-spheres setting a good example for others to follow.

The average Indian is highly secretive by nature. When this failing stops with the individual only mental development of fellow humans tends to stagnate, or is even retarded, e.g., an expert artisan vis-a-vis his pupil. It is said that many skills and arts have been lost to the Indian people because of ultra-secretiveness on the part of the elder experts. When this failing pervades organisations like the government, for instance, the whole nation suffers. Openness is a consciously cultivated habit. It takes time to become a second nature, but we may plan to make a beginning now.

Outside the limits of social intercourse within a family or a 'jaati', the Indian is an unsocial being. We do not have people's organisations worth the name, and if we do have any, they are those that have been set up for someone in particular to climb up the ladder-individually, just by himself.

The answer to this is, first, to buttress our democracy with popular, people's organisations, and second, to wean away trouble-makers from their intent and canalise their energies in gainful pursuits. A possible third is the flourishing of the 'co-operative' instinct in people leading to more satisfying results in the 'co-operative movement'.

People should welcome any organisation that would represent their cause collectively as is evident from the tremendous popularity of a network programme on Doordarshan portraying a woman crusader against social evils.

But liking a television programme and wanting to take collective action against social wrongs will not by themselves bring about organisations. We need initiators, organisers, administrators, fund collectors and unassuming, willing workers. At the present juncture such volunteers are difficult to find. However, with proper 'status' incentives we may succeed in attracting the right types.

THE NON-EXISTENT INTELLIGENTSIA

The 'intelligentsia', as different from the 'literati', is the back-bone and life-force -- the 'kundalini' -- of a nation. Like the 'kundalini', it remains inert and passive until it is energised for action. But the intelligentsia is ever vigilant to impropriety, injustice and exploitation, and does not hesitate to take up the cudgels whenever necessary. Thus the intelligentsia is the rudder of the nation and in its absence or malfunctioning, the dependent people lose their moorings and bearings.

We have to face the fact that India does not boast of a robust intelligentsia unlike most advanced countries. From the literary and academic angle we are an advanced country, but we sorely lack a substantial intelligentsia which serves as a bulwark against authoritarianism and all forms of injustice and exploitation. Until we acquire one we are not likely to overcome the obstacles on the way and commence our journey on the road to progress.

The non-existence of an intelligentsia group among our people is not peculiar to modern times only. The lack of it was commented upon by Alberuni as early as in the 11th Century A.D.

It is not that we do not even have individual crusaders among us. We also have organisations like the People's Union of Civil Liberties, People's Union for Democratic Rights, Citizens For Democracy (CFD) and so on. But their strength is so small and, therefore, their voice is so weak that they are easily silenced; for example, the CFD is presently in trouble over its report on the Punjab.

Intelligentsia would not take root in rocks or barren ground. It requires fertile soil. Turning over the All India Radio and Doordarshan to the control of autonomous corporations might help -- in the long run.

SECULARISING INDIA

The gravest danger India is now facing is the lack of harmony among various religious communities, or rather, between Hindus on the one hand and Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, etc., individually, on the other. The reason for the disharmony is no longer a nebulous concept. Subsequent to the partitioning of India, some of the Hindu leaders have begun to feel that what is left over belongs to the Hindu religious community only, and so all other communities may continue to live in India subject to the Hindu community's sufferance only. Unfortunately for this small group within the majority community, the Constitution is not on their side. Nor are any right thinking people. However, since elections have now become a mere numbers game, and as any party which is assured of wholehearted support from the majority community is sure to win, some of the political parties in the field have started wooing the Hindu voter. As a result, already large-scale polarization has taken place in the body politic.

We are now sitting on the lid of a powder keg with people and parties preaching for the transformation of India into a 'Hindu' State, and even hinting that they would not be averse to the use of violence. Any time the explosive inside may go off disintegrating everything in sight. Therefore, immediate action is needed to defuse the situation.

Indonesia is trying to keep its multi-religious citizenry in check by compelling all political parties and organisations by law to adopt the State philosophy of 'Pancasila' (Panchsheel) as their own. 'Pancasila' stipulates: (a) belief in God, (b) humanism, (c) democracy through consultations and consensus, (d) national unity, and (e) Social justice. We may adopt a similar measure as suits our peculiar conditions.

CROWDING INDIA

At the time of partition, the population of residual India was approximately 350 million. During the last 38 years we have added another 400 million to this figure. The Union Ministry of Health has urged on all States to achieve a birth rate of 21 per 1,000 and a death rate of 9 per 1,000 by A.D. 2000. Due to this imbalance between the birth and death rates, the country's population will record further growth. According to P.H. Reddy, Director of Population Centre, Bangalore, based on the 1981 Census the population of India as on 1.3.1985 was about 685 million. This figure is likely to increase to 1,003 million by 2001. He predicts that as per present indications there will not be any food problem in A.D. 2001. But food is not the only need of humans; living space, house building materials, medical

care, clothes, education, recreation, employment, travel facilities and so on will have to be provided for this increased number. According to the Planning Commission, we already have 320 million below the poverty line, and this will increase to 500 million by A.D. 2001. So the struggle for grabbing the meagerly available 'fishes and loaves' will get intensified. And how are we to find so many extra jobs?

In the opinion of the Worldwatch Institute, India has to strive for the goal of the one-child family norm if it is to avoid a decline in living standards. India has rejected this suggestion as unsuitable to our country. Similar opinion has been voiced by Mrs Avabai B.Wadia, President of the International Planned Parenthood Federation and President of the Family Planning Association of India. The Government has also ruled out any compulsory family planning (FP) measures as we are committed to the democratic approach.

It has been forecast that very soon India would be overtaking China's population which country had pushed through draconian measures to achieve a 'zero' birth rate. It is a pity that when we are unable to absorb even the educated youth at the present level in jobs we are still not serious about our perceptions for the future. There is already a feeling that an overwhelming majority of the volunteers reporting at the FP clinics are those who would in any case have opted for FP, with or without governmental help. Therefore, the government's present programme touches only the fringe of the community groups for which FP is a must. The reasons are not far to seek.

Delivery of children is a natural function of the woman. Except in very rare cases it does not weaken her. Secondly, except at the time of labour pain a woman gets immense pleasure in being associated with babies. Thirdly, many-children norm is considered an index of the fertility of the woman and the prosperity of the family, in our society. Fourthly, bringing up many children is not a problem at all for people who know how to make the extra rupee. Fifthly, as parental care is minimum in our country, one or many makes no difference. And finally, as pointed out earlier, the concept of 'Indianness' and one's duty towards the community and posterity are yet to be even remotely felt by the average Indian. For example, it has been reported that, at the present rate of felling of trees, denudation of our forest wealth will be complete by A.D. 2000. Who cares?

Even in a democratic set-up many measures can be adopted with a view to discouraging the large-family norm. Prevention of plural marriages which are taking place throughout the country despite the law, open

encouragement of celibacy, abolition of maternity leave, stoppage of all maternity benefits including medical expenses, taxing of confinement charges, total lifting of prohibition, tax benefits to the unmarried, strict vigilance over cleanliness of streets and surroundings, compulsory free education to all citizens up to the high school level, prevention of begging and alms-giving, prevention of child-labour, compulsory national developmental work service, and so on are some of the measures which ought to be tried out. On the other hand, such welfare-propos as mid-day meal schemes are likely to encourage large-family norm among Indians.

THE RESERVATION SQUEEZE

Next to the communal frenzy, it is the 'Reservation' issue that has taken the heaviest toll in human lives. At the time of writing, the beneficiaries of reservations constitute about 70 per cent of the population. More community groups are standing in the queue clamouring for inclusion in the list. The Centre has neither formulated nor intends formulating any common national policy to deal with this problem. At the State level there is utter confusion. Although the Supreme Court had directed in 1963 itself that reservations should not exceed 50 per cent of both jobs and seats in educational institutions this ruling is yet to be implemented in many States.

Reducing this problem to brass tacks we are faced with the following facts:

- (a) During the last 38 years India's population has more than doubled.
- (b) The increase in the number of educational institutions as well as seats in them(not universities, but certainly taking into account day-cum-evening colleges and correspondence courses) during the same period is not commensurate with the increase in population. With respect to schools up to Higher Secondary level, the growth is much less.
- (c) Any further increase in job opportunities, taking into account the efforts being made and planned in this direction, is going to be only marginal vis-a-vis the mounting population.

The turn-out of the backward castes at the polling booths is roughly 80 per cent of the eligible voters among them, which will stand in the way of any political party receiving a mandate to abolish or drastically amend the reservation policy. Hence the hesitation in the country. But reservation is not a statutory compulsion. Therefore, any bold leader should be able to revise the benefits and remove the element of injustice inherent in them.

The following suggestions are put forward as a possible way out:

- (a) Abolish all reservations.
- (b) Make available free educational facility up to Higher Secondary level to all the economically backward students, irrespective of caste or creed.
- (c) Select specific number of promising students from scheduled castes and tribes every year and give them expert coaching for higher studies, and any other assistance required to pursue the studies. (The Constitution does not specify 'Harijans' therefore, these benefits should be made applicable also to all members of the scheduled castes and tribes who had become Muslims, Christians, Buddhists, etc., and who continue to be economically backward).
- (d) Reserve for the scheduled castes/tribes only a small percentage of jobs at the lowest level of recruitment, and a reasonable number in senior positions for which direct recruitment is resorted to.
- (e) Subsequent promotions to be based on service-cum-merit.

THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGE IMBROGLIO

The official language problem in our country, as far as national integration is concerned, has two aspects. The first pertains to the regional language. Subsequent to Independence, States were reorganised on linguistic basis. The reorganisation generated further discord in its wake. Though the disputes that arose as a result, such as the Belgaum boundary dispute, the 'sons of the soil' movement in Goa, the Shiv Sena stir against non-Maharashtrians in Bombay, and so on are still simmering they are fairly localised ones and are, therefore, controllable.

The second pertains to Hindi which has been declared as the official language of the Indian Union (and the mode of communication between various States) for the simple reason that its various forms are spoken by about 51 per cent of our population. Whereas the Hindi protagonists of the North wish to bring to fruition the constitutional provisions on Hindi, the Southern States, particularly Tamil Nadu are attempting to extend the moratorium on the use of Hindi. In the process, some basic facts about Indian languages either are lost sight of or have been elbowed away from the line of sight, they being unsavoury.

Let us put the record straight so that we do not keep chasing shadows. First of all, the commonly held belief that Sanskrit is the mother of all

Indian languages is incorrect. In the words of Kaka Saheb Kalelkar, noted Sanskrit scholar: "It is rather curious that Sanskrit should have been called the 'Deva-Bhasa' or the language of the gods when history shows that it is the result of the conscious efforts of the Aryans to fuse many original Prakrit dialects into a polished speech All the languages and dialects of ancient India have contributed to and enriched the vocabulary of Sanskrit".

Due to several centuries of neglect all the important languages of India had stopped growing and they are still at their original level of development. They have all seen their heydays and those days will never come again. It is unbelievable that we cannot even coin the name of a village or town as sweet-sounding as days of yore!

Sanskrit, of course, has a substantial vocabulary as the elite and the literati had spent all their time and energy only on the development of this single language. We can re-borrow words from Sanskrit and use them to express better in a different Indian language. But many key technical words in Sanskrit are jaw-breaking and are not suitable for general use.

Hindi, though a very sweet and easy language, being of very recent origin has very little tradition and only minimal literature. Its vocabulary is insufficient for modern use. Aware of this shortcoming, the Indian National Congress appointed a committee in the 1920s to compile an exhaustive dictionary. Half a century later that committee reported failure of its assigned mission. (It might interest the reader to know that when the Russians were faced with a similar problem they set up a committee in the 18th or 19th century. Those stalwarts laid the foundations of Modern Russian).

Language is meant for communication. If we have to continually borrow words from foreign languages, then Hindi can at best be only 'pidgin Hindi'. Alternatively, students cannot make a sudden jump and learn a foreign language from scratch when they have to pursue higher studies. No, we have to have a language which will meet all our needs at minimum cost and effort. Additionally, Hindi has no market outside India. With our ever expanding population and shortening horizons of work it will be in our selfish interest to adopt an international language as our official language.

Many Indians are already well conversant with English. From 15 million at the beginning of the 19th century the number of people who speak English has risen today to 700 million. The number of non-native users of English around the world overtook the number of native speakers several years ago. We will not lose face by adopting English as our official language as already nearly one fourth of the world's population is using English. After all, how

much use does a villager put his mother-tongue to? Very little. He needs the assistance of a learned man or a specialist to take up his work for him. This way we can not only resolve the differences amongst us but also reap the benefit of putting an international language to greater use in India.

We can still find use for Hindi as the common language for spoken communication. By adopting the three-language formula all Indians will be on equal footing.

CONCLUSION

We have examined in this essay some of the very pressing problems that are threatening to disintegrate our country and have tried to find workable solutions for each. Very few political leaders seem to be able to gauge the desperate situation that our country is heading for. We seem to be going down an abyss and unless there are many willing and strong hands to pull the country upto the top, very soon we are likely to lose our foot-hold, shape and identity.

At this juncture it may be inspiring to recall what H.G. Wells had written of us: "Such was Asoka, greatest of kings. He was far in advance of his age. He left no prince and no organisation of men to carry on his work, and within a century of his death the great days of his reign had become a glorious memory in a shattered and decaying India."

There were no foreign invaders to cause the 'shattering and decaying' that our country underwent after Asoka's reign. The virus developed from within The consequential weakness persists to this day. We are presently witnessing a similar process taking place as it did after the death of Asoka. We should not allow history to repeat itself.

The world is expecting much from us.

Military Leadership in War*

LT GEN M L THAPAN PVSM (RETD)

Older readers of the United Services Institution Journal will recall the caricature of the peace-time regular officer which emerged between the two World Wars -- Colonel Blimp -- always depicted as a bald, red-faced man with a walrus moustache, at home in his world of pig-sticking, polo and Poonah; fond of his gin and brandy pawnee, but totally at sea in his chosen profession of conducting military operations. The intensity of fighting in the Second World War saw the near total elimination of this species; the few that survived sat out the War, waiting for peace to return, so that they could get back to "real" soldiering. But just as a garden, unless well tended, suffers from an incursion of weeds, so also must the defence services be on their guard to prevent a recurrence of this species, infiltrating their higher ranks.

Whilst the outcome of any war depends on several factors, moral, material and physical; in the last resort it depends on leadership, and the way in which operations are conducted. As the author puts it in this deeply analytical study of higher command, "Although at the lower levels of command, a few weak links in the chain may have to be accepted, nothing can compensate for shortcomings at the top. A first class operational commander will often succeed, despite all sorts of handicaps, and an indifferent one fail, despite many advantages, if confronted by a well-led enemy. Virtually no price is too great to pay to ensure that only the very best men occupy the higher command positions, and that they are properly prepared to carry out their tasks."

General Sir Frank Kitson is well qualified to address himself to the theme of his book; that of finding leadership for the forces of democratic governments who may be involved in limited armoured and mechanised warfare, or prolonged counter insurgency. He was commissioned in the Rifle Brigade soon after the end of the War, and saw service in Kenya, Malaya, Oman, Cyprus and Northern Ireland. He is the British Army's leading expert on counter-revolutionary war; has commanded an armoured division, the Staff College and has held important appointments in the Ministry of

* *Directing Operations* by Frank Kitson, Published by Faber and Faber Ltd., 3 Queen Square, London WC1N (U.K.) 1989. Pages 190, Price \$ 12.99

Defence. He spent the final three years of his service as Commander-in-chief, United Kingdom Land Forces.

He begins his book with a reasoned assessment of the form that warfare may take in the nuclear age. Saner elements in the leadership of both super-powers are now convinced that the use of nuclear weapons cannot be limited; if employed escalation would follow, leading to mutually assured destruction. However, they do have a deterrent effect, and their present distribution amongst the major powers, ironically, has proved beneficial, in that most conventional warfare is waged at a lower intensity level than would otherwise be the case. He proceeds to describe the pattern of high intensity operations which may develop in a conflict between well-equipped forces, in Europe or elsewhere, stopping short of a nuclear exchange. The pressures on commanders at all levels and their troops would be very great, and General Kitson rightly disabuses those who hold the fanciful view that modern technology dispenses with the human element of stamina, discipline and courage. He then goes on to describe the forms of low intensity operations, mainly those relating to insurgency and the means adopted to counter it. Here, the soldier has to operate under several restraints; political, legal, lack of intelligence and the need to carry public opinion with him.

The major portion of this book is devoted to the qualities that are required of a commander who may be called upon to lead his men in these different operations, and how they may be developed. Command in peacetime is as important a function as in war; the transition from one to the other is so short that there is no time available to make good lapses caused by complacency, inertia or sloth, in peace. Of the qualities which an operational commander should possess, General Kitson stresses those of physical and mental energy, physical and moral courage; the latter is of supreme importance, a commander must not compromise on issues where no compromise is possible; self confidence, which can come only with knowledge, wide experience and diligent study; the ability to make sound decisions and finally, to see them through with determination. There are other qualities too, which he covers in his overview, integrity, loyalty, trust, approachability, clarity of thought and expression, to mention some.

There is a chapter on the qualities required of officers whose business it is to support operational commander -- the general, administrative and logistic staffs, and those in charge of training establishments. The author also examines the political interface; the problems that senior officers face in formulating defence policy in the higher echelons of governments; the necessity for them to have moral courage when unpopular recommendations have to be made to the politicians, and to have the backbone to stand up

for the commanders in the field against politically motivated, but militarily unsound proclivities.

The last three chapters of this book suggest a reappraisal of how officers should be prepared to command troops in war, bearing in mind the changes which have occurred in the last forty years or so, since the end of World War II. These are of the greatest interest and merit careful consideration. The key to the future is younger commanders. They will emerge through balanced career planning, by exposure in various fields, which will help discern the direction in which an officer's natural aptitude and temperament lie. Staff, instructional and administrative experience go towards the development of a rounded personality of potential commanders; but to maintain a youthful profile they must not stay too long in such assignments. The career prospects of those who do not make it to the top must not be ignored; however, the Services should guard against a proliferation of higher ranks, created solely for this purpose. Above all, the system of selection of higher commanders, in whose hands the future of a nation's security is to be placed, must be objective. As the author says: "It is all too easy in peacetime to make allowances for shortcomings.... out of a mistaken sense of fairness, a man may be allowed to continue in a job after it is evident that he would not be able to do it in an operational situation...such an attitude shirks the possibility that a future operation could be jeopardised to say nothing of the peril in which many other people would be placed."

Military history is replete with examples of such misplaced generosity.

This is a thought provoking book which all those engaged in the formulation of higher defence policy in the Ministry of Defence and Services Headquarters, would do well to study. The large sums of money provided and the sacrifice that the nation makes towards its defence, when put to the test, would come to nought, without good leadership. Such students will find General Kitson's recommendations, distilled as they have been over forty years of active soldiering, of value to them, in working out the reforms which they may wish to undertake, in consequence.

Modern Military Law*

MAJ GEN S C SINHA PVSM (RETD)

In his preface Mr Rowe identifies two sorts of readers at whom his book is primarily aimed. Firstly, it is the layman, widely read on defence matters, and eager to inform himself more fully about their legal aspects. The other is the lawyer, with the intention to use it as a text or reference book. Since the contents in the first part deal only with British military law, it would naturally be of limited interest to readers in India. But with so much of our present day laws, both civil and military, having come to us from our British colonial past even this portion of the book will be of more than passing interest to Indian readers. The second portion of the book, which deals with various aspects of international laws of war, including the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two 1977 Protocols, is of course of universal interest.

Till 1981 the Armed Forces Acts in Britain used to be renewed by acts of Parliament each year. After 1981 the three services Acts are required to be reviewed and re-enacted by Parliament after every five years. This practice enables Parliament to amend, introduce or even delete any of the provisions of these acts. In a recent review for instance a provision was enacted to introduce new military offences to cover any person intentionally impairing the efficiency or effectiveness of any service property or interfering with or modifying any message or signal. The object of this new offence is primarily to deal with those servicemen, who interfere with a computer by intentionally altering its programme. This laid down requirement, of the Acts being reviewed every five years by Parliament, ensures that its provisions are kept abreast to meet the changed circumstances in the Services and is a desirable feature, of which our law makers could well take note.

Previously civil courts in Britain could try again the same offences that had already been tried by Courts martial. This was to ensure that in all matters of jurisdiction, between military and civil courts, the authority of the civil courts prevailed. This is no longer the case in Britain since now a soldier, who has been tried by Court martial or by his Commanding Officer, cannot be tried again for that offence by a civil court. The Mother

* *Defence - The Legal Implications: Military Law and the Laws of War* by Peter Rowe.

Published by Brassey's Defence Publishers, 24 Gray's Inn Road, London WC1X 8HR, U.K. 1987, Pages 447, Price \$ 29.95

of Parliaments has thus given short shrift to this aspect of the much vaunted principle of civilian authority always prevailing over the military, a principle much over-worked in our country to the advantage of our civil administrative services.

The British Army has the same three types of courts martial as in the Indian Army -- The General Court Martial, District Court Martial and a Field General Court Martial (Summary General Court Martial in our case) and they do not have the equivalent of our Summary Courts Martial in the British Army). But in procedure there are some major differences. In their case a general court martial must be, while a District Court Martial may be, assisted by a judge advocate from the staff of the Judge Advocate General. In our case all but a Summary Court Martial must have a judge advocate. In Britain the judge advocate is an independent legally qualified official appointed by the Lord Chancellor and is not, therefore, a member of the military command structure.

Calling out the military in aid of civil power is an interesting aspect covered in this book. In Britain, apart from Northern Ireland, the Army and Navy were last used in place of the police in 1919. Since then although there have been several occasions of public disorder, even on a scale that may well have presaged the 'military option' to control it, it has been the local police force supplemented by other police forces, that has borne the brunt of maintaining order. This was largely due to the awareness of the British Govt that a properly trained and equipped police force is able to cope with most situations. The author feels that the creation of a third force or Para Military police force, like the CRS in France or former 'B' Specials in Northern Ireland, is not politically a realistic alternative to the use of the police or the military. Since containment of disorders by minimum force is considered to be a basic tenet of maintaining order, he feels, it would set a dangerous precedent to employ, at the outset, a para military force. Far better, it is thought, to hold in reserve the Army to be used only if minimum force used by the police proves obviously to be inadequate. Of course, the practice followed by the British in their colonies was not of such a benign pattern, and of which Jallianwalah Bagh is perhaps an extreme example.

The book contains a very interesting discussion on the British official Secrets Act. This is of equal interest to us in this country as the existing Indian Official Secrets Act is a hang-over from our colonial past and closely resembles in form and substance the British version. The author shows what ridiculous situations can result from a strict application of Section 2 of the British Act. He shows how a soldier, who disclosed to his mother that there

was a green filing cabinet in the guard room could be charged with having committed an offence under this section. Fortunately, the British law provides some safeguards as the consent of the Attorney General is required for such prosecutions, which we do not have. The trial in 1985 of Clive Ponting, an assistant secretary at the Ministry of Defence, who was charged with an offence under this section for passing on documents relating to the sinking of the Argentinian cruiser, the General Belgrano, to Mr Dallywell, an MP, brings in a new perspective to these outmoded laws. In this case although the trial judge summed up to the jury that Ponting had committed an offence as defined by the Act and was therefore liable for trial, the person was acquitted by the jury. In India we do not always have the advantage of a jury modifying the opinion of the judge.

The author's quote of a 1960 saying by Roling from Hague Receuil deo Cours to the effect that "The way to international hell seems paved with good conventions" aptly sums up all international laws on warfare. Nevertheless, the various chapters on the practical applicability of the various articles of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the two 1977 Protocols are of great value. These chapters and the indexes reproducing the various Geneva Conventions and Protocols should be compulsory readings for not only all military officers but also for those politicians and civil servants, who have to guide the country's policies when its Armed Forces are committed to war.

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Indian Army Before Independence*

BRIG N B GRANT AVSM (RETD)

The title of the book appears to be a misnomer. The book is not a history, either of the Indian Army, or the King's enemies. Possibly, 'Snippets of the Indian Army' or 'What Made the British Indian Army Tick', would have been a more appropriate title. Throughout the book runs a central theme or a web, which tries to bring out the motivation of the Indian Army to fight for a foreign ruling power like the British. The fact that, the British had nothing in common with Indians, and that the King's enemies were by no stretch of imagination enemies of India, makes the motivation factor difficult to understand, but nevertheless fascinating to read. If Cromwell's 'Lovely Company' fought for the cause of dissent against the bishops and the republicanism against the King, and the French Revolution and Napoleon were inspired by hatred of Kings and patriotism, the Germans fought for the Kaiser or Hitler for national socialism, and the Japanese for the Emperor, the Indian soldier fought for a high esteemed calling, in which the mercenary profession not only became an honourable one, but even an enviable one.

The book gives glimpses of the organisation of the Indian Army from the initial Madras sepoys to what it was just before Independence. In this, Trench seems to think that, the object of recruiting from the 'martial class', was simply to obtain the best soldiers, and that there was no other deeper or sinister motive. He admits however, that this did distance the Indian soldier from the general population, and insulate him from nationalistic politics. A very great motivation factor was the complete and unquestioning trust that the Indian soldier had for his British officers. The latter spent all their leave periods touring the districts from which their men were recruited, and spent more than 50% of their off-duty hours playing games with their men. The officer-JCO relationship, was established by each one addressing one another as 'Sahib'. There was very little crime, in the military sense, in Indian regiments; where every man regarded it as a calling and wanted to stay on in the army as long as possible, discipline presented no great problem.

The Indian Army and the King's Enemies 1900-1947, By Charles Chenevix Trench
Published by Thames and Hudson, 30 Bloomsbury Street, London WC1B 3QP (U.K.), 1989, Pages 312, Price \$ 16.95.

The book is made up of 26 chapters, each one pertaining to a particular military period, with emphasis ranging from 1900-1945. The history of a campaign is portrayed by stories of individuals, regiments and battalions, rather than a narration of tactics and strategy. Nevertheless, at the end of it, the reader can expect to get significant information of the various operations in sufficient detail. This, I feel, is the most remarkable aspect of this book. However, while reviewing a book of this nature, it would be futile to analyse each chapter, as they consist mainly of incidents, extracts from diaries, personal relationships and attitudes. For instance, the Indian cavalry regiments are described as 'irregulars', defined by characteristics such as, (a) attitude of mind with emphasis on regimental differences and idiosyncrasies; (b) loose practical uniform on service and more splendid for ceremonial; and (c) the 'Silladar system', whereby each sawar owned the horse he rode on by paying for it. Notwithstanding this, a few examples taken from the various campaigns may help the reader to appreciate the main thrust of this book -- viz, motivation.

In World War I, the motivation of the Indian soldier was not the same as that of the frontier wars of Afghanistan and Waziristan. Whereas in the latter campaigns, he was emotionally involved, both geographically and also through blood relation, in Europe, it was mainly to fight for the King who paid him and whose salt he ate. Further, to expect the Indian Moslem troops to fight against the Sultan of Turkey, who was also the Khalif of Islam, created a psychological barrier; nevertheless once they embarked in Europe, they fought well inspite of the religious and cultural shock syndrome. In these chapters of World War I, series of combat incidents are well described, like the winning of the first VC of Sepoy Khudadad Khan, followed by a second one by Nk Dharwan Singh Negi. Although all these heroes are stuff of what legends are made of and constitute regimental history, they are all true; however, for the whole truth, one must read also diaries and letters written but not published. This is where the book scores over normal historical documents.

Another interesting observation made during World War I needs mentioning -- namely oft reported malingering of the Indian soldier. According to Trench, in this respect, the Indian soldier was no better or worse than the British and Germans, and a great deal better than the French and Belgians. However, European historians expected more of the Indian soldier, largely due to Rudyard Kipling having depicted him as a superman. Any failure attributable to him due to, (a) bitter cold in the trenches without proper clothing and acclimatisation, (b) slaughter of British officers on whom he completely relied upon, and (c) dilution of one class regiments through failure of the reserve system - perhaps a lesson for our mixed class regiment concept today.

The book goes through the above kind of observations based on incidents and diaries of campaigns in Gallipoli, East Africa, Mesopotamia, Palestine, Waziristan, the African Campaign of Eighth Army, Italy and Burma. A few examples taken from some of the above campaigns are worth mentioning. For instance, in the Palestine campaign entailing Lawrence of Arabia, although the latter had a high respect for Indian troops, yet he kept his distance. Raisildar Hasan Singh had this to say "Lawrence Sahib was a great snob; unless you were of a good family he had no use for you." In the Burma Campaign, Trench's treatment of the Indian National Army (INA) paints a picture of treachery and total disloyalty. In the African desert wars, it appears that Gen Montgomery had no time for the Indians, and if it was not Gen Tucker (a great friend of the Indians) threatening to resign, the now famous 4th Indian Division would not have fought with the Eighth Army.

This is one of the very few military books of its kind, where history is written, not on the actions of Kings, Prime Ministers, Presidents and Supreme Commanders, but based on the everyday actions and statements of the common soldier. The central theme moving throughout the book emphasises the attitudes, human relations and thought processes of the men in the trenches, rather than the grand strategies and tactics of generals in the operational rooms.

The last incident in the saga of the British Indian Army makes interesting reading. On 13 August '47, a draft of the final Army Order was sent by a staff officer to Lt Gen Sir Reginald Savory, the then Adjutant General, for his approval. There was a para therein regarding the correct postal address of Army Headquarters after Independence. Sir Savory's reaction was classic, "The draft was a model of efficient 'staff duties'. It struck me however, as showing a lack of historical perspective. This would be the final order of the British - Indian Army, and would signal the end of an era. It would be a pity if it dealt only with the minutiae of postal procedure. I took a red pencil, drew a line through the whole para, and instead wrote simply, THIS IS THE LAST INDIAN ARMY ORDER."

To conclude, this book must be read, not so much with a view to acquire knowledge of the military history of the Indian Army, but to get an insight of the essence of any military history, in this case, as to what motivated the Indian Soldier to fight for the British.

The Battle for Moscow *

MAJ GEN LACHHMAN SINGH LEHL PVSM, VrC (RETD)

Though somewhat dated 'Moscow 1941', gives a typical pattern of ground battles during World War II. The author brings out successfully the atmosphere and moods prevailing in Moscow and Berlin just before and during the early days of the Russo-German War. The book gives a useful military geopolitical introduction to European Russia and brings out the importance of Moscow as a political centre and communication hub of Central Russia. In the next chapter are the biographical sketches of the military commanders of both sides.

The author quotes Pravada's comments during August 1940, "The Non Aggression Pact has eliminated the possibility of armed conflict between Russia and Germany". He has brought out the fact that the Germans were working on a draft plan for the offensive against Russia at that very time. As late as 13 June 1941, Tass News Agency announced that all rumours concerning war with Germany were completely unfounded. No wonder that the German offensive, about a week later, achieved absolute surprise and seriously crippled the unsuspecting Russian forces.

The German blitzkrieg made good progress and the Wehrmach announced on 11 July that the Russians had lost 3332 tanks, 1809 guns and 323,898 prisoners already. Colonel General Halder, chief of General Staff of the German Army noted in his diary on 3 July, "It would probably not be an exaggeration to say that the campaign against Russia has been won within 14 days." Smolensk, approximately 300 Kilometers from Moscow, was captured by 19 July and the Luftwaffe bombed Moscow on 22 July. The achievements of the German offensive were impressive.

About this time, Hitler started playing with new ideas and on 30 July, Fueherer's HQ issued a fresh Directive laying down that the Army Group Centre was to go over to defence and the two Panzer Groups under it were to be withdrawn for replenishments. Hitler now felt that the most important objectives were Crimea and the industrial base of Donets while he rated Moscow as third in importance. The Army felt that an offensive in the South by diverting Panzer forces from the Moscow front would cost so much time

* *Moscow 1941* by Janus Piekalkiewicz, Published by Presidio Press, 31 Pamaron Way, Novato, CA94947(USA), Pages 285, Price \$ 20.00

that a winter campaign would become unavoidable. Hitler overruled the advice of the Army and on 21 August ordered a halt to the offensive against Moscow. He ordered a major offensive towards Leningrad and Donets basin and allotted Panzer Group 2 and 3 respectively in support of these operations. This decision gave the defenders of Moscow a two month respite to move reinforcements and to prepare the defences around Moscow. The war situation was aptly assessed by the Swiss Radio on 15 August, "Neither the spirit of the German offensive nor the strength of the Russian resistance has been broken."

The Germans launched their offensive in the South and encircled large forces in Kiev Sector. On 3 September, Stalin sent a message to Churchill, "without a second front and supplies of war material, the Soviet Union will be either defeated or weakened to the extent that it will lose for a long time the ability to help its allies by active operations." By 21 September, Germany had captured Kiev along with 6,65,000 prisoners, 3718 guns and 884 tanks. In the meantime, Hitler had second thoughts and had instructed Army Group Centre on 16 September to plan the capture of Moscow. On 26 September, "Operation Typhoon" for the capture of Moscow was ordered.

"Operation Typhoon" was launched on 2 October as soon as the Panzer Groups were in position. It achieved complete surprise and encircled large Russian armies. On 7 October, Stalin told Zhukov, "In the direction of Moscow, the situation has taken a turn for the worse". Zhukov was appointed commander of Moscow Front on 9 October. In the meantime, work for defence of Moscow was expedited and elements of the Siberian Army started moving towards Moscow. By the middle of October, the Germans had captured 6,73,098 prisoners and vast quantities of war equipment in the battles of the encirclements. The Head of the Moscow Party Organisation said on 13 October, "We do not want to close our eyes, Comrades. Moscow is in danger". The Germans had reached within 100 Kilometers of Moscow.

On 16 October, the foreign embassies started moving out of Moscow. Moscow was in a state of panic and full of rumours that the Party and the government were fleeing. On 18 October, the autumn rains set in and the mud made operations of any kind nearly impossible as all movements came to a stop. Then on 3 November, frost set in suddenly and movement became possible. The German troops were still in summer clothes. They planned to use this period for the offensive before the onset of winter but could not build up stocks of ammunition and fuel before 15 November.

Both sides knew the stakes and the fighting was bitter. The Germans managed to reach within 15 kilometers of Moscow by 30 November while the Russian War Cry was, "Comrades, we cannot retreat; for behind us lies

Moscow." By 1 December, the Germans had exhausted themselves.

Now it was the turn of the Russians and the Siberian Winter Army struck the exhausted Germans on 6 December. Colonel General Guderian of the 2 Panzer Group noted, "Not only has 'Operation typhoon' failed at the gates of Moscow but also 'operation Barbarossa'". The Germans reeled back under the unexpected blows of this fresh army which was equipped for winter warfare. The Germans had to concede ground despite Hitler's orders "the troops are to be forced to resist fanatically in their positions regardless" Hitler now tried to save a hopeless military situation with a simple change of commanders.

Hitler took over the High Command of the Army and removed the Commander-in Chief and dozens of senior Commanders, who, in his opinion, were not enforcing his orders fully. Colonel General Hoepner, Commander of 4 Panzer Army, when reproached by the newly appointed Army Group Commander gave a classic reply, "I have obligations that take priority over my obligations to you and to the Fuehrer. These are my obligations to the troops entrusted to me". He was removed from command and expelled from the Wehrmacht. Even the drastic mass dismissals did not deter Colonel General Model from speaking out when Hitler tried to interfere with the deployment of his troops, "Meir. Fuehrer, are you commanding the 9th Army or am I?"

The book is well researched and brings out the prevalent atmosphere of war in the opposing camps during the different stages of fighting. The maps make it easy to follow the progress of the campaign. The pictures not only make the book interesting but bring out vividly the impact of weather on the operations. The author has brought out clearly the impact of faulty decisions on the conduct of operations. The account has interesting anecdotes which bring out the professional and novel responsibilities of senior commanders in battle.

It is a book worthy of study by students of World War II and particularly those interested in the Russo-German War during 1941. The author gives an interesting comparison of the progress of the German offensive against Moscow with Napoleon's Campaign. The book will be a valuable asset in any military library.

Book Reviews

A US Foreign Policy for Asia; the 1980's and Beyond

By Raymon H Myers

Published by Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, Stanford, California, 1982, Pages 144, Price \$ 19.95.

This book deals with the super power game that goes on around, all over the globe without respite; a fascinating subject for study when one is not too closely involved.

It is a by-product of a conference convened in April 1981, at the Hoover Institute of Stanford University, where US scholars specialising in Asia, concerned at the seeming drift in foreign policy during the Carter administration, met to recommend measures that would give a fresh thrust to US foreign policy.

Two issues appear to be paramount in all US calculations -- one, the doctrine enunciated by Truman, the containment and neutralisation of Soviet influence, the other being the promotion of US influence, everywhere. The seven contributors, each an expert on a region of Asia, feel that the Soviets had stolen a march over the US in Asia, a situation that needed to be corrected. They saw the need for as much attention to be given to Asia as has been given to NATO and Western Europe. The reasons put forward are telling -- West Asia is the source of cheap and plentiful oil; Africa and Asia are the source of cheap and rare raw materials; they are potentially vast markets for the products of the US and its allies; the potential for US investment in the region, is great; besides these regions are of geostrategic importance to the countries of the Asia Pacific region which in turn are of vital importance to US security and its material well being.

To be assured of Gulf oil, the region must be held in a vice like grip. Israel, the proven and trusted dependent provides one end of the vice. Iran provided the other end in the good old days of the Shah. It has to be replaced, hence the importance of Pakistan. All undesirable elements in between have to be dealt with, however, not by direct American physical presence -- the Korean and Vietnamese experience were unpleasant.

China's usefulness has been called to question. India has been marked out for attention. In this context the word "neutralisation" has been used.

These were the suggestions. As mentioned earlier, it is worth studying what has happened during the Reagan administration to see whether the

suggestions were considered and if so what have been the effects.

A useful, if somewhat dated, book for the students of International relations, particularly for those interested in the American foreign policy in our region and how it is shaped.

-- Col. R.R. Chatterjee

SDI - What could happen

By John Rhea

Published by Stackpole Books, Cameron and Kelker Streets, P.O. Box 1831, Harrisburg, PA 17105, 1988, Pages 136, Price \$ 7.95.

"The nuclear Armageddon that mankind had feared for the past half century was over in two days. The escalating tactical nuclear war in the Middle East, which began when Israeli fighter bombers dropped nuclear bombs on 'Kiev' and 'Odessa' in retaliation for the Libyan attack on Israel, led to a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union destroyed the radar satellites of the US 'Star Wars' anti-missile system, battle managers in the American Space Station responded by directing the Kinetic energy weapons in their Satellites against the Soviet 'Fighting mirror Satellites'".

The above is a glimpse from one of the eight scenarios dealing with as to what could happen in the SDI context by the year 1997. John Rhea has written this future history, verging on Sci-fi, precariously perched on substantiated facts of the Strategic Defence Initiative-type research programmes of the two super powers. Beautifully illustrated, this book has many official photographs of the various advanced gadgetry of the SDI project of the USA and a few artist's impressions of those of the Soviets. The author has imaginatively unfolded the SDI Scenarios in appropriate and plausible political backdrops, some of which are: Russia overtaking the Japanese in the economic field as a result of perestroika; toppling of Gorbachev; overthrow of the Yugoslav government propping up of the Iranians by the Soviets; and withdrawal of all land forces from Europe by the United States in return for assured supply of Soviet oil. This technique has the advantage of having a mass appeal.

SDI necessitates the following five functions at each of the three layers (each of which would allow only approximately 10 percent of missiles to go past) against all the four points of ballistic trajectory; namely boost-phase, deployment phase, mid course phase and terminal phase:

- a) Detection of the threat (including aircraft and cruise missiles) and alerting the defence systems.

- b) Acquisition and tracking.
- c) Identification of actual threat involving discriminating of decoy.
- d) Interception and deception.
- e) Assessment.

So far the research programmes have been inhibited by the 1972 ABM Treaty; which precludes actual deployment for proper testing; as also the near-insurmountable technological hitches. Nevertheless, astronomical sums are being set aside for the SDI, for getting the world rid of the threat of nuclear holocaust. The United States and the Soviet Union are inching forward in their quest for the initiative. Space based lasers as well as those operated from ground station using 'fighting mirrors' for deflection of the laser beam are reported to have been tested. Research on Particle beam weapons capable of destroying electronics of missiles and satellites with the help of radio frequency accelerators is underway. Kinetic energy weapons using streams of minute particles of heavy metals like tungsten or molybdenum accelerated to speeds upto 25 km/sec have been tested under laboratory conditions. Space based imagery radar (teraherty) for discriminating the decoys from the killer missiles is on the drawing board. Possibly, on full development it would also pick up the 'Stealth bombers' and missiles too. Advances in fibre optics will lead to extra-super computers capable of computing complex trajectories in nano-seconds.

The SDI projects if and when perfected, within the constraints of the prevalent technology, will remain fraught with the possibilities of errors of human judgement and of course accidents owing to malfunctions. A nuclear Armageddon will always remain a possibility thus, despite the MAD and balance of terror. So why not abandon it and rechannelize the huge monetary outlays for more practicable schemes that could be beneficial to civilizations to come? Why not banish the nuclear weapons altogether? These are some of the scenarios, John Rhea unfolds.

This book should be acquired by all those interested in high-tech warfare.

-- Lt Col A.K. Sharma

Economics and Pacific Security: The 1986 Pacific Symposium

Published by National Defence University Press, Washington, D.C., 1987, Pages 260, Price not mentioned.

The dynamic economic and political development of Pacific nations has increased the importance of the region in international relations. The long term outcome of any strategic alterations can be especially difficult

to foresee in a region as large and diverse as the Pacific. Consequently, frequent analysis of the area and its future is essential.

In the article on "China and the Pacific region" Minister Zhang Zai describes how China fits into the larger picture. Sufficient economic strength provides backing for national security. What may seem today to be a sure guarantee could tomorrow be inadequate. China must achieve socialist modernisation. Top priority must be given to agriculture, industry, science and technology. From that great economic strength will flow sufficient resources for a future military take off. The old centralised direct control of the economy is being changed. China needs a long-term peaceful international environment in order to accomplish modernisation. Chinese policy is based on the following principles:-

- (a) Never to attack or foster strategic relation or to forge an alliance with any big power or bloc or powers.
- (b) To stand by other Third World nations.
- (c) To oppose hegemonism and to safeguard world peace.
- (d) To establish and develop friendly ties with all countries on the basis of five principles of peaceful co-existence.
- (e) To uphold current open policy so as to boost technological and economic exchanges and cooperation with all countries on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.

In another article on "the changing economic structures" by Dr. Stumrt Hannis, he highlights the fact that US trade with the Pacific region has exceeded trade with Europe. He also feels that in Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Philippines a major problem is internal subversion.

To achieve major military strength requires high technology and related industrial structure. In the USSR, the centre of economy is shifting to SIBERIA with its large resources of oil, natural gas and coal. The USSR is interested in containing China and limiting the linkages between China, Japan and the US.

Dr. Young-Hoon Paik writing on the Korean Economy feels that it is the fastest growing in the Pacific Basin and achieved third position in the region behind Japan and Australia. Dr. Paul Chan, in his article on "Trade Protections in the Pacific Basin" feels that China views USSR as a critical threat. To balance USSR -- Vietnam threat, China courts both the US and ASEAN. China needs US trade, investment and technologies. The outcome of China's modernisation will have a long term global significance.

The book makes it obvious that national security means not only political and military stability but also social, cultural and in particular, economic stability which is fundamental to a nations health.

-- Maj. Gen. B.D. Kale (Retd)

Choices: Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Defence Options

By Oliver Ramsbotham,

Published by - Brassey's Defence Publishers Ltd., 24 Gray's Inn Road, London WC1X 8HR -- UK, 1987, Pages 473, Price \$ 35.00

The world today has a nuclear weapon stockpile totalling some 55,000 warheads. Their approximate yield comes to 500 kgs of TNT equivalent per every single individual on this planet. It is irrelevant to even attempt to consider how many times the world can be destroyed if this capability were to be used. We are only now beginning to appreciate the delicate ecological balance of the universe. Even a few nuclear explosions may be sufficient to cause irreparable damage to this environment. The accident at Chernobyl, which was equivalent of only a few kiloton yield, is a suitable example.

It is in this background that we need to discuss the Book *Choices*. The Book attempts to take a dispassionate view of nuclear weapons and identify policy options for Great Britain and the NATO. It follows an interesting and original format which does credit to its organiser and presenter, Oliver Ramsbotham. First, he sets forth two opposite and contrary views in separate short and cogent essays. One argues "Against continued Nuclear Weapon Deployment" and the other favours deployment. Both the rational and moral aspects are examined. Next he sets forth specific questions on the different points at issue. These are in four parts: Global Policy, NATO Policy, British Policy and Recommendations. In each part he poses a number of alternate questions which he then proceeds to analyse at some length.

The opinion of the commentators are generally shaped by their belief in one of three conditions. First, whether the Warsaw Treaty forces have a near three to one superiority in conventional capability and will, therefore, launch an attack on western Europe given half a chance. This group, of course, strongly believes in nuclear deterrence and would like to strengthen it. Second condition is the belief that a general conventional balance exists where military aggression by either side becomes entirely unpredictable. Nuclear deterrence may then compound this feeling of uncertainty and may thus strengthen deterrence. Third condition is the belief that both forces

are fairly evenly balanced. In this situation there is no need to rely on nuclear deterrence to the same extent.

Another problem, which applies to this Book as well, is that the entire nuclear doctrinal question has been approached from a Western perspective and superpower confrontation. For the Third World, which now has both the ability and some compulsion to develop a similar capability, these do not necessarily apply. If the nuclear weapon has maintained the peace in Europe, and is therefore, a good thing; how is it bad for others? Should not the concept of nuclear deterrence apply here as well, where many nations fear that their conventional strength is inadequate to deal with the threats they face?

The book is a valuable addition to our understanding of the thinking behind the West's nuclear policies. Even though by itself it cannot come to any definitive conclusions, it makes an important contribution towards formulating policy options. Discerning readers in India will find much that is of value, especially the question of morality. In India we have felt that a weapon that is morally unjustifiable and whose use can have but only one consequence, that of universal destruction, is not only unnecessary but essentially evil and hence must be eliminated.

-- Brig D Bannerjee

Books Published by the Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, California-94720

1. **The Vietnamese Tradition of Human Rights**
By Ta Van Tai, 1988 *Pages 292 Price \$ 17.00*
2. **Pacific-Asian Issues: American and Chinese Views**
Edited by Robert A. Scalapino and Chen Qimao, 1986, *Pages 289 Price \$ 20.00*
3. **Asia and the Major Powers: Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy, 1988, Pages 386, Price \$ 20.00**
4. **Asian Communism-Continuity and Transition**
Edited by Robert A. Scalapino and Dalchoong Kim, 1988 *Pages 364, Price \$ 20.00*
5. **Korea- U.S. Relations: The Politics of Trade and Security**, Edited by Robert A. Scalapino and Hongkoo Lee, 1988, *Pages 239, Price \$ 17.00*
6. **Thailand - U.S. Relations Changing Political, Strategic and Economic Factors** edited by Anil Ramsay and Wiwat Mungkandi, 1988, *Pages 335, Price \$ 20.00*

The Institute of East Asian Studies was established at the University of California in fall 1978 to promote research and teaching on the cultures and societies of China, Japan, and Korea and contains the following research centres and programmes namely, centre of Chinese, Japanese, Korean studies, group in Asian studies, East Asia national research centre and Indo-China Studies project. The publication series sponsored by the Institute include - Research papers and policy studies series and monographs series under which the above books have been published.

The Indo-China research monograph on "*Vietnamese tradition of Human Rights by Ta Van Tai*, (Research associate of Harvard law school) encompasses not only the legal, social, political history of Vietnam but also the human Rights issue debated in contemporary law.

He brings to us a new understanding of the foundation of one important traditional Asian Society, a society deeply influenced by Confucian ethos common to its region and yet with its own special traits.

The study presents details on important aspects of life in traditional Vietnamese society and state that are rarely available in general history books. It points out the interaction between law and politics and the economic and social rights that were surprisingly, enforceable even in a country with a primarily agricultural economy.

The author concludes by saying that, the legal norms and practices of traditional Vietnam even centuries ago, adhered to many of today's international human rights standard.

The essays in '*Pacific-Asian issues: American and Chinese views*, Edited by Robert A. Scalapino and Chen Qimao, take the reader into domestic arena of Asian States, while discussing their economic and political importance in the global context. Other issues which are highlighted by different authors include -- the growing importance of Japan, superpower struggle for military superiority in Asia and Pacific, Role of International Trade in shaping South East Asian countries.

The main problem of Japanese foreign policy is 'Educational' says Charmels Johnson, while discussing Japan's Foreign Policy. Other issues which are highlighted include chapters on India and Pakistan and their relation with East Asian countries and the USA and Soviet Union. The policy options available to these two South Asian States in the context of the involvement of External powers in the region is given in depth.

All these essays give a detailed analysis of the emerging trends in Asia-Pacific region.

One important determinant of Foreign Policy of a nation is its domestic element -- politics, society, etc. The relationship between the domestic politics of a society and its Foreign policy involves at least three significant and inter-related variables. It is around this theme that foreign policy of each Asian State is discussed in '*Asia and major powers: Domestic politics and Foreign policy*' Edited by Robert A. Scalapino Seizaburosato, Jusuf Wanandi and Sung-joo Hais.

Many essays in this volume make clear, that governance in much of Asia remains highly personalised, with political institutions, fragile and subject to easy manipulation. It is within this broad context that the foreign policy of contemporary Asian nations are constructed and changed. Specific cases are discussed, along with India and Pakistan providing the reader with abundance knowledge of foreign policy making.

The foundation of communism lay in theories of Marxism modified and applied by Lenin. The fascination involved in exploring Asian Communist states in the volume on '*Asian Communism: Continuity and Transition*, Edited by Robert A. Scalapino and Dalchoong Kum' lies in comparing the mix of continuity and change that makes each society (Asian).

The main component of communism -- 'ideology' has been discussed, while comparing the role status of ideology in different Asian Leninist societies. This comparative study helps the reader to conclude that Leninism both in its native land and in Asia is struggling to leave the monarchist tradition behind and find safe ways of sharing and distributing power. The health of South Korea -- US relations will depend very much upon whether democratization proceeds smoothly and whether the US continues to play a positive role in that process is the main theme of the book "*Korea-US Relations*" -- *the politics of Trade and Security*: Edited by Robert A. Scalapino and Hong Koo Lee.

The essays that follow, apart from discussing the effect of Korean domestic politics in 80s on Korea-US relations, also discuss the economic conditions and issues, and security relationship. Essays in this volume were prepared for the second US-Korea Bilateral Forum sponsored by the Institute of East Asian Studies.

In the Volume, '*Thailand-US Relations: Changing political, strategic and Economic factors*, Edited by Anil Ramsay and Wiwat Meeingkandi, elements of common interests between both countries are identified. Authors agree that political and security relations between these two countries are very close and also share a common perception of security issues. They foresee that the issues which may become contentious between both countries, include:

- 1) Future acceptable settlement on Cambodia
- 2) Soviet presence in South East Asia

The concluding chapters, discuss the trade relations, and identify that protectionist measures by the US are damaging Thailand's progress for continued economic progress. Thus the responsibility for addressing many of the problems of trade turbulence between both the countries depends much on Thailand's government.

One can conclude, after reading these books that, there is an element of depth while exploring South-East Asian countries and they provide the reader the basic tools for research and are useful for not only research scholars, but also historians, lawyers, social scientists to continue further study of an area which is of growing importance in the context of strategic significance of Asian-Pacific region.

-- G. Satyawati J.N.U.

New Aspects of Naval History: Selected Papers from the 5th Naval History Symposium Ed.

By The Department of History, US Naval Academy,
*Published by the Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America,
Baltimore, Maryland, USA, 1985, Pages 213, Price not mentioned.*

As the name suggests, the contributors of various papers throw light on the new aspects of the Naval History bringing out some very valid points from which a number of lessons can be learnt.

The first two chapters cover the deficiencies in the study of Naval History. As is known, not much attention has been paid to Naval History by the public outside the naval circles particularly by the universities. The contributions by eminent naval personalities are overlooked even though they contributed immensely to the nation's development. This leads to prejudices towards the naval profession.

The next two papers give the naval activities in the era before Christ in the island of Greece. These papers give details of their command and control system under civilian power of the democratic set up for the selection of naval commanders for specific operational requirements.

The paper on ship design deals with the ship construction in the early ages and how the knowledge of mathematics and science changed the design concept gradually and how Italy emerged as a leading sea power in the medieval age.

The papers on the French Naval officer Corps during the seven years war and the development of organisational structure of medical men and the naval surgeons of the US Navy in the naval operations and statistical studies of various diseases plus findings and preventive cure is of interest from a historical angle only.

The paper on the Old Navy and the social change in the Royal Navy during the period 1780-1860 covering the aspects of Discipline Punishment and Authority is an outstanding contribution. This paper also gives various systems which were in vogue, why they were introduced and subsequently changed and developed to make the Royal Navy a most effective organisation. These days when social changes are taking place due to the impact of technological development and speed of communication, the study of this outstanding paper would be of value to make contribution in the development of an organisation. This paper should be read by all service officers in particular the naval officers as it establishes a deep relationship between discipline, good administration and operational commitments.

In other papers, there is a discussion on the value of Journalism in maritime affair, role of Japanese Navy in the Pacific, U-Boat operation in the Atlantic, and the decline of the great Royal British Navy.

In peace time a navy generally concentrates on building of major warships with limited ships in support of main battle group. The need for a large number of smaller ships like the destroyers for escort and ASW duties and other activities need consideration. The paper on Destroyer for Mobilisation examines the debate of "High-low" option.

This book is of great value as each paper has been written after thorough research. It is a Must for all libraries. Its study by officers of all the services would help in their development. Consideration should be given to include this book as part of Naval Training for the growth of the naval officers. Journalists can also benefit if they intend to write on naval matters.

-- Captain C.M. Vyas NM Indian Navy (Retd)

The Marine Officer's Guide (5th Edition)

By Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth W. Estes

Published by Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland (USA), 1985, Pages 523, Price not mentioned.

The book is a unique source of information and an excellent guide for all US Marine Corps Officers.

To educate the newly commissioned officers, the author has devoted the first five chapters on the "US Marine Corps (What it is and what it stands for), The Organisation of National Security, The Department of the Navy, The Missions and Status of the Marine Corps and Organisation of the Marine Corps."

In the sixth chapter, the author traces the history of the US Marine Corps from its inception in 1775 with two Marine Battalions to a full fledged organisation with its own Marine Corps Aviation today. It also gives the part played by the corps in the two World Wars, the Wars in Korea, Vietnam and other theaters.

The remaining chapters deal with subjects like Customs and Traditions, Ceremonials, Honours and Awards, Administration, Pay and Allowances, Leadership, House Keeping, Military Justice, Personal Affairs etc.

The book has covered all the above aspects in great detail and nothing which a Marine Officer should know has been left out. The author has gone into minute details like how to salute, how to enter a commanding officer's room, use of telephone, the procedure for reporting on board a ship, ward room etiquettes etc.

In a book of this nature the matters relating to personal affairs are usually overlooked. The author is to be complimented for giving in clear and concise form wealth of information on various insurances, survival benefits, social security, medicare, travel etc. Otherwise an officer has to search for this information in the various Rules and Regulations which are not usually compiled in one book. Armed with this information, an officer is in a position to firstly plan his personal affairs and secondly know what to do in case of a calamity.

The chapter on Leadership is thought provoking. It gives in a simple language the attributes of a Marine Officer, the Dos' and Dont's, how to deal with the subordinates etc. The observation about RHIP (Rank has its privileges) is both appropriate and interesting. This chapter should be read and re-read by the Marine Officers who inspire to reach higher ranks.

Though a little voluminous, an informative and well presented book which should be a proud possession of every Marine Corps Officer irrespective of his rank.

-- Captain R.P. Khanna AVSM
Indian Navy (Retd)

Yashimoto's Last Dive

By Antony Trew

Published in paperback by FONTANA, Box 29, Douglas Isle of Man, 1987, Pages 287. Price \$ 2.95.

This book is trying to do many things. The wonderful thing is that mostly it fails. Antony Trew, the author, has previously written two well received books and if only he had left this one unwritten, his record might have been unblemished. But he did and unfortunately, I can't conceive of anyone wanting to actually buy this book (that presumably is what makes a best seller) besides libraries of course.

The Second World War, it is generally agreed, was a terrible thing. So, it is unfair, that those who weren't around should be given these ambiguous accounts of it. The tale could be about:-

- a) A submarine
- b) Yashimoto -- the Captain of the submarine.
- c) Restless -- an American vessel.
- d) Baratt -- the Captain of Restless
- e) The Chase between the two.

The fairest choice would be (b) because the book is titled after this character -- an austere, almost cruel taskmaster with a penchant for asking the time of moonset or moonrise. Not that he doesn't know, just a sadistic diversion, a trap in case the junior officer doesn't know. But whether the book really endorses all this, is dubious. I cannot find any evidence of a consistent or developing attitude towards Yashimoto. As opposed to this you have a somewhat crude representation of the crude Americans -- the good guys, yes; heroes, yes; but they must speak unheroically -- "you can't make an omelette without eggs" This we presume is the required touch of realism provided.

Neither one can find any marvellous heights being scaled in writing style. There is the rare interestingly put image "the cultars scarcely described a gleaming arc, the *dull thud of clearance* scarcely audible as the prisoner's head fell -- " along with absurd ones like -- " the sea was in turmoil, pieces of wreckage, jets fuel oil and water, and great bubbles of air bursting to the surface with obscene, plops".

All about a submarine chase, this book says very little and tells very little. Highly forgettable, it may hold you, or it may not.

-- Col. Narender Singh.

Jane's Infantry Weapons 1987-88 & 1988-89, 13th & 14th Edition.

By Ian V Hogg

Pub. by Jane's Publishing Co. Ltd., 238 City Road, London EC1V 2PU (UK)

The Jane's Infantry Weapons is a store house of knowledge and a remarkable collection of information regarding infantry weapons the world over. It is also a study in the trends and pattern of development of infantry weapons in various countries. Each section is a volume by itself with self descriptive notes, diagrams and attractive photographs. The size and the volumes of the edition should not deter a reader, once he will open these editions, he will find them highly absorbing and interesting.

Thirteenth Edition 1987/88 has some 1009 pages and includes a foreword by the editor which summarises important trends in infantry weapons as seen in 1987/88. Broadly, the sections have been divided into 'Target Weapons', 'Area Weapons', Anti Tank and Anti Air Craft Weapons. There are separate sections on developments in electronics, optics, training aids, simulators and body armour. Information on weapons which are considered obsolete in developed countries, but still very much in use in some under developed countries, has also been included in the edition. One wonders where does the ammunition and spare parts come from since their production has long been stopped in the countries of their origin.

A new development of interest has been in the 9 mm semi automatic folding weapons which have been provided with a long barrel and therefore resemble a sub-machine gun. Description of a grenade of original design developed in the USSR with an aluminium casing will be found on page 996. The designs and new trends of Chinese small arms will be of special interest, although many of these are copies of European weapons.

Fourteenth Edition 1988/89 is somewhat slimmer as it has only 765 pages. The volume still has some 1577 entries including 60 new ones. The weapons systems have been catalogued somewhat differently in that the weapons have been categorised under the headings of 'Personal weapons', 'Area weapons', 'Crew served weapons'. Ammunition and ancillaries have been grouped separately.

Editor's comments on the development of new anti tank weapons that 'give him some thing like M72, AT4 or Panzerfaust, with which he can deal with light armour and leave the MBT to the weapons which can demonstrate their ability to kill with one shot', will be of interest. It has also been suggested that "an effective response of reactive armour might be to use

a fuel air explosive in such a manner that it detonates the entire carapace of reactive armour at once”.

Information on 'Black Kalashnikov' which has been seen on PAK-Afghan border would also be of interest. The origin of this rifle, which has a finish of black plastic furniture and black metal is still obscure.

Information on Chinese AK based Bullpup rifle would indicate the current trends and thinking in the Peoples Liberation Army. Several other details on developments of Chinese infantry weapons which will be of special interest will be found on pages 135 to 137.

Some other new entries which will interest many readers are, 'Baar Trap' anti personnel mine, the Lietz Elcan rifle sight and Chinese type 77 Machine gun.

-- Maj. Gen. Afsir Karim AVSM (Retd)

The Patkoi Nagas

By Maj Gen S C Sardeshpande

Pub. by Daya Publishing House, 1302, Vaid Wara, Nai Sarak, Delhi - 6, 1987, Pages 200, Price Rs 225.

The book is based on the author's personal experiences and as DIG, Assam Rifles, the author attempts an anthropological cum historical research. It also delves into the tribal culture of the Khamungans of the Konyak tribe of Mon district of Nagaland. While Christianity, modernisation, and the general awakening brought about by interaction with the rest of the country have brought the rest of the Naga tribes out of the bush, the Khamungans, nonetheless, have been fairly slow in this regard. If modernisation and development continue to maintain their present pace, they too would join the national main stream in the near future.

Konyaks, as known are the largest group of Naga tribes and if combined with their country cousins -- the Konyaks in Burma -- they would outdo any other tribal group in number and perhaps, richness of culture and quality of life.

The book is richly illustrated and well researched, though perhaps a little expensive at Rs 225 a copy. Students and research scholars with interest in the North-East region of India would find the book useful.

-- Brig. Chandra B Khanduri

The German Military in the Age of Total War

By Wilhelm Deist, with a foreword by Paul Kennedy.

Published by Berg Publishers Ltd., 24 Binswood Avenue, Leamington Spa, Warwickshire, CV 32 5sQ, U.K., 1985, Pages 362, Price \$ 24.50.

Military History has traditionally concentrated around great campaigns and the exploits of the great captains. Now the trend is to analyse the political ethos, economic constraints, social class relations and conflicts as well as technical advances which form the background to war. The theme of this book, therefore, is "War and Society" in relation to the German Armed Forces leading upto and including the Second World War. The articles are written by German scholars who are members of the German Military History Research Office, and the information is gleaned from records at the Federal Military Archives Freiburg.

In the context of Germany between the two wars the external and internal enemies of the Reich are dealt with in detail. The rise of the industrial working class contributed significantly to the class conflicts and chaos which eventually led to the rise of Hitler, and the decline in prestige of the German Army with which Hitler never really felt at ease. A vast change from the period 1871 -- 1914 when it was said that "Germany is not a state with an army but an army with a state"

The saga of the restoration of German pride culminating in the theory of race ideology, by the relentless pursuit of revisionism (of the Versailles Treaty), the desire for Lebensraum through the elimination of Bolshevik Russia, is covered in depth. So intense was Hitler's desire to establish a continental empire by expanding East that in his overall strategy he considered the war against Britain and France to be in the nature of flank protection actions. His Naval and Mediterranean strategy fitted in with this concept.

Other interesting articles are the ones relating to the Briand-Kellogg no-war pact of 1928; the debate on the use of chemical warfare; the waffne (armed) SS-Hitler and Himmler's trusted political army; the Blitz strategy or non strategy?; inherent weakness of the Luftwaffe and the innovation of including political offences in the revised German Military Law. It is interesting to note that between 1939 and 1944 there were, 9,732 death sentences carried out in the German army as against 40 in the British and about 100 in the French armies. The German war machine was not all what it was made out to be.

An absorbing collection of essays which offer guidelines for the study

of history of the German national state which has been determined to a large extent by the sword. Though many central themes of war and society have been covered, yet more areas remain for possible research such as the educational system, the control of public opinion and effects of the activities of the military on the economic and social conditions in the country. Hitler had to take into consideration what general Groener realised in 1916, that the war could not be won against the workers, and what Ludendorff had understood in the summer of 1918, that a war could not be conducted against the will of the mass of ordinary soldiers.

-- Maj Gen R L Chopra PVSM .(Retd)

The Road to Sedan: The French Army 1866-70

By Richard Holmes.

Published by -- Swift Printer (Publishing) Ltd. for the Royal Historical Society, London ECI -- (U.K.), 1984, Pages 272, Price not mentioned.

The study deals with the period, when Emperor Louis Napoleon III, was the Commander-in-Chief of the French army. His good intentions and hard work could not compensate for his incapacity, when facing the Prussian army of 1870. What led to the defeat of an army which was considered by many, as the most powerful force in Europe? The author deals with the study in two parts. The military structure, deals with the military institutions of France; the combatant arms, command, staff, administration and composition of the army. The second part, doctrine, deals with politics, security, strategy, road to war, education, training and tactics. A study which has been a favourite of many writers. Unfortunately post-defeat atmosphere did not encourage logical evaluation but only the finding of a scapegoat.

An aftermath of war, specially a shattering defeat should lead to a critical analysis and become the basis of tactical training of the post-war French army. Unfortunately, as events became distorted by historiography, so the new tactics became increasingly unrealistic.

The French army was mainly a conscript army. The officer cadre came from the ranks except those who could afford to pay for the training at the military academy. Of the teeth arms, artillery and engineers were the specialist arms; their officers were mainly academy trained and had a tangible ascendancy over their less educated colleagues from the infantry and cavalry. In 1859, Napoleon remarked that if one wants something done, only the officers of the specialist arms are capable of doing it.

The low status of the army within the French society contributed to

problems of recruitment and morale and a large number of officers resigned after joining. The education and training of the officers was also sketchy. All these were the major structural defects on the eve of the Franco-Prussian war. Due to lack of training, full use could not be made of the breech loading rifle, with a longer range, higher rate of fire and greater accuracy. The cavalry drills were outmoded, the Battery Commander exercised full control over the artillery and engaged targets of his choice. In brief, each combatant arm failed to meet the challenge posed by the fire power revolution. The French artillery as it failed to concentrate, proved incapable of defending other arms against omni-present might of the Prussian guns; the gunner proved the master of the battlefield.

The author has been critical and frank, in bringing out the defects of the French military system and says that the war was lost not so much on the battlefield at Sedan and Metz as in the French Cabinet, Ministry of War, the academics and the regiments. A useful study both for our military planners and politicians, who guide and control the destiny of the army. We must plan now, lest we suffer from the same defects as before October 1962.

-- Brig Y.P. Dev (Retd)

Regiments of the Empire: A bibliography of their Published Histories, Comp.
By Roger Perkins.

Published by Roger Perkins, PO Box 29, Newton Abbot, Devon TQ 12 1XU (UK) 1989, Pages 382, Price \$ 24.50.

This book is much more than a Bibliography. It gives details of the publications, the authors and a brief summary of the contents of the books. It is encyclopedic in its scope and encompasses all Regimental Corps and even Armed Police units of the British Empire. It is well laid out, indexed and most informative, is an excellent reference book and a gold mine for anyone doing research in Military History. A must for any library.

-- Lt. Gen K P Candeth, PVSM (Retd)

Brigades of the British Army 1939-45, Pages 89, Price \$ 4.95

Divisions of the British Army 1939-45, Pages 85, Price \$ 4.95

Both books compiled and Published By Malcom A. Bellis, 10 White Hart Lane, Wistaston, Crewe Cheshire CW 28EX, 1986.

As the titles indicate, these two booklets cover in much detail the order of battle of divisions and brigades from 1939 to 1945. Obviously a

labour of love, they show painstaking care and accuracy, the result of careful research through records. The books are complementary in that the first gives details of Brigaded units and the second follows with supporting arms and services of the division. There are organisational charts in both to describe the changes during the war years and tables of changing locations with different divisional and brigade headquarters by dates.

The booklets are of value to those researching into units and formations and their history during the last world war; they are comprehensive, easy to follow and give black and white illustrations of formation insignia.

-- Tindi

From Sepoy to Subedar: being the life and adventures of Subedar Sita Ram, a native officer of the Bengal Army, Written and related by himself
By James Lunt

Published in paperback by PAPERMAC: a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, 4 Little Essex Street, London, WC 2R 3 LF, 1988, Pages 186, Price \$ 6.95

This book is an autobiography written in Hindi in 1861 by Sita Ram, a sepoy of the British Indian Army who joined it in 1812 in the service of the East India Company and later rose to the highest rank possible, that of a Subedar, before he retired in 1860. During these 48 long years of service Sita Ram saw action in wars with the Gorkhas, Sikhs, Afghans and the Pindaris. He was wounded seven times and decorated with six medals. He was taken prisoner in the famous British retreat from Afghanistan. Subsequently in the Mutiny of 1857, which he describes as the "Wind of Madness: and in which he remained characteristically "true to his salt".

The book was originally translated from Hindi into English by Lt Col James Thomas Norgate and published in 1873. Eventually it became a standard text book for British Officers serving in India. The present edition has been re-edited and annotated by Major General James Lunt and contains a vivid account of the life and times of Indian sepoys serving in the British Indian Army of the Nineteenth Century. It is also well illustrated with several maps and life-sketches.

Philip Mason in his book "A Matter of Honour" describes the memoirs of Subedar Sita Ram as the only first-hand evidence of the life of a sepoy and commenting on the doubts raised about its authenticity he says, "There is a strong balance of probability that Norgate did persuade Sita Ram to

write down what he remembered, and Sita Ram, I regard in general as a credible witness".

The book is a virtual feast for anyone interested in the history of the Indian Army under the British Indian Empire. It gives a first-hand account of various wars fought during early nineteenth century between the British in India and the Afghans, Gorkhas, Sikhs and the Pindaris.

Sita Ram's account of these campaigns provides an excellent example of the attitude of the Indian sepoys towards their master, the great Company Bahadur, and the British Officers who led them. Commenting on the rule of the Company and later the British Government, Sita Ram had this to say in his concluding remarks:

"Our learned men had told us that the Company's rule would come to an end in 1857, since this was one hundred years after the Company's first great battle, but they did not tell us that another kind of English rule would take its place. This rule was far harder and much harsher. The Company Bahadur and its Officers were much kinder to the people of India than the present government."

This view of Sita Ram was admirably expressed in the marching-song of the Bombay Army.

"Kabhi sukh aur Kabhi Dukh
Angrez ka Naukar"

("Sometimes pleasure, sometimes pain,
In the service of the English")

-- N B S

Letters to the Editor

Letters are invited on subjects which have been dealt in the Journal, or which are of general interest to the services

I

USI JOURNAL: APRIL-JUNE 1989

Sir,

I want to thank you for sending me the Journal which provides some very interesting reading particularly in these rather distant surroundings. I am sure Vice Admiral Mookerjee's article will stimulate goodly discussion among the time honoured naval 'adversaries'. Incidentally, with reference to Brig Grant's article on Colonel Commandants (with which I am in full agreement), I think I'm right in saying that the Army adopted Police rank badges after Independence and not the other way around. With only a touch of 'tongue in cheek' perhaps COAS would like to look at adopting a variant of the Air Force/Navy rank badges for the Army. It would certainly make for much improvement in 'relativity' questions.

Arun Singh
Former Minister of State
for Defence

II

NAVAL DEBATE

Sir,

I would like to congratulate Vice Admiral Subimal Mookerjee, PVSM AVSM (Retd) and my able friend Brigadier N.B. Grant, AVSM (Retd) on their articles "Indian Naval Development - Need for Review and Navy's Blue Water Obsession" which appeared in the April-June, 1989 and July-September, 1989 issues of the USI Journal respectively. Both these articles question the wisdom of the Indian Navy planners to build their navy around Carrier Task Forces. As a blue water Naval Salt I would like to add my weight to the weighty arguments so ably put forward by both the above authors and to indicate that another old Sea Dog strongly supports the views expressed.

The role of Aircraft Carriers has been a matter of acute controversy from the closing stages of World War I when they made their operational debut. In the nuclear age, changing technology has meant that this is still very much the case.

The high cost of an aircraft carrier is a function of the size of the hull and the sophistication of the aircraft. The aircraft are expensive, for the same reasons all the aircraft are, but the carrier based aircraft suffer two basic disadvantages. Firstly, the special considerations for operating them on board necessitate special design. Secondly, the number of carrier based aircraft operated, ordered and built is typically smaller than equivalent land based aircraft. For both reasons, their unit cost tends to be higher.

Because of the geographical position of India and its potential enemies, the reconnaissance and air strikes can be accomplished by shore-based aircraft maintained and operated by the Indian Navy. These, for the same functional requirements would be much cheaper.

One more aspect has to be taken into consideration. Although an aircraft carrier may have an increased fire power, because of its size it presents a larger target. As such, it is easier to be detected and is very vulnerable. With the advent of sophisticated missiles, some with nuclear warheads and very reliable detection systems, the safety of an aircraft carrier can never be guaranteed. Can a poor country like India afford to lose such an expensive ship and be ridiculed by the countries all over the world?

I would like to emphasize another important aspect. This is the need to have requisite support for the ships which the Indian Navy has. While an aircraft carrier is a show piece, it is vital that the existing fleet is well maintained and supported. The ships of today are very sophisticated. The more technologically advanced a ship is, the higher the maintenance task and the down time. There are many situations where only the best available will do. A one per cent a month engine failure rate will be accepted for a Delhi Transport Undertaking bus but not airliners. A submarine will probably get one chance only to sink a surface target, so its torpedoes must be as effective as possible.

The Indian Navy has at present about 19 conventional submarines and one nuclear powered. It is understood that for the last so many years, there has been no Submarine Rescue Vessel. It is only very recently, one Diving Support Vessel has been taken on charter from a dockyard. The reasons for the Indian Navy not acquiring its own Submarine Rescue Vessel, I presume is the lack of funds. All the money in the kitty was spent on Virat

and the plans to build another aircraft carrier indigenously. While the former is a very important though invisible requirement, the later gives only false prestige to the Indian Navy. Possibly, the decision to acquire Virat and building another carrier indigenously was taken by senior aviators at the helm of affairs at that time and because of their bias towards the aviation branch.

I entirely agree with Admiral Mookerjee that what the Indian Navy needs today is surface ships in the form of frigates, destroyers, Mine Sweepers, Mine Hunters, Fast Patrol Boats etc., with advanced weapon and communication equipment. To this are to be added Attack and Hunter Killer submarines, some coastal, shore based long range surveillance and strike aircraft. Besides we must have adequate maintenance and support organisation both ashore and afloat so that every ship which goes out to sea is fully supported and is operational so that the story of kukri is not repeated.

Captain R.P. Khanna, AVSM
Indian Navy (Retd)

III

TRAINING OF OFFICERS

Sir,

With the Defence Services having the latest in modern technology for every day use in combat, be it on board computers, lasers for ranging, advanced radar for search guidance of missiles, Electronic Warfare, the personnel specially officers who handle and employ them, perforce must have a technical background to know its capabilities and limitations and for rectifying minor defects.

The US Armed Forces realising this have restructured their training of Officer Cadets by having technical subjects obligatory and part of the curriculum at the various Service Academies. All cadets on commissioning receive a Degree in Engineering/Science and not Humanities. Over 50% of the officers commissioned from the Service academies are encouraged to go on and do their Master's Degree and a few about 3 to 5% obtain a Doctors degree mostly from prestigious universities like Stanford, some of them in humanities or management studies.

All US astronauts who are Service officers are Combat pilots who possess a doctorate in Engineering/Science. The head of their Defence Research & Development is always a Service Officer and that too of the Combat Arms/Captains of ships/combat pilots. All decisions are taken by Service Officers at all levels though there are innumerable civilian scientists

also. The same rule applies for Defence Inspection where again it is an officer of the Combat Arms who heads the organisation and decision at all levels made by Service Officers for they best know the requirements and implications of having faulty equipment under combat conditions.


Here in India, due to lack of technical knowledge, it is usually a Technical officer, not an officer of the Combat Arms, who is with the DRDO/Defence Inspection. Again in both these organisations a lot of top jobs at vital decision making levels are held by Civilian Scientists who have little knowledge of the requirements under Combat conditions.

It is about time we restructured our Officer training, specially, at the various Service academies to meet the requirement of technically aware officers who will be able to handle and put to efficient use the highly sophisticated equipment available with the Services.

It may be interesting to note that equestrian classes are no longer obligatory at the US Military Academy, West Point, and the stables have been converted into Computer Classrooms!

P.M. Ravindran
Lt. Col. (Retd)

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
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